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Saturday, September 18, 2010

The 2010 Divorce Reform Amendments

The 2010 Divorce Reform Amendments

By Joel R. Brandes, Bari Brandes Corbin and Evan B. Brandes

The 2010 Session of the legislature has resulted in legislation that is intended to bring significant reform New York’s divorce process, increase the amount of temporary maintenance awards, and compel New York court to promptly make counsel and expert fee awards to the non-monied spouse. The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with a clear and concise explanation of the 2010 Divorce Reform Amendments, including the new Temporary Maintenance Guidelines which are codified in new Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][5-a]. However, it does not contain an extensive discussion of the Temporary Maintenance Guidelines. For a comprehensive discussion of the Temporary Maintenance Guidelines we refer you to the "Guide to the Temporary Maintenance Guidelines", written by Joel R. Brandes, which comes with The New York Divorce and Family Law™ Temporary Maintenance Calculator.

Laws of 2010, Ch 384, effective October 12, 2010, amended Domestic Relations Law § 170 to add subdivision 7. It adopts the “irretrievably broken” no-fault divorce ground for New York. However, a divorce may not be granted until all of the major ancillary issues are resolved by the parties or the court.

Laws of 2010, Ch 371, effective October 12, 2010, amends Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6] to add a subdivision 5-a. It revises the process for setting awards of temporary maintenance during the pendency of a matrimonial action, by creating a formula and list of factors that presumptively govern such awards. It amends Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][a] to update the definition of “maintenance” by cross-referencing it to Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] subdivision 5-a and amends Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6] to add 5 new factors for the court to consider in determining the amount and duration of “post-divorce “maintenance.

Laws of 2010, Ch 329, as amended by Laws of 2010, Ch 415, effective October 12, 2010) amended Domestic Relations Law §§ 237 and 238 to create a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. It adds actions to obtain maintenance or distribution of property after a foreign judgment of divorce to the actions for which such fees shall be awarded. In exercising the court's discretion, the court is required to seek to assure that each party is adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. In addition the court is authorized to order expert fees to be paid by one party to the other to enable the party to carry on or defend the action. The parties and their attorneys are also required to submit an affidavit to the court with financial information to enable the court to make its determination. The monied spouse is now required to disclose how much he has agreed to pay and how much he has paid his attorney. The affidavit must include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses. In addition, Domestic Relations Law § 238 was also amended to add to the actions for which such fees shall be awarded “actions to enforce a court order”.


Domestic Relations Law § 170

Domestic Relations Law § 170 was amended to allow a judgment of divorce to be granted to either a husband or a wife without assigning fault to either of the parties. A divorce can only be granted after the major ancillary issues have been resolved. Section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law was amended by adding subdivision 7 allowing a divorce where a marriage is ‘irretrievably broken”, for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath. It would appear that the verified complaint should suffice for this purpose. The statute does not define the terms ‘irretrievably broken, nor does it eliminate the five year statute of limitations in Domestic Relations Law § 210. The judgment can only be granted after the following ancillary issues have been resolved: the equitable distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and expert fees and expenses, and custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage.


Section 170 (7) of the domestic relations law provides as follows:

(7) The relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath. No judgment of divorce shall be granted under this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties or determined by the court and incorporated into the judgment of divorce.


Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][5-a]

Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1] was amended by adding a new subdivision 5-a establishing a process for determining the presumptive amount of temporary maintenance awards, with factors for deviation, where the award is unjust or inappropriate. Laws of 2010, Ch 371, §1 . The amendments took effect immediately except for sections one, two and four, which all take effect on October 12, 2010 and apply to matrimonial actions commenced on or after the effective date of such sections. Laws of 2010, Ch 371, § 6.

The application of the temporary maintenance guidelines (“TMG”) is mandatory. In any matrimonial action the court must make its award for temporary maintenance pursuant to the provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 236[B], [5-a], except where the parties have entered into an agreement pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 236 [B][3] providing for maintenance. Domestic Relations Law § 236[B],[5-a][a]. The application temporary maintenance guidelines will only result in a maintenance award when there is an income gap between the two parties so that the payee’s income (the less-monied spouse) income is less than two thirds of the payor’s income (more monied spouse). For example, if the payor's annual income is $90,000 a year, the TMG will only result in an award if the payee's annual income is less than $60,000.

To determine the temporary maintenance guideline amount, the court must compare two calculations of the spouses' annual incomes, up to an income cap of $500,000 on the payor’s income. For both of these calculations, any income of the payor that exceeds $500,000 is not included.

Calculation (1): 30% of the payor's income minus 20% of the payee's income,

OR

Calculation (2): 40% of the combined income of the two spouses. The payee's income is then subtracted from this figure.

The sum of this calculation is the Presumptive award. The court must select the lesser of these two figures as the temporary maintenance guideline amount.

The court must order the presumptive award of temporary maintenance, unless the court finds that the presumptive award is unjust or inappropriate. Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][5-a][e][1].

Where the court finds that the presumptive award is unjust or inappropriate, it may adjust the presumptive award of temporary maintenance accordingly based upon consideration of 17 factors.

If the payor has an annual income exceeding $500,000, the judge may adjust the amount based upon the additional income over $500,000. The court must consider 19 factors to determine any additional amount of temporary maintenance on the payor's income above the $500,000 cap.

The duration of the temporary award is determined solely by considering the length of the marriage. Historically, temporary awards were made during the entire pendency of the action. This new language indicates that it was the intention of the legislature to give the court discretion to award temporary maintenance for a limited period of time, rather than for the entire pendency of the action.

The temporary maintenance guidelines also include protections for individuals whose annual income is less than the self-support reserve.

Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][5-a] provides:

5-a. Temporary maintenance awards.

a. Except where the parties have entered into an agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part
providing for maintenance, in any matrimonial action the court shall
make its award for temporary maintenance pursuant to the provisions of
this subdivision.

b. For purposes of this subdivision, the following definitions shall
be used:

(1) "Payor" shall mean the spouse with the higher income.
(2) "Payee" shall mean the spouse with the lower income.
(3) "Length of marriage" shall mean the period from the date of
marriage until the date of commencement of action.
(4) "Income" shall mean:
(a) income as defined in the child support standards act and codified
in section two hundred forty of this article and section four hundred
thirteen of the family court act; and
(b) income from income producing property to be distributed pursuant
to subdivision five of this part.
(5) "Income cap" shall mean up to and including five hundred thousand
dollars of the payor's annual income; provided, however, beginning Janu-
ary thirty-first, two thousand twelve and every two years thereafter,
the payor's annual income amount shall increase by the product of the
average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all
urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States department of
labor bureau of labor statistics for the two year period rounded to the
nearest one thousand dollars. The office of court administration shall
determine and publish the income cap.
(6) "Guideline amount of temporary maintenance" shall mean the sum
derived by the application of paragraph c of this subdivision.
(7) "Guideline duration" shall mean the durational period determined
by the application of paragraph d of this subdivision.
(8) "Presumptive award" shall mean the guideline amount of the tempo-
rary maintenance award for the guideline duration prior to the court's
application of any adjustment factors as provided in subparagraph one of
paragraph e of this subdivision.
(9) "Self-support reserve" shall mean the self-support reserve as
defined in the child support standards act and codified in section two
hundred forty of this article and section four hundred thirteen of the
family court act.

c. The court shall determine the guideline amount of temporary mainte-
nance in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph after deter-
mining the income of the parties:

(1) Where the payor's income is up to and including the income cap:

(a) the court shall subtract twenty percent of the income of the payee
from thirty percent of the income up to the income cap of the payor.
(b) the court shall then multiply the sum of the payor's income up to
and including the income cap and all of the payee's income by forty
percent.
(c) the court shall subtract the income of the payee from the amount
derived from clause (b) of this subparagraph.
(d) the guideline amount of temporary maintenance shall be the lower
of the amounts determined by clauses (a) and (c) of this subparagraph;
if the amount determined by clause (c) of this subparagraph is less than
or equal to zero, the guideline amount shall be zero dollars.

(2) Where the income of the payor exceeds the income cap:

(a) the court shall determine the guideline amount of temporary main-
tenance for that portion of the payor's income that is up to and includ-
ing the income cap according to subparagraph one of this paragraph, and,
for the payor's income in excess of the income cap, the court shall
determine any additional guideline amount of temporary maintenance
through consideration of the following factors:

(i) the length of the marriage;
(ii) the substantial differences in the incomes of the parties;
(iii) the standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(iv) the age and health of the parties;
(v) the present and future earning capacity of the parties;
(vi) the need of one party to incur education or training expenses;
(vii) the wasteful dissipation of marital property;
(viii) the transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimo-
nial action without fair consideration;
(ix) the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household or a
pre-divorce separate household;
(x) acts by one party against another that have inhibited or continue
to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain meaningful
employment. Such acts include but are not limited to acts of domestic
violence as provided in section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social
services law;
(xi) the availability and cost of medical insurance for the parties;
(xii) the care of the children or stepchildren, disabled adult chil-
dren or stepchildren, elderly parents or in-laws that has inhibited or
continues to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain
meaningful employment;
(xiii) the inability of one party to obtain meaningful employment due
to age or absence from the workforce;
(xiv) the need to pay for exceptional additional expenses for the
child or children, including, but not limited to, schooling, day care
and medical treatment;
(xv) the tax consequences to each party;
(xvi) marital property subject to distribution pursuant to subdivision
five of this part;
(xvii) the reduced or lost earning capacity of the party seeking
temporary maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed educa-
tion, training, employment or career opportunities during the marriage;
(xviii) the contributions and services of the party seeking temporary
maintenance as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker and to the
career or career potential of the other party; and
(xix) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just
and proper.

(b) In any decision made pursuant to this subparagraph, the court
shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its deci-
sion. Such written order may not be waived by either party or counsel.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, where the guide-
line amount of temporary maintenance would reduce the payor's income
below the self-support reserve for a single person, the presumptive
amount of the guideline amount of temporary maintenance shall be the
difference between the payor's income and the self-support reserve. If
the payor's income is below the self-support reserve, there is a rebutt-
able presumption that no temporary maintenance is awarded.

d. The court shall determine the guideline duration of temporary main-
tenance by considering the length of the marriage. Temporary maintenance
shall terminate upon the issuance of the final award of maintenance or
the death of either party, whichever occurs first.

e. (1) The court shall order the presumptive award of temporary main-
tenance in accordance with paragraphs c and d of this subdivision,
unless the court finds that the presumptive award is unjust or inappro-
priate and adjusts the presumptive award of temporary maintenance
accordingly based upon consideration of the following factors:

(a) the standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(b) the age and health of the parties;
(c) the earning capacity of the parties;
(d) the need of one party to incur education or training expenses;
(e) the wasteful dissipation of marital property;
(f) the transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial
action without fair consideration;
(g) the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household or a
pre-divorce separate household;
(h) acts by one party against another that have inhibited or continue
to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain meaningful
employment. Such acts include but are not limited to acts of domestic
violence as provided in section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social
services law;
(i) the availability and cost of medical insurance for the parties;
(j) the care of the children or stepchildren, disabled adult children
or stepchildren, elderly parents or in-laws that has inhibited or
continues to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain
meaningful employment;
(k) the inability of one party to obtain meaningful employment due to
age or absence from the workforce;
(l) the need to pay for exceptional additional expenses for the child
or children, including, but not limited to, schooling, day care and
medical treatment;
(m) the tax consequences to each party;
(n) marital property subject to distribution pursuant to subdivision
five of this part;
(o) the reduced or lost earning capacity of the party seeking tempo-
rary maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed education,
training, employment or career opportunities during the marriage;
(p) the contributions and services of the party seeking temporary
maintenance as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker and to the
career or career potential of the other party; and
(q) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just
and proper.

(2) Where the court finds that the presumptive award of temporary
maintenance is unjust or inappropriate and the court adjusts the
presumptive award of temporary maintenance pursuant to this paragraph,
the court shall set forth, in a written order, the amount of the unad-
justed presumptive award of temporary maintenance, the factors it
considered, and the reasons that the court adjusted the presumptive
award of temporary maintenance. Such written order shall not be waived
by either party or counsel.

(3) Where either or both parties are unrepresented, the court shall
not enter a temporary maintenance order unless the unrepresented party
or parties have been informed of the presumptive award of temporary
maintenance.

f. A validly executed agreement or stipulation voluntarily entered
into between the parties in an action commenced after the effective date
of this subdivision presented to the court for incorporation in an order
shall include a provision stating that the parties have been advised of
the provisions of this subdivision, and that the presumptive award
provided for therein results in the correct amount of temporary mainte-
nance. In the event that such agreement or stipulation deviates from the
presumptive award of temporary maintenance, the agreement or stipulation
must specify the amount that such presumptive award of temporary mainte-
nance would have been and the reason or reasons that such agreement or
stipulation does not provide for payment of that amount. Such provision
may not be waived by either party or counsel. Nothing contained in this
subdivision shall be construed to alter the rights of the parties to
voluntarily enter into validly executed agreements or stipulations which
deviate from the presumptive award of temporary maintenance provided
such agreements or stipulations comply with the provisions of this
subdivision. The court shall, however, retain discretion with respect to
temporary, and post-divorce maintenance awards pursuant to this section.
Any court order incorporating a validly executed agreement or stipu-
lation which deviates from the presumptive award of temporary mainte-
nance shall set forth the court's reasons for such deviation.

g. When a party has defaulted and/or the court is otherwise presented
with insufficient evidence to determine gross income, the court shall
order the temporary maintenance award based upon the needs of the payee
or the standard of living of the parties prior to commencement of the
divorce action, whichever is greater. Such order may be retroactively
modified upward without a showing of change in circumstances upon a
showing of newly discovered or obtained evidence.

h. In any action or proceeding for modification of an order of mainte-
nance or alimony existing prior to the effective date of this subdivi-
sion, brought pursuant to this article, the temporary maintenance guide-
lines set forth in this subdivision shall not constitute a change of
circumstances warranting modification of such support order.

i. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall,
where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as
defined in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this
article, on the factors enumerated in this subdivision.


Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][a]

Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][a] was amended to update the definition of “maintenance” by cross-referencing it to Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] subdivision 5-a.

Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][a] now provides as follows: “The term "maintenance" shall mean” payments provided for in a valid agreement between the parties or awarded by the court in accordance with the provisions of subdivisions five-a and six of this part, to be paid at fixed intervals for a definite or indefinite period of time, but an award of maintenance shall terminate upon the death of either party or upon the recipient's valid or invalid marriage, or upon modification pursuant to paragraph (b) of subdivision nine of section two hundred thirty-six of this part or section two hundred forty-eight of this chapter.”


Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6]

Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6] was amended to add as factors for the court to consider in determining the amount and duration of maintenance: the need of one party to incur education or training expenses; the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household or a pre-divorce separate household; the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the parties; the care of the children or stepchildren, disabled adult children or stepchildren, elderly parents or in-laws that has inhibited or continues to inhibit a party's earning capacity; and the inability of one party to obtain meaningful employment due to age or absence from the workforce.

The title of this section was amended from “Maintenance “ to “ Post-divorce Maintenance Awards”, which might lead the reader to make the erroneous assumption that the section is only applicable to divorce proceedings, and not applicable to maintenance awards in other proceedings, such as annulment or dissolution, in which they maintenance awards are also authorized.



Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6], now entitled “ Post-divorce Maintenance Awards” provides as follows:

6. a. Except where the parties have entered into an agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part providing for maintenance, in any matrimonial action the court
may order maintenance in such amount as justice requires, having regard for the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage, whether the party in whose favor maintenance is granted lacks sufficient property and income to provide for his or her reasonable needs and whether the other party has sufficient property or income to provide for the reasonable needs of the other and the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such order shall be effective as of the date of the application therefor, and any retroactive amount of maintenance due shall be paid in one sum or periodic sums, as the court shall direct, taking into account any amount of temporary maintenance which has been paid. In determining the amount and duration of maintenance the court shall consider:

(1) the income and property of the respective parties including marital property distributed pursuant to subdivision five of this part;
(2) the length of the marriage;
(3) the age and health of both parties;
(4) the present and future earning capacity of both parties;
(5) the need of one party to incur education or training expenses;
(6) the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household or a pre-divorce separate household;
(7) acts by one party against another that have inhibited or continue to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain meaningful employment. Such acts include but are not limited to acts of domestic violence as provided in section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law;
(8) the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting and, if applicable, the period of time and training necessary therefor;
(9) reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities during the marriage;
(10) the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the parties;
(11) the care of the children or stepchildren, disabled adult children or stepchildren, elderly parents or in-laws that has inhibited or continues to inhibit a party's earning capacity;
(12) the inability of one party to obtain meaningful employment due to age or absence from the workforce;
(13) the need to pay for exceptional additional expenses for the child/children, including but not limited to, schooling, day care and medical treatment;
(14) the tax consequences to each party;
(15) the equitable distribution of marital property;
(16) contributions and services of the party seeking maintenance as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party;
(17) the wasteful dissipation of marital property by either spouse;
(18) The transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a
matrimonial action without fair consideration;
(19) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage, and the availability and cost of medical insurance for the parties; and
(20) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.

b. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel.

c. The court may award permanent maintenance, but an award of maintenance shall terminate upon the death of either party or upon the recipient's valid or invalid marriage, or upon modification pursuant to paragraph [(b)] B of subdivision nine of this part or section two hundred forty-eight of this chapter.

d. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall, where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this article, on the factors enumerated in paragraph a of this subdivision.


Domestic Relations Law § 237

Domestic Relations Law § 237 was amended to create a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. It adds actions to obtain maintenance or distribution of property after a foreign judgment of divorce to the actions for which such fees shall be awarded. In exercising the court's discretion, the court is required to seek to assure that each party is adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. provide for a presumption of counsel fees to a non-monied spouse. In addition the court is authorized to order expert fees to be paid by one party to the other to enable the party to carry on or defend the action. The parties and their attorneys are also required to submit an affidavit to the court with financial information to enable the court to make its determination. The monied spouse is now required to disclose how much he has agreed to pay and how much he has paid his attorney. The affidavit must include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses


Prior law placed an onus upon the party in a matrimonial action seeking counsel fees pendente lite, to show why the interests of justice require it. In addition, Judges appeared reluctant to order pendente lite counsel fee awards in matrimonial actions under the current statute. The Assembly Memorandum in support of this amendment indicates that given the importance of pendente lite counsel fees, and the frequency of financial imbalance between parties to matrimonial proceedings, it is inappropriate to place the burden upon a non-monied spouse to justify it. This amendment requires that in a matrimonial action an order for pendente lite counsel fees and expenses should be granted at the outset of the case to ensure adequate representation of the less monied spouse from the commencement of the proceeding, and it is left to the affected parties to show why, in the interests of justice, the order should not be made. Nothing precludes an award of counsel fees to a nonprofit legal service organization where such organization provides legal services without charge to a party who is eligible for counsel fees. In addition, the amendment is not intended to preclude a court's discretionary power to award counsel fees for services and expenses incurred before the action begins.


Domestic Relations Law §237 provides as follows:

(a) In any action or proceeding brought (1) to annul a marriage or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, or (2) for a separation, or (3) for a divorce, or (4) to declare the validity or nullity of a judgment of divorce rendered against a spouse who was the defendant in any action outside the State of New York and did not appear therein where such spouse asserts the nullity of such foreign judgment, (5) to obtain Maintenance or distribution of property following a foreign judgment of divorce, or (6) to enjoin the prosecution in any other jurisdiction of an action for a divorce, the court may direct either spouse or, where an action for annulment is maintained after the death of a spouse, may direct the person or persons maintaining the action, to pay counsel fees and fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other spouse to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. In exercising the court's discretion, the court shall seek to assure that each party shall be adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis, pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. Applications for the award of fees and expenses may be made at any time or times prior to final judgment. Both parties to the action or proceeding and their respective attorneys, shall file an affidavit with the court detailing the financial agreement between the party and the attorney. Such affidavit shall include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses. Any applications for fees and expenses may be maintained by the attorney for either spouse in his own name in the same proceeding. Payment of any retainer fees to the attorney for the petitioning party shall not preclude any awards of fees and expenses to an applicant which would otherwise be allowed under this section.


(b) Upon any application to enforce, annul or modify an order or judgment for alimony, maintenance, distributive award, distribution of marital property or for custody, visitation, or maintenance of a child, made as in section two hundred thirty-six or section two hundred forty of this article provided, or upon any application by writ of habeas corpus or by petition and order to show cause concerning custody, visitation or maintenance of a child, the court may direct a spouse or parent to pay counsel fees and fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other spouse or parent to enable the other party to carry on or defend the application or proceeding by the other spouse or parent as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. In exercising the court's discretion, the court shall seek to assure that each party shall be adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis, pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. Applications for the award of fees and expenses may be made at any time or times prior to final judgment. Both parties to the action or proceeding and their respective attorneys, shall file an affidavit with the court detailing the financial agreement, between the party and the attorney. Such affidavit shall include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses. Any applications for fees and expenses may be maintained by the attorney for either spouse in counsel's own name in the same proceeding. Payment of any retainer fees to the attorney for the petitioning party shall not preclude any awards of fees and expenses to an applicant which would otherwise be allowed under this section.


Domestic Relations Law § 238

Domestic Relations Law § 238 was amended to create a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. It adds actions to obtain maintenance or distribution of property after a foreign judgment of divorce to the actions for which such fees shall be awarded and provides that such actions shall also include actions to enforce a court order. In exercising the court's discretion, the court is required to seek to assure that each party is adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. In addition the court is authorized to order expert fees to be paid by one party to the other to enable the party to carry on or defend the action. The parties and their attorneys are also required to submit an affidavit to the court with financial information to enable the court to make its determination. The monied spouse is now required to disclose how much he has agreed to pay and how much he has paid his attorney. The affidavit must include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses

Prior law placed an onus upon the party in a matrimonial action seeking counsel fees pendente lite, to show why the interests of justice require it. In addition, Judges appeared reluctant to order pendente lite counsel fee awards in matrimonial actions under the current statute. The Assembly Memorandum in support of this amendment indicates that given the importance of pendente lite counsel fees, and the frequency of financial imbalance between parties to matrimonial proceedings, it is inappropriate to place the burden upon a non-monied spouse to justify it. This amendment requires that in a matrimonial action an order for pendente lite counsel fees and expenses should be granted at the outset of the case to ensure adequate representation of the less monied spouse from the commencement of the proceeding, and it is left to the affected parties to show why, in the interests of justice, the order should not be made. Nothing precludes an award of counsel fees to a nonprofit legal service organization where such organization provides legal services without charge to a party who is eligible for counsel fees. In addition, the amendment is not intended to preclude a court's discretionary power to award counsel fees for services and expenses incurred before the action begins.


Section 238 of the domestic relations law provides as follows:

238. Expenses in enforcement and modification proceedings. In any action or proceeding to enforce or modify any provision of a judgment or order entered in an action for divorce, separation, annulment , declaration of nullity of a void marriage, declaration of validity or nullity of a judgement of divorce rendered against a spouse who was the defendant in any action outside the state of new york and did not appear therein where such spouse asserts the nullity of such foreign judgment, or an injunction restraining the prosecution in any other jurisdiction of an action for a divorce, or in any proceeding pursuant to section two hundred forty-three, two hundred forty-four, two hundred forty-five, or two hundred forty-six of this article, the court may in its discretion require either party to pay counsel fees and fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other party to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. In any such action or proceeding, applications for fees and expenses may be maintained by the attorney for the respective parties in counsel's own name and in counsel's own behalf. In exercising the court's discretion, the court shall seek to assure that each party shall be adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. Applications for the award of fees and expenses may be made at any time or times prior to final judgment. Both parties to the action or proceeding and their representative attorneys, shall file an affidavit with the court detailing the financial agreement between the party and the attorney. Such affidavit shall include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses. Payment of any retainer fees to the attorney for the petitioning party shall not preclude any awards of fees and expenses to an applicant which would otherwise be allowed under this section.

Summary of Laws of 2010 New York Family Law Legislation

Summary of Laws of 2010 New York Family Law Legislation (September 18, 2010)


Chapter 32

Amends Domestic Relations Law §236 [B][2][b][2]

Exempts from the automatic orders provisions prohibiting transfer of any retirement plan upon commencement of a matrimonial action when the retirement plan is already paying benefits. Effective date March 30, 2010


Chapter 41

Amends CPLR 1101; Amends Domestic Relations Law §§ 236, 75-f, 76-f, 112-b, 113, 115-b, 240 & 254, ; Amends Executive Law §§ 503 & 508; Amends Judiciary Law §§ 35 & 35-a; Amends Family Court Act, generally; Amends Public Health Law §§ 2306 & 2782; Amends Social Services Law §§ 358-a, 372, 383-c, 384, 384-a, 384-b, 409-e, 409-f & 422.

Replaces the term "law guardian" with the term "attorney for the child" to more accurately reflect the attorney's role. Effective date April 14, 2010.


Chapter 182

Amends Tax Law §§ 606, 171-a, 171-h & 697, Tax Law ; amends Family Court §§ Act 451, 461 & 440, adds Family Court Act §437-a; amends Domestic Relations Law §236; amends Social Services Law §111-h.

The "Low Income Support Obligation and Performance Improvement Act." Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 1, effective October 13, 2010.

Family Court Act § 451 is amended to provide two new bases for modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party's income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This section would provide that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions and also would clarify that retroactive support is paid and enforceable as provided under Family Court Act § 440. Also conforms the language of the Family Court Act provision governing the modification of child support orders to the Domestic Relations Law so that both provisions provide for a "substantial change in circumstances" as a basis for modification of an order of child support. Laws of 2010, Ch 182, §6 (Effective October 13, 2010 and applicable only to child support orders which incorporate but do not merge stipulations or settlement agreements if the stipulation or agreement was executed on or after the effective date of the bill. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13)

Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B](9)(b) is amended by separating out the "substantial change of circumstances" basis for modification of child support orders into its own section for clarity and provides two new bases for the modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party's income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This provision provides that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 7 (Effective October 13, 2010 and applicable only to child support orders which incorporate but do not merge stipulations or settlement agreements if the stipulation or agreement was executed on or after the effective date of the bill. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13)


Family Court Act §440 is amended to add a subdivision 4 which requires that all orders establishing a child support obligation contain a notice regarding the right to apply for a modification of the order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances or the occurrence of the additional enumerated bases for modification. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 8.(Effective October 13, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13)


Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B](7) is amended to add a new subdivision (d) which require that all orders establishing a child support obligation contain a notice regarding the right to apply for a modification of the order if there has been a substantial change in circum stances or the occurrence of the additional enumerated bases for modification. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 9.(Effective October 13, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13)

Family Court Act § 437-a is added to authorize the Family Court to require the non-custodial parent of a child to seek employment, or to participate in job training, employment counseling or other programs designed to lead to employment, where such programs are available, if he or she is unemployed at the time the court is establishing the support order unless he or she is in receipt of supplemental security income (SSI) or social security disability (SSD) benefits. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 10.(Effective October 13, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13)

Social Services Law § 111-h is amended to state that if the respondent is required to participate in work programs or activities, and if the order of support is made payable on behalf of persons in receipt of public assistance, the support collection unit may not file a petition to increase the support obligation for twelve months from the date of entry of the order if the respondent's income is derived from the work activity or program. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 11. (Effective October 13, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13)


Family Court Act § 461 is amended to reflect the two new bases for modification of an order of child support. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 12. (Effective October 13, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13)

These provisions are effective October 13, 2010, except that: (1) sections 6 and 7 only apply to child support orders which incorporate but do not merge stipulations or settlement agreements if the stipulation or agreement was executed on or after the effective date of the bill. Laws of 2010, Ch 186, § 13


Chapter 325

Amends Family Court Act § 842

Authorizes the family court in family offense proceedings to extend an order of protection upon the showing of good cause or consent of the parties. Effective date August 13, 2010. ( § 3.This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to all orders entered prior to such effective date, and to all actions and proceedings pending on or commenced on or after such effective date.) Laws of 2010, Ch 325 (8.13.10)


Chapter 329

Amends Domestic Relations Law § § 237 & 238.

Laws of 2010, Ch 329, as amended by Laws of 2010, Ch 415, effective October 12, 2010, amended Domestic Relations Law §§ 237 and 238 to create a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. It adds actions to obtain maintenance or distribution of property after a foreign judgment of divorce to the actions for which such fees shall be awarded. In exercising the court's discretion, the court is required to seek to assure that each party is adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. In addition the court is authorized to order expert fees to be paid by one party to the other to enable the party to carry on or defend the action. The parties and their attorneys are also required to submit an affidavit to the court with financial information to enable the court to make its determination. The monied spouse is now required to disclose how much he has agreed to pay and how much he has paid his attorney. The affidavit must include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses. In addition, Domestic Relations Law § 238 was also amended to add to the actions for which such fees shall be awarded “actions to enforce a court order”.


Chapter 341

Amends Family Court Act §§ 446, 551, 656, 759 and 1056 . Amends Domestic Relations Law § 240(3)(e). Amends Family Court Act 812 (1). Amends Family Court Act 842.

Provides that orders of protection shall not be denied, in support proceedings, paternity proceedings, termination of parental rights proceedings, person in need of supervision proceedings, family offense proceedings and child protective proceedings, solely on the basis that the events alleged are not contemporaneous with the application therefor or the conclusion of the action. Effective date August 13, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 341 (8.13.10)

In addition these sections provide that the duration of any temporary order
shall not by itself determine the length or issuance of any final order.

According to the Assembly Memorandum this legislation is intended to overturn a line of Appellate Division cases that have attempted to institute a statute of limitations on incidents of abuse that a victim of domestic violence may plead and prove, where the legislature specifically did not institute one. (See, Yoba v. Yoba, 183 A.D.2d 418(1st Dept.,1992); Swersky v. Swersky, 299 A.D.2d 540(2d Dept., 2002); Thomas v. Thomas, 32 A.D.3d 521 (2d Dept., 2006);Matter of Ashley P., 31 A.D.3d 767 (2d Dept., 2006); Matter of Ann P. v.Nicholas C.F., 44 A.D.3d 776 (2d Dept., 2007); Matter of Hall v. Hall, 45 A.D.2d 842 (2d Dept., 2007); Matter of Loriann Q. v. Frank R., 53 A.D.3d 735 (3d Dept., 2008), denying civil orders of protection as a primary, or as a secondary basis, because the incidents pled were not "relatively contemporaneous"). The memorandum states that there is a disturbing trend in the Family, Supreme and Integrated Domestic Violence Courts of denying civil orders of protection where incidents of abuse alleged are considered by the courts as not "relatively contemporaneous" with the filing of the petition, the findings of fact, or the dispositional stage of the proceeding, presumably in reliance on the Appellate Division cases. Furthermore, some trial courts have been denying a final order order or protection on the basis that the temporary order of protection was in effect for too long. This legislation is also intended to address such denials of final orders of protection that are based on the duration of a temporary order issued during the pendency of a case. It is important for a court to hear and consider the history of violence to craft a careful and meaningful order that accomplishes the purpose of securing safety. Allegations that are more remote in time can give the finder of fact an enormous amount of information including how long the violent relationship has lasted so the finder of fact can craft a meaningful order of protection. Any incident of abuse that precipitates the filing for an order of protection must be viewed in the context of the history of the pattern of abuse suffered by the applicant and there is no statutory requirement to limit incidents pled to be within a specific period of time.
See NY Legis Memo 341(2010)



Chapter 342

Amends Family Court Act §§1055, 1087, 1088, 1089 & 1090; Adds Article 10-B, Section 109; Amends Social Services Law § § 371 & 409-a.

Relates to trial discharges of children in foster care and voluntary re-placements of older adolescents in foster care; amends the provisions of Articles 10 and 10-A of the Family Court Act to extend trial discharges at court permanency hearings for successive periods of up to six months until a child turns 21. The trial discharges require the consent of the child. The law also adds a new Article 10-B to permit youths between 18 and 21 who have opted to leave state care within the past 24 months to seek to return voluntarily. In such cases, the court must find that the youth has no reasonable alternatives to foster care, that he or she consents to an appropriate vocational or educational program and that a return would be in his or her best interests. Attorneys who previously represented the youths would continue to do so.

Laws of 2010, Ch 342. Effective November 11, 2010.



Chapter 343

Adds Family Court Act Article 6 Part 1-A, Sections 635 - 637; Amends Family Court Act §1089; Amends Social Services Law §384-b.

Provides a process for a petition to restore previously terminated parental rights under certain circumstances.

Effective date November 11, 2010 (§ 4. This act shall take effect on the ninetieth day after it shall have become a law. Laws of 2010, Ch 343).

This legislation amends the provisions of the Family Court Act and the Social Services Law to authorize Family Court, in narrowly-defined circumstances, to restore a birth parent's parental rights after they have been terminated. With the consent of the respondent in the original termination of parental rights proceeding, as well as that of the child, a petition to restore parental rights could be filed provided: (i) at least two years had elapsed since issuance of the order transferring guardianship and custody of the child; (ii) the original adjudication terminating parental rights could not have been based upon severe or repeated child abuse; and (iii) the child would have to be under the jurisdiction of the Family Court and have a permanency goal other than adoption. The agency to which guardianship and custody had been committed must consent unless the court finds that the consent had been withheld without good cause. Family Court is authorized to grant the petition where clear and convincing proof establishes that restoration of parental rights would be in the child's best interests. This restoration would, in effect, revoke the disposition transferring guardianship and custody of the child but would leave in place the fact-finding upon which the termination of parental rights adjudication had been based. A clause also would be added to the permanency hearing order provision permitting the Court to recommend the filing of a petition to restore parental rights.

The court has the authority to grant the restoration petition conditionally. This option would retain guardianship and custody of the child with the agency but authorize the child to reside with the birth parent on a trial discharge for a period of up. to six months, during which time the agency may be directed to supervise the family and to develop a reunification plan with appropriate transitional services. If temporary restoration proves successful and in the child's best interests, it could be made final at the end of the designated period and guardianship and custody would be transferred at that time to the birth parent. If, however, the child were removed from the birth parent during the designated period by reason of abuse or neglect, the Court could dismiss the restoration petition and direct the agency that retains guardianship and custody to make efforts to further an alternative permanency plan for the child. See NY Legis Memo 343 (2010).


Chapter 363

Repealed & Added Judiciary Law §212 sub 2 P(n).

Extends for two years authorization of courts to designate referees to determine order-of-protection applications by Family Courts based, in part, on ex parte conversations. The state empowered the referees to issue the orders when first approving their use against non-family members in 2008. Grants the chief administrator of the courts the authority to allow referees to determine applications to a family court for an order of protection when such application is made ex parte or without the presence of all the parties except the applicant; specifies that such provisions shall only apply during those hours that the family court is in session and after 5:00 p.m.

Effective date August 13, 2010. (Laws of 2010, Ch 363 effective 8.13.10 (This act shall take effect immediately; provided that paragraph (n) of subdivision 2 of section 212 of the judiciary law, as Added by section one of this act, shall expire and be deemed repealed September 1, 2012.)


Chapter 371

Amends Domestic Relations Law § 236.

Amends Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6] to add a subdivision 5-a which revises the process for setting awards of temporary maintenance during the pendency of a matrimonial action, by creating a formula and list of factors that presumptively govern such awards. It amends Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][a] to update the definition of “maintenance” by cross-referencing it to Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] subdivision 5-a.
It also amends Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6] to add 5 new factors for the court to consider in determining the amount and duration of maintenance. Subdivision 3 directs the law revision commission to study the effects of divorce and maintenance.

Effective date August 13, 2010. (Laws of 2010, Ch 371 (8.13.10) (§ 6. This act shall take effect immediately; provided, however, that sections one, two and four of this act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after this act shall have become a law and shall apply to matrimonial actions commenced on or after the effective date of such sections.)


Chapter 384

Amends Domestic Relations Law 170 to add subdivision 7.

Provides that spouses may be granted a judgment of divorce in a timely fashion provided the relationship between husband and wife is irretrievably broken” for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath. No judgment of divorce may be granted unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or determined by the court and incorporated into the judgment of divorce.

Effective October 12, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 384, (8.13.10) (§ 2. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after it shall have become a law and shall apply to matrimonial actions commenced on or after such effective date.)


Chapter 415

Amends Chapter 329 of the Laws of 2010 (which amended DRL 237 and 238) to change its effective date from 120 days after it shall have become a law to 60 days after it shall have become a law. Effective date August 13, 2010. Laws of 2010, Ch 415. (8.13.10)

Chapter 421

Amends Family Court Act 352.3 to add (1-a)

Authorizes family courts to issue orders of protection for the protection of witnesses.
Provides that upon the issuance of an order pursuant to Family Court Act 315.3 or the
entry of an order of disposition pursuant to Family Court Act 352.2, a court may, for good cause shown, enter an order of protection against any respondent requiring that the respondent refrain from engaging in conduct, against any designated witness specifically named by the court in the order, that would constitute intimidation of a witness pursuant to section 215.15, 215.16 or 215.17 of the penal law or an attempt thereof provided that the court makes a finding that the respondent did previously, or is likely to in the future, intimidate or attempt to intimidate such witness in such manner.

Effective November 28, 2010


Chapter 446

Amends Family Court Act 153-b; amends Domestic Relations Law 240 (3-a) in relation to service of orders of protection including applications to extend and petitions for violations of orders of protection and temporary orders of protection in family court.

Clarifies that litigants have the same options of peace and police officer service for orders and temporary orders and legal papers issued in later stages of family offense proceedings including service of extended orders and for petitions
alleging violations of orders of protection as they have for original orders and accompanying pleadings. Makes it clear that such service must be available
without fee to the litigants. The provision prohibiting fees from being charged by police and peace officers for service of all orders of
protection, whether issued upon default, temporary, modified, final, or
extended as well as associated petitions and summonses, emphasizes legislation enacted in 2007. That statute amended section 8011 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to prohibit sheriffs from charging the statutory $45 fee and any mileage fees for service of orders of protection and related orders or papers when service has been directed by the court. See L. 2007, c. 36. The statute is essential to ensure compliance by New York State with The Federal Violence Against Women Act.
42 U.S.C.A. S3796hh(c)(4).

Effective August 30, 2010.

Monday, July 05, 2010

Important New Court of Appeals and Appellate Decisions

Court of Appeals Holds that the Initial Determination of Whether a Particular Asset Is Marital or Separate Property Is a Question of Law, Subject to Plenary Review on Appeal, and DRL 236 Creates a Presumption That All Property, Unless Clearly Separate, Is Deemed Marital Property' and the Burden Rests with the Titled Spouse to Rebut That Presumption.

In Fields v Fields, __NY3d ___, 6/11/2010 NYLJ 36, (col. 3) the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Graffeo, observed that, although the manner in which marital property is distributed falls within the discretion of the trial court, 'the initial determination of whether a particular asset is marital or separate property is a question of law, subject to plenary review on appeal' (DeJesus v. DeJesus, 90 NY2d 643, 647 [1997])." Here, the Court concluded that the value of the husband's one-half interest in the parties' residence, a Manhattan townhouse that the husband purchased during the marriage and where the parties had lived for nearly thirty years, was marital property and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.
At the outset Judge Graffeo set forth the applicable principals of law that applied to this case. She pointed out that Domestic Relations Law §236 defines 'marital property' as 'all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, and the definition of marital property includes a 'wide range' of tangible and intangible interests. She indicated that "it is telling that the Legislature chose to initially categorize all property, of whatever nature, acquired after parties marry as marital property." The Equitable Distribution Law 'recognizes that spouses have an equitable claim to things of value arising out of the marital relationship and classifies them as subject to distribution by focusing on the marital status of the parties at the time of acquisition. This marital property designation is in keeping with the fundamental purpose of the Equitable Distribution Law, the recognition of marriage as an economic partnership, in which 'both parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker. The Legislature did provide for several exceptions to this general classification. Section 236 specifies that marital property does not include 'separate property' and the statute sets forth four categories of property that constitute separate property: '(1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse; (2) compensation for personal injuries; (3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse; (4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties pursuant to subdivision three of this part'. When the Legislature enacted Domestic Relations Law §236, it sought 'to recognize the direct and indirect contributions of each spouse. Hence, the Court has stressed that marital property should be 'construed broadly in order to give effect to the ' economic partnership' concept of the marriage relationship'. By contrast, separate property, denoted as an exception to marital property, should be construed 'narrowly'. The structure of section 236 therefore creates a statutory presumption that 'all property, unless clearly separate, is deemed marital property' and the burden rests with the titled spouse to rebut that presumption.
The Husband and the wife, who were 60 and 69 years old, respectively, were married in 1970 and had a son who was born in 1973. In 1978, the parties decided to purchase a home on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, selecting a five-story townhouse with ten apartments and a basement. The Wife agreed to the acquisition of the townhouse only if the husband consented to certain preconditions because she believed that working outside the home and caring for their son, together with maintaining the townhouse, would be too burdensome. Because of the wife's reticence, the husband decided to purchase the townhouse with his mother's assistance. The husband paid $130,000 for the townhouse, making a $30,000 down payment. The down payment came from funds the husband received from his grandparents--half in lieu of a bequest and half on loan, which his mother agreed to repay. The balance of the purchase price was paid through two mortgages held jointly by the husband and his mother. The Husband took title solely in his name but later conveyed a one-half interest in the building to his mother. From 1982 to 2001, the husband and his mother managed the townhouse as a formal partnership. They deposited rent proceeds into a partnership bank account and made mortgage payments from that account. But the partnership bank account was not used exclusively for the building's income and expenses; the husband acknowledged that he commingled marital funds in the account.
In September 1978, husband and the Wife moved into the townhouse, initially residing in apartment 2. In 1979, the couple converted the basement into an apartment where they lived together for five months until the wife became ill and moved into apartment 3. In 1983, after apartment 3 was burglarized, the wife relocated to apartment 2. The husband remained in the basement apartment and the couple shared occasional meals until 1997. The husband paid rent to the partnership for the basement apartment until 2002; he used his income from employment to make rental payments. The Wife also paid rent using her wages while she was living in apartment 3. The husband 's mother and stepfather resided in the building as well and paid rent for three apartments that they combined into a single residence. The remaining apartments were leased to various tenants. and the Wife were continuously employed outside of the home, although they each took periods of parental leave to care for their son. The couple shared child care expenses and responsibilities as parents.
The Husband commenced this divorce action in February 2005 and Supreme Court referred the matter to a Special Referee. After a hearing on issues of equitable distribution, the Referee found that both parties contributed to the long-term marriage, their son's upbringing and the townhouse. Included in his findings, the Special Referee determined that wife decorated the basement apartment, purchasing a carpet, a Formica counter top, couches, a linen closet, bathroom cabinets, a chandelier, curtains, and rugs. She installed a door in the basement apartment, wallpapered the bathroom and paid for flooring and a mirror for the foyer outside the apartment. The Wife also helped with the townhouse's day-to-day maintenance. She cleaned the basement apartment and purchased the vacuum used to clean the lobby. The wife cleaned the mailbox vestibule, swept the interior and exterior steps, periodically cleaned the sidewalk, raked and bagged leaves in the backyard and planted a garden. She also cleaned lobby windows and washed the curtains, polished the lobby mirror and, during times when the husband was away, disposed of the townhouses refuse. The Referee recommended that the husband 's one-half interest in the townhouse be classified as marital property, less the $30,000 down payment, which the Referee deemed as the husband 's separate property because those funds had been received from the husband 's grandparents. He also found that the husband 's one-half interest in the partnership bank account was marital property. The Referee awarded the Wife 35 percent of the value of all marital assets because he concluded that the Wife had made direct and indirect contributions to the townhouse, including services as a spouse and mother. Supreme Court confirmed the Referee's Report and directed entry of a judgment of divorce.
The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, affirmed (65 AD3d 297 [1st Dept 2009]). The court held that the husband 's interest in the townhouse, less the $30,000 down payment, was properly categorized as marital property subject to equitable distribution. The majority emphasized that the husband purchased the townhouse during the parties' marriage, that the couple continuously lived in the townhouse and raised their son in the home, and that the Wife made direct and indirect contributions to the upkeep of the townhouse. Rejecting the husband 's assertion that his interest in the townhouse should be viewed as separate property, the court explained that '[t]he fact that the marital residence can also be used to generate income... does not therefore reclassify marital property into separate property' (id. at 304).
The husband argued in the Court of Appeals that his one-half interest in the townhouse was separate property because he owned and managed the building with his mother and because the Wife did not contribute to its purchase or its appreciation in value. The Court of Appeals disagreed and concluded that the value of the husband 's one-half interest in the townhouse was marital property subject to equitable distribution.
Judge Graffeo wrote that this case involved the application of the well-settled statutory presumption that all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage, unless clearly separate, is deemed marital property (see DeJesus, 90 NY2d at 652). Here, the husband purchased the townhouse in 1978, approximately eight years into the marriage, and therefore, on the date of acquisition, the presumption of marital property arose. Even where one spouse contributed monies derived from separate property toward the acquisition of the marital residence, this has not precluded its classification as marital property where the other spouse made economic or other contributions to the residence and the marriage; the contributing spouse generally has received a credit for that contribution.
Here, the property was purchased eight years into the parties' marriage with the intent that it would be used as the marital residence where the parties would live and raise their son. In fact, that is precisely what occurred, the parties resided in the home with their son and other family members for nearly 30 years. Thus, the statutory presumption that a residence acquired during the marriage is marital property clearly applied in this case.
Once the statutory presumption was triggered, the burden shifted to the husband to rebut that presumption (DeJesus, 90 NY2d at 652). The Husband relied on the fact that he used monies derived from separate property, the $30,000 down payment, to acquire the townhouse. But the townhouse was not 'acquired in exchange for' the $30,000 down payment (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [3]). Instead, the husband 's $30,000 separate property contribution covered only a fraction of the purchase price. While the down payment facilitated the acquisition, the use of a 'separate property' down payment does not, in and of itself, establish the property's character as separate property.
The remaining $100,000 of the purchase price was paid through two mortgages and, despite the husband 's claim that he made mortgage payments solely from rental proceeds, he failed to substantiate that allegation. The husband testified that he commingled marital assets in the partnership bank account from which mortgage payments were made. Specifically, he acknowledged that he would sometimes deposit his paychecks, which were marital property, into the account. Funds from other sources of marital income were also placed into the account, such as the husband 's earnings from his tax preparation and video businesses and wife's paychecks. The fact that the husband would later transfer funds or give cash to the Wife does not alter the commingled nature of the funds. Finally, both the husband and the Wife paid rent to the partnership using income from their outside endeavors, which was a partial source of the mortgage payments. The Court found that the therefore failed to establish that the mortgages, which were used to pay the majority of the townhouse's purchase price, were paid using monies derived exclusively from separate property, much less that all of the expenses associated with the property were covered by segregated funds.
Judge Graffeo noted that there is no single template that directs how courts are to distribute a marital asset that was acquired, in part or in whole, with separate property funds. In these situations, courts have usually given the spouse who made the separate property contribution a credit for such payment before determining how to equitably distribute the remaining value of the asset. In distributing any appreciation in value, courts may consider any of the factors listed in Domestic Relations Law §236 (B) (5) (d) or any other relevant considerations, including the respective contributions of each spouse and the effect of market forces.
In this case, the courts below properly considered the spectrum and quantity of contributions made by each spouse to the management and maintenance of the townhouse and the extent to which market factors enhanced the value of the property. Under these circumstances, the Court declined to disturb the determination below that the husband failed to rebut the statutory presumption that his interest in the townhouse is marital property subject to equitable distribution and that the Wife was entitled to 35 percent of the husband 's interest in that asset.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that the husband purchased the townhouse eight years into the 35-year marriage and that the family maintained their living arrangement since 1978. It is not for the courts to dictate what type of lifestyle a 'normal' marriage should reflect or how married couples should structure their marital relationships. That the husband and the Wife in this case maintained separate apartments in the building did not change the character of the property from marital to separate, especially since they both made economic and noneconomic contributions to their marriage and the upbringing of their son. Many married couples sleep in different bedrooms for a variety of reasons and such arrangements do not affect the 'marital property' status of their homes if they divorce. The fact that the husband took title to his one-half interest in the townhouse in his name alone is irrelevant under the statute's express language, nor does the fact that the husband acquired title with his mother interfere with the marital character of his interest in the property. That portions of the townhouse were used as an income-generating business does not transform the building into separate property. The Wife's lack of an initial monetary investment and involvement in the management activities pertaining to the townhouse do not preclude a holding that the husband 's interest in the building is marital property. These were factors properly considered by the trial court in determining the extent of wife's distributive award (see Domestic Relations Law §236 [B] [5] [d]).
Judge Graffeo pointed out that the dissent failed to recognize the statutory presumption that property acquired during a marriage is marital property; instead, the dissent begins with the assumption that the building was separate property at the time of its acquisition. The majority did not view the husband 's interest in the townhouse as property 'acquired in exchange for' his separate property contribution toward the down payment. Under the dissent's analysis, any time a married couple purchases a marital residence using 'separate' funds contributed by one spouse towards the down payment, the entirety of the marital home would be classified as separate property. This approach is not consistent with relevant precedent, does not heed Domestic Relations Law's statutory presumption in favor of marital property and is contrary to the very purpose underlying the statute in recognition of an 'economic partnership.'
The husband also claimed that his one-half interest in the partnership bank account was separate property because the account was created solely to manage funds relating to the townhouse. But, he commingled marital assets in the partnership bank account and he could not sufficiently delineate any of the funds in the account as separate property . Thus, the husband's interest in the partnership bank account was marital property that should be allocated between the parties.
The husband also challenged the trial court's distribution of the marital property, arguing that the court abused its discretion by awarding the Wife 35 percent of the value of the marital assets. The Court of Appeals disagreed. In recognizing marriage as an economic partnership, Domestic Relations Law §236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors. (Domestic Relations Law 236 [B] [5] [d]). Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court may not disturb the trial court's distributive award. Here, Supreme Court issued a comprehensive decision addressing all relevant factors, including that the husband and the Wife were married for 35 years; that both maintained employment and made economic and noneconomic contributions to the marriage, their son and the townhouse; that they had equal parenting responsibilities; that the Wife did not invest in the purchase of the townhouse; and that the couple maintained separate units in the building for approximately 28 years. In light of these considerations, particularly the length of the marriage, the age of the parties and wife's contributions to the marriage, the Court could not conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion in awarding the Wife 35 percent of the value of the husband 's half interest in the townhouse and other marital assets.
Judge Smith dissented in an opinion in which Judge Read concurred.


First Department Holds Prenuptial Agreement May Contain Enforceable Waiver of Interest in Retirement Assets.

In Strong v Dubin,--- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2010 WL 1905004 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.) the First Department found, in an opinion by Justice Andrias, that the parties' prenuptial agreement contained an enforceable waiver of defendant wife's interest in the marital portion of plaintiff husband's retirement assets. In analyzing this issue it revisited its determination in Richards v. Richards (232 AD2d 303, 303 [1996]), where the court had found that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 'only a spouse can waive spousal rights to employee plan benefits, that a fiancee is not a spouse, and that such rights, therefore, cannot be effectively waived in a prenuptial agreement.' Justice Andrias wrote that insofar as the Court's determination in Richards v. Richards (232 AD2d 303 [1996]) would preclude the waiver of pension rights in the event of divorce in a prenuptial agreement, it should not be followed in that it failed to recognize the distinction between waivers of survivor benefits and other pension benefits. For purposes of equitable distribution, a waiver of any interest in a pension as marital property by an otherwise valid prenuptial agreement is not prohibited by The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 USC 1001 et seq. ), as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) (citing Moor-Jankowski, 222 AD2d at 423; Edmonds v. Edmonds, 184 Misc 2d 928 [Sup Ct, Onondaga County 2000]).


Second Department Disapproves of Requirement of Showing Existence of "Special Circumstances" Warranting Discovery from a Nonparty in Order to Successfully Oppose a Motion to Quash a Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on That Nonparty

In Kooper v Kooper, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2010 WL 1912142 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the appeal considered the principles governing the discovery of documents from nonparties pursuant to CPLR 3101(a)(4). It provides that the party seeking disclosure must give notice stating "the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required" from the nonparty. The question before the court was whether a party must establish the existence of "special circumstances" warranting discovery from a nonparty in order to successfully oppose a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on that nonparty? Justice Angiolillo, in the opinion for the court, noted that many of the cases of the Second Department continued to apply that standard after CPLR 3101(a)(4) was amended to remove the requirement that discovery from a nonparty be obtained only "where the court on motion determines that there are adequate special circumstances." and concluded: “We hereby disapprove the further application of the "special circumstances" standard in this context.”
On July 18, 2008, the defendant served subpoenas duces tecum on five nonparty financial institutions, demanding production of documents related to any accounts held by the plaintiff, and on July 21, 2008, the defendant served an amended subpoena on one of the five institutions. The following notice appeared on the face of each subpoena: "The circumstances or reasons said disclosure is sought or required are to identify and value certain marital property, which is material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of this action." Copies of the six subpoenas were served on the plaintiff. After the wife refused to withdraw the six subpoenas duces tecum served on nonparty financial institutions, the husband moved to quash the subpoenas, and the wife filed a cross-motion to compel the husband to comply with discovery demands, for an award of interim counsel fees, and to direct the husband to pay the wife one-half of the proceeds from the rental of the parties' vacation home. The Supreme Court granted the husband's motion to quash on the ground that the defendant had failed to tender a sufficient explanation why the discovery from nonparties was necessary and denied wife's cross-motion in its entirety.
On appeal the Appellate Division noted that subsequent document production by three of the five nonparty financial institutions rendered part of defendant’s appeal academic. It turned to defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly granted plaintiff's motion to quash the subpoenas she served on the two remaining nonparty financial institutions, American Express and Principal Trust Company, f/k/a Delaware Charter Guarantee & Trust Company.
The court pointed out that disclosure in New York civil actions is guided by the principle of "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” (CPLR 3101). The phrase "material and necessary" is "to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason" ( citing Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403). The Court of Appeals' interpretation of "material and necessary" in Allen has been understood "to mean nothing more or less than 'relevant'.
To withstand a challenge to a discovery request, therefore, the party seeking discovery must first satisfy the threshold requirement that the disclosure sought is "material and necessary," whether the request is directed to a party or non-party. If a request for discovery from a nonparty is challenged solely on the ground that it exceeds the permissible scope of matters material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of the action, a motion to quash is properly denied if that threshold requirement is satisfied, or properly granted if the discovery sought is not material and necessary.
The Court held that in this action for a divorce and ancillary relief in which the parties seek, inter alia, the equitable distribution of marital assets, "the entire financial history of the marriage is open for examination," and "[broad pretrial disclosure enabling both spouses to obtain necessary information regarding the value and nature of the marital assets is deemed critical if the trial court is to properly distribute the marital assets.” The two subpoenas at issue sought financial records including periodic statements for any accounts in the plaintiff's name for the time period of "January 1, 2002 to the present." The court found that this information was material and necessary as an aid to the parties in determining the value and nature of the marital assets and an aid to the trial court in properly distributing those assets. Since the defendant met the threshold requirement, an order quashing the subpoenas could not be premised on the ground that the requested disclosure was not material or necessary to the prosecution or defense of this action.
Beyond the requirement of materiality and necessity which defines the scope of permissible discovery, a disclosure request directed to a nonparty implicates considerations in addition to those governing discovery from a party. The Court noted that CPLR 3101, entitled "Scope of Disclosure," sets forth general requirements applicable to all discovery. At one time, CPLR 3101 allowed disclosure as against a nonparty only "where the court on motion determines that there are adequate special circumstances. In 1984, the Legislature amended CPLR 3101(a)(4) to eliminate the "on motion" and "special circumstances" language, substituting therefor the requirement that such disclosure be obtained "upon notice stating the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required.” The 1984 amendment, however, did not change the requirement that a party obtain "[a] court order upon a showing of special circumstances" when further disclosure is sought concerning the expected testimony of an expert witness; this is the sole remaining subsection with the "special circumstances" language. After the 1984 amendment, CPLR 3120, which specifically governs document production, continued to require a court order for discovery from a nonparty. Subdivision (b) of that Rule required the party seeking disclosure to obtain the order upon motion with notice to adverse parties and the nonparty from whom disclosure was sought. In 2002, the Legislature amended CPLR 3120, dispensing with the need to make a motion and requiring CPLR 3120, as amended in 2002, requires only service of a subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents in the custody and control of a nonparty witness. The 2002 amendment brought nonparty document production into line with the procedure for compelling a nonparty witness to produce documents during the nonparty's deposition, which requires service of a subpoena without a motion or court order.
Justice Angiolillo noted that the Second Department has adhered to the view that a subpoena duces tecum served on a nonparty is "facially defective" and unenforceable if it neither contains, nor is accompanied by, a CPLR 3101(a)(4) notice stating the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required. However, it has indicated, in dicta, that such a facial defect might be remedied and in a case involving facially defective subpoenas that allegedly, dehors the record, were reissued with the required notice, it considered the merits of the showing in opposition to a motion to quash and found it lacking. The Second Department has not had occasion to consider whether a motion to quash for lack of the required notice may be successfully defeated upon an adequate showing of circumstances and reasons for the requested disclosure.
In this case the two subpoenas at issue contained a notice with a statement of circumstances and reasons why the defendant sought the disclosure. The question was whether the “circumstances and reasons” proffered by the defendant were sufficient to withstand the plaintiff's motion to quash.
The Court noted that after the 1984 amendment eliminating the "special circumstances" language, the departments of the Appellate Division differed in their interpretations of the "circumstances and reasons" requirement and the sufficiency of the showing necessary to withstand a challenge to disclosure from a nonparty. In 1988, the Second Department held, in a case involving a nonparty deposition, that the "special circumstances requirement survived the 1984 amendment to CPLR 3101(a)(4)". In light of the elimination from CPLR 3101(a)(4) in 1984 of the “special circumstances” language, the Second Department disapproved of further application of the "special circumstances" standard in its cases, except with respect to the limited area in which it remains in the statutory language, i.e., with regard to certain discovery from expert witnesses. It held that on a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum or for a protective order, in assessing whether the circumstances or reasons for a particular demand warrant discovery from a nonparty, those circumstances and reasons need not be shown to be "special circumstances."
Looking to the reasoning in its cases to find guidance with respect to the circumstances and reasons which it considered relevant to the inquiry with respect to discovery from a nonparty, the court noted that since Dioguardi, the Court has deemed a party's inability to obtain the requested disclosure from his or her adversary or from independent sources to be a significant factor in determining the propriety of discovery from a nonparty. A motion to quash is, thus, properly granted where the party issuing the subpoena has failed to show that the disclosure sought cannot be obtained from sources other than the nonparty, and properly denied when the party has shown that the evidence cannot be obtained from other sources. The cases have not exclusively relied on this consideration, however, and have weighed other circumstances which may be relevant in the context of the particular case in determining whether discovery from a nonparty is warranted such as a conflict in statements between the plaintiff and nonparty witness; unexplained discontinuance of the action against the witness, formerly a party; and previous inconsistencies in the nonparty's statements. The Court declined to set forth a comprehensive list of circumstances or reasons which would be deemed sufficient to warrant discovery from a nonparty in every case. Circumstances necessarily vary from case to case. The particular circumstances of each case must always weigh in the trial court's consideration of a discovery request and in our review of the trial court's exercise of its discretion. The Court emphasized that its cases have consistently adhered to the principle that "[more than mere relevance and materiality is necessary to warrant disclosure from a nonparty".
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court found that the defendant proffered circumstances and reasons in her notice on the face of each subpoena which amounted to no more than a statement that the information would be relevant and material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of the action. In opposition to the plaintiff's motion to quash, the defendant failed to add to this showing, arguing only generally that neither the plaintiff nor the nonparty financial institutions had affirmatively shown prejudice or inconvenience. This proffer was insufficient in the context of this case. The defendant sought discovery from the nonparties prior to expiration of the plaintiff's time to respond to her discovery demands. The defendant conceded that she has since received the plaintiff's voluminous response to her demands, consisting of approximately 27,000 pages of documents. The defendant should have reviewed the material received from the plaintiff to ascertain whether the information sought from the various nonparties was supplied by the plaintiff in his discovery responses. Had that procedure been followed, it may have obviated the need for, or significantly narrowed and focused, the subpoenas served on the nonparties. Accordingly, as the defendant did not make a sufficient showing of the circumstances and reasons discovery from the nonparties was warranted, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion to quash the subpoenas served on American Express and Principal Trust Company, f/k/a Delaware Charter Guarantee & Trust Company. The court also found merit, however, in that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was for an award of an interim counsel fee. It held that given the significant disparity in the parties' financial circumstances, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's request for counsel fees and directed the plaintiff to pay the defendant an interim counsel fee in the sum of $100,000.
Court of Appeals Reaffirms Alison D, and Rejects Parenthood by Equitable Estoppel But Recognizes Partner As Parent By Giving Full Faith and Credit to Vermont Civil Union
In Debra H v Janice R, ___NY3d___, 2010 WL 1752168 (N.Y.) the Court of Appeals reaffirmed it holding in Alison D v. Virginia M. (77 N.Y.2d 651 [1991] ), that only a child's biological or adoptive parent has standing to seek visitation against the wishes of a fit custodial parent. It rejected the argument that Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D. (7 N.Y.3d 320 [2006] ) endorsed a nonbiological or nonadoptive parent's right to invoke equitable estoppel to secure visitation or custody notwithstanding Alison D and held that Alison D., in conjunction with second-parent adoption, creates a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic breakups. However, because Debra H. and Janice R. entered into a civil union in Vermont before M.R.'s birth, it reversed the Appellate Division's for reasons of comity, holding that Debra H. was M.R.'s parent under Vermont law and, as a matter of comity she was his parent under New York law as well, thereby conferring standing for her to seek visitation and custody in a best-interest hearing. The Court limited its ruling, which did not resolve whether New York extends comity to the civil union for other purposes. It decided only that New York will recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont.
Respondent Janice R. was the biological mother of M.R., a six-year old boy conceived through artificial insemination and born in December 2003. Janice R. and petitioner Debra H. met in 2002 and entered into a civil union in the State of Vermont in November 2003, the month before M.R.'s birth. Janice R. repeatedly rebuffed Debra H.'s requests to become M.R.'s second parent by means of adoption. After the relationship between Janice R. and Debra H. soured and they separated in the spring of 2006, Janice R. allowed Debra H. to have supervised visits with M.R. each week. After a while Janice R. began scaling back the visits and then cut off all communication between Debra H. and M.R. Debra H. brought a proceeding against Janice R. in Supreme Court for joint legal and physical custody of M.R., restoration of access and decisionmaking authority with respect to his upbringing, and appointment of an attorney for the child. At the hearing Debra H. acknowledged the decision in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M. (77 N.Y.2d 651 [1991] ), which held that only a child's biological or adoptive parent has standing to seek visitation against the wishes of a fit custodial parent, but contended that Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D. (7 N.Y.3d 320 [2006] ) endorsed a nonbiological or nonadoptive parent's right to invoke equitable estoppel to secure visitation or custody notwithstanding Alison D. In support of this interpretation of our precedents, Debra H. emphasized that Shondel J. cited Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H. (246 A.D.2d 282, 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 [2d Dept 1998] ), a divorce proceeding in which the husband successfully invoked equitable estoppel to seek custody and visitation with a child born to the wife prior to the marriage, whom he neither fathered nor adopted. Debra H. also urged Supreme Court to consider the effect of the parties' civil union, and alluded to the Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins (180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951 [2006], cert denied 550 U.S. 918 [2007] ). Janice R. stressed that she had always spurned Debra H.'s entreaties to permit a second-parent adoption. She argued, among other things, that Alison D., which interpreted Domestic Relations Law 70, was not eroded or overruled by Shondel J
Supreme Court ruled in Debra H.'s favor. The judge reasoned that "it [was] inconsistent to estop a nonbiological father from disclaiming paternity in order to avoid support obligations, but preclude a nonbiological parent from invoking [equitable estoppel] against the biological parent in order to maintain an established relationship with the child" since, in either event, "the court's primary concern should be furthering the best interests of the child". Supreme Court concluded that the facts alleged by Debra H., if true, "establish[ed] a prima facie basis for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel." In this regard, the judge considered the parties' civil union to be "a significant, though not necessarily a determinative, factor in [Debra H.'s] estoppel argument" because, under Vermont law, "parties to a civil union are given the same benefits, protections and responsibilities . . . as are granted to those in a marriage," which "includes the assumption that the birth of a child during a couple's legal union is 'extremely persuasive evidence of joint parentage' " ( quoting Miller-Jenkins, 180 Vt. at 466, 912 A.2d at 971). Because of the many contested facts, however, Supreme Court ordered another hearing to resolve whether Debra H. stood in loco parentis to M.R., as she asserted, and therefore possessed standing to seek visitation and custody.
Janice R. appealed, and obtained a stay of the equitable-estoppel hearing ordered by Supreme Court, pending disposition of the appeal. On April 9, 2009, the Appellate Division unanimously reversed on the law, vacated Supreme Court's order, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The court acknowledged that while the "record indicate[d] that [Debra H.] served as a loving and caring parental figure during the first 2 1/2 years of [M.R.'s] life, she never legally adopted [him]" and, in accordance with Alison D ., "a party who is neither the biological nor the adoptive parent of a child lacks standing to seek custody or visitation rights under Domestic Relations Law 70" (61 AD3d 460, 461 [1st Dept 2009] ). The Appellate Division commented that, to the extent that denial of any right to equitable estoppel in this case might be considered inconsistent with Shondel J. and Jean Maby H., its own "reading of precedent was such that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may not be invoked where a party lacks standing to assert at least a right to visitation".
The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Read, reaffirmed its holding in Alison D., but reversed the Appellate Division's order in this case for reasons of comity in light of Debra H.'s status as M.R.'s parent under Vermont law. She pointed out that in Alison D., the court decided that DRL section 70 does not confer standing on a biological stranger to seek visitation with a child in the custody of a fit parent. Domestic Relations Law § 70(a) provides, in part, that "[w]here a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either parent for such time, under such regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions and directions, as the case may require, and may at any time thereafter vacate or modify such order.

The Court rejected Debra H.’s argument that the court should exercise what she characterized as longstanding common law and equitable powers to recognize the parentage of a nonbiological, nonadoptive individual on a theory of equitable estoppel and in the child's best interest. She asked the court to revisit and either distinguish or overrule Alison D., a case that closely resembles this one factually.

Judge Read explained that in that case Alison D., the former romantic partner of Virginia M., petitioned for visitation with Virginia M.'s child under Domestic Relations Law s 70. According to Alison D., she and Virginia M. established a relationship, began living together, and decided to have a child whom Virginia M. would conceive through artificial insemination. They agreed to share all parenting responsibilities, and continued to do so for the first two years of the child's life. When the child was about 2 1/2 years old, however, the parties ended their relationship and Alison D. moved out of the family home. The parties adhered to a visitation schedule for a time, but Virginia M. at first restricted and eventually stopped Alison D.'s contact with the child. In that case the Court rejected Alison D.'s argument that she "acted as a 'de facto' parent or that she should be viewed as a parent 'by estoppel ' " (Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 656, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 572 N.E.2d 27). The rationale of the Court in Alison D was that "[t]raditionally, in this State it is the child's mother and father who, assuming fitness, have the right to the care and custody of their child, even in situations where the nonparent has exercised some control over the child with the parents' consent ... To allow the courts to award visitation--a limited form of custody--to a third person would necessarily impair the parents' right to custody and control" (id. at 656-657, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 572 N.E.2d 27). Because Alison D. conceded that [Virginia M. was a fit parent, she had no right to petition the court to displace the choice made by the fit parent in deciding what is in the child's best interests. The Court emphasized that where the Legislature deemed it appropriate, it gave other categories of persons standing to seek visitation and it gave the courts the power to determine whether an award of visitation would be in the child's best interests" . Thus, it refused to read the term parent in section 70 to include categories of nonparents who have developed a relationship with a child or who have had prior relationships with a child's parents and who wish to continue visitation with the child. Judge Read noted that the in its decision in Alison D., the Court cited Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys (40 N.Y.2d 543 [1976] ) and Matter of Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG. (70 N.Y.2d 141 [1987] ), cases which set forth bedrock principles of family law. In Bennett, the Court held that the State "may not deprive a parent of the custody of a child absent surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances". Where extraordinary circumstances are present, the court determines custody based on the child's best interest. Concomitantly, in Ronald FF., it held that "[v]isitation rights may not be granted on the authority of the ... Bennett ... extraordinary circumstances rule, to a biological stranger where the child, born out of wedlock, is properly in the custody of his mother"; and further noted that the mother possessed a fundamental right "to choose those with whom her child associates," which the State may not "interfere with ... unless it shows some compelling State purpose which furthers the child's best interests".
Judge Read rejected Debra H.’s argument that the Court implicitly departed from Alison D. in Shondel J., where there were affirmed findings of fact that Mark D. had held himself out as the child's biological father, and had treated her as his daughter for the first 4 1/2 years of her life. When Shondel J. sought orders of filiation and support, Mark D. requested DNA testing. The Family Court hearing examiner ordered genetic marker tests, which revealed that Mark D. was not the child's biological father. Shondel J. was an unusual case because "the process was inverted": "The procedure contemplated by sections 418(a) and 532(a) of the Family Court Act is that Family Court should consider paternity by estoppel before it decides whether to test for biological paternity". The Court held in Shondel J. that "a man who has mistakenly represented himself as a child's father may be estopped from denying paternity, and made to pay child support, when the child justifiably relied on the man's representation of paternity, to the child's detriment". The Court premised its decision on "our precedents, the affirmed findings of fact and the legislative recognition of paternity by estoppel". On the latter point, it highlighted that although paternity by estoppel for purposes of child support "originated in case law," it was "now secured by statute in New York"; namely, sections 418(a) and 532(a) of the Family Court Act.
Judge Read pointed out that the Court did not mention Alison D. in Shondel J. Nor did it intend to signal disaffection with Alison D. by citing Jean Maby H., one of a handful of lower court decisions applying equitable estoppel to custody and visitation proceedings despite Alison D., where it considered and explicitly rejected this approach. The holding in Shondel J. was limited to the context in which that case arose--the procedure for determining the paternity of an "alleged father." The Court saw no inconsistency in applying equitable estoppel to determine filiation for purposes of support, but not to create standing when visitation and custody are sought. The Legislature has drawn the distinction in sections 418(a) and 532(a) of the Family Court Act which direct the courts to take equitable estoppel into account before ordering paternity testing, while section 70 of the Domestic Relations Law does not even mention equitable estoppel.
The Court rejected Debra H’s request to replace the bright-line rule in Alison D. with a complicated and non-objective test for determining so-called functional or de facto parentage. The Court stated that the flexible type of rule championed by Debra H. threatens to trap single biological and adoptive parents and their children in a limbo of doubt. These parents could not possibly know for sure when another adult's level of involvement in family life might reach the tipping point and jeopardize their right to bring up their children without the unwanted participation of a third party. It found significant that the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by" the United States Supreme Court (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 [2000] ). Courts must be sensible of "the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child" and protect the parent's "fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of" that child. In the Courts view, this fundamental right entitled biological and adoptive parents to refuse to allow a second-parent adoption, as Janice R. did, even if they have permitted or encouraged another adult to become a virtual parent of the child, as Debra H. insisted was the case here.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Janice R. that any change in the meaning of "parent" under our law should come by way of legislative enactment rather than judicial revamping of precedent. Whether to expand the standing to seek visitation and/or custody beyond what sections 70, 71 and 72 of the Domestic Relations Law currently encompass remains a subject for the Legislature's consideration.
The Courts reaffirmation of Alison D. did not dispose of this case, because Debra H. and Janice R. entered into a civil union in Vermont before M.R.'s birth. This circumstance presented two issues: (1) whether Debra H. was M.R.'s parent under Vermont law and, (2) in the event that she is, whether as a matter of comity she is his parent under New York law as well, thereby conferring standing for her to seek visitation and custody in a best-interest hearing.
Judge Read explained that Vermont's civil union statute provides that parties to a civil union shall have "all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law ... as are granted to spouses in a marriage" (Vt Stat Ann tit 15, 1204[a] ); and that they shall enjoy the same rights "with respect to a child of whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union," as "those of a married couple" (Vt Stat Ann tit 15, 1204[f] ). In Miller-Jenkins, the Vermont Supreme Court relied upon these provisions to hold that a child born by artificial insemination to one partner of a civil union should be deemed the other partner's child under Vermont law for purposes of determining custodial rights following the civil union's dissolution (Miller-Jenkins, 180 Vt. at 464-465, 912 A.2d at 969-970). The court concluded that in the context of marriage, a child born by artificial insemination was deemed the child of the husband even absent a biological connection. In light of section 1204 and by parity of reasoning, the court decided that the same result pertained to the partner in the civil union with no biological connection to the child.
Judge Read noted that the potential legal ramifications in New York of entering into a civil union in Vermont were uncertain in 2003, and remain unsettled except to the extent the Court resolves the specific issue--i.e., parentage--presented by this case. Whatever her motivation or expectation, Janice R. chose to travel to Vermont to enter into a civil union with Debra H. In light of the Miller-Jenkins decision, the Court concluded that Debra H. was M.R.'s parent under Vermont law as a result of that choice.
The next question was whether New York courts should accord comity to Vermont and recognize Debra H. as M.R.'s parent under New York law as well. Judge Read explained that the doctrine of comity "does not of its own force compel a particular course of action. Rather, it is an expression of one State's entirely voluntary decision to defer to the policy of another. Such a decision may be perceived as promoting uniformity of decision, as encouraging harmony among participants in a system of co-operative federalism, or as merely an expression of hope for reciprocal advantage in some future case in which the interests of the forum are more critical" (citing Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 580 [1980]). New York's "determination of whether effect is to be given foreign legislation is made by comparing it to our own public policy; and our policy prevails in case of conflict". The court locates the public policy of the state in "the law as expressed in statute and judicial decision" and also considers "the prevailing attitudes of the community". Even in the case of a conflict, however, New York's public policy may yield "in the face of a strong assertion of interest by the other jurisdiction" . The Court noted that New York will accord comity to recognize parentage created by an adoption in a foreign nation (citing see L.M.B. v. E.R.J., 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 01345, *4-5 [2010] [comity may be extended to a Cambodian adoption certificate so that an individual who is a child's father under Cambodian law is also his father under New York law] ). It saw no reason to withhold equivalent recognition where someone is a parent under a sister state's law. Janice R., as was her right as M .R.'s biological parent, did not agree to let Debra H. adopt M.R. But the availability of second-parent adoption to New Yorkers of the same sex negates any suggestion that recognition of parentage based on a Vermont civil union would conflict with our State's public policy. Nor would comity undermine the certainty that Alison D. promises biological and adoptive parents and their children: whether there has been a civil union in Vermont is as determinable as whether there has been a second-parent adoption. And both civil union and adoption require the biological or adoptive parent's legal consent, as opposed to the indeterminate implied consent featured in the various tests proposed to establish de facto or functional parentage. The Court commented that the decision does not lead to protracted litigation over standing and is consistent with New York's public policy by affording predictability to parents and children alike. The Court limited its ruling, which did not resolve whether New York extends comity to the civil union for other purposes. It decided only that New York will recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont. The determination that Debra H. was M.R.'s parent allowed her to seek visitation and custody at a best-interest hearing. There, she will have to establish facts demonstrating a relationship with M.R. that warrants an award in her favor.

The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the case remitted to Supreme Court for a best-interest hearing in accordance with this opinion.
Judge Graffeo concurred with Judge Read's analysis as well as the result she reached in a separate concurring opinon in which Judge Jones concurred. She wrote separately to explain why she believed the decision in Matter of Alison D. v. Virgina M. (77 N.Y.2d 651 [1991] ) must be reaffirmed. Judge Ciparick, concurred in the result in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurred. She agreed with the majority that principles of comity require the recognition of Debra H.'s parentage of M.R. because of the Vermont civil union between the parties, but wrote separately to set forth her view that Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M. (77 N.Y.2d 651 [1991] should be overruled as outmoded and unworkable. Judge Smith concurred in the result in an opinion.

Court of Appeals Holds Equitable Estoppel May Be Used by Biological Father to Prevent Child's Mother from Asserting Biological Paternity, When Mother Has Acquiesced in the Development of a Close Relationship Between the Child and Another Father Figure, and it Would Be Detrimental to the Child's Interests to Disrupt That Relationship.

In Matter of Juanita A, v Kenneth Mark N., ___NY3d___, 2010 WL 1752194 (N.Y.) the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Pigott, held that under the circumstances of this case, where another father-figure is present in the child's life, a biological father may assert an equitable estoppel defense in paternity and child support proceedings. The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be used by a purported biological father to prevent a child's mother from asserting biological paternity, when the mother has acquiesced in the development of a close relationship between the child and another father figure, and it would be detrimental to the child's interests to disrupt that relationship.
On June 25, 1994, the child, A., was born. At the time, mother was unmarried, but living with Raymond S., who was listed as A.'s father on her birth certificate. The Mother and Raymond had a previous child together and, after the birth of A., had another child. When A. was seven years old, during a family dispute, she became aware that Raymond may not be her biological father. At that time, the mother called Kenneth at his home in Florida and had him speak with A. The conversation lasted less than ten minutes, during which time A. asked questions concerning his physical characteristics. Kenneth's attempt to speak with A. a second time was rebuffed by Raymond, who warned Kenneth not to speak to A. again. Kenneth had no further contact with A. In 2006, when A. was approximately twelve years old, the mother filed a petition against Kenneth, seeking an order of filiation and child support. Kenneth appeared before Family Court for the first time by way of telephone. Kenneth agreed to the ordered genetic marker testing, which indicated a 99.99% probability that Kenneth was A.'s biological father. When the issue of equitable estoppel was raised by Kenneth, the Magistrate, lacking the authority to hear that issue, transferred the case to a Judge of the Family Court. That court, determining the issue on motion papers and oral argument, held that Kenneth was the father of A. and entered an order of filiation.

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable in paternity proceedings only where it is invoked to further the best interests of the child, and "generally is not available to a party seeking to disavow the allegation of parenthood for the purpose of avoiding child support" (63 AD3d 1662 [4th Dept 2009] ).
Judge Pigott pointed out that in Shondel J. v. Mark D. (7 N.Y.3d 320 [2006] ), the Court set forth the law applicable to equitable estoppel in paternity and child support proceedings. The Court noted there that the "purpose of equitable estoppel is to preclude a person from asserting a right after having led another to form the reasonable belief that the right would not be asserted, and loss or prejudice to the other would result if the right were asserted. The law imposes the doctrine as a matter of fairness. Its purpose is to prevent someone from enforcing rights that would work injustice on the person against whom enforcement is sought and who, while justifiably relying on the opposing party's actions, has been misled into a detrimental change of position." It concluded that the "paramount" concern in such cases "has been and continues to be the best interests of the child".
Judge Pigott stated that equitable estoppel has been used, as it was in Shondel J., to prevent a man from avoiding child support by claiming that he is not the child's biological father. In such a case, the man has represented himself to be the child's father and the child's best interests are served by a declaration of fatherhood. The doctrine in this way protects the status interests of a child in an already recognized and operative parent-child relationship. Here, Kenneth sought to invoke the doctrine against mother, who led Kenneth to form the reasonable belief that he was not a father and that Raymond was A .'s father. He argued that it was not in A.'s best interest to have her current, child-father relationship with Raymond interrupted.
At the time the petition was brought, A. was 12 years old and had lived in an intact family with Raymond and her mother. His name appeared on her birth certificate and he was the biological father of her older and younger siblings. For most of A.'s life, she referred to Raymond as father. Thus, Kenneth appropriately raised an issue as to whether it was in A.'s best interest to have someone besides Raymond declared her father this late in her childhood.
The Court concluded it was proper for him to assert a claim of estoppel to, among other things, protect the status of that parent-child relationship.
The Court disagreed with the Law Guardian's position that a person who has already been determined to be a child's biological father cannot raise an equitable estoppel argument. The doctrine has been used to prevent a biological father from asserting paternity rights when it would be detrimental to the child's interests to disrupt the child's close relationship with another father figure. The same best-interests considerations that justify estopping a biological father from asserting his paternity may justify preventing a mother from asserting it. Whether it is being used in the offensive posture to enforce rights or the defensive posture to prevent rights from being enforced, equitable estoppel is only to be used to protect the best interests of the child. Therefore, the Court held that that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be used by a purported biological father to prevent a child's mother from asserting biological paternity, when the mother has acquiesced in the development of a close relationship between the child and another father figure, and it would be detrimental to the child's interests to disrupt that relationship.
The Court concluded that a hearing was needed to decide the merits of Kenneth's claim. At that hearing, Raymond had to be joined as a necessary party, so that Family Court may consider the nature of his relationship with the child and make a proper determination of A.'s best interests. It remitted the matter to Family Court for such a hearing and determination.
In a footnote Judge Pigott pointed out that Family Court should have addressed the equitable estoppel issue prior to directing that Kenneth undergo genetic marker tests. The fact that testing was conducted, however, does not bar the court from thereafter deciding the estoppel issue, as Shondel itself held.



Court of Appeals Holds Family Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Support Petition Brought Pursuant to "UIFSA" by Biological Parent Seeking Child Support from Former Same-sex Partner.


In the Matter of H.M. v. E.T. ___NY3d___, 48 opn 10 (2010) the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Ciparek, held that the Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") (Family Ct Act art 5-B) by a biological parent seeking child support from her former same-sex partner. The Court concluded that because H.M. asserted that E.T. was the child's parent, and was chargeable with the child's support, the case was within the Family Court's Article 4 jurisdiction. It did not decide whether it was also, as the Support Magistrate and the Appellate Division dissent concluded, within that Court's Article 5 jurisdiction. Nor did it decide the merits of H.M.'s support claim.

H.M. sought child support from E.T. According to H.M.'s allegations, which the court took as true for present purposes, the parties were involved in a romantic relationship in New York from 1989 through 1995, and cohabited during much, if not all, of that period. During the first year of their relationship, they planned to conceive and raise a child together, discussing available methods of conception, child-rearing practices, and whether the child would be raised as a sibling of E.T.'s children from a prior relationship. In 1993, after many failed attempts, H.M. became pregnant by artificial insemination. E.T. performed the procedure by which H.M. was inseminated.

H.M. gave birth to a son in September 1994. E.T. was present at the delivery and cut the umbilical cord, and the parties shared the expenses associated with the conception and birth of the child. After the child's birth, both parties participated in his care. However, four months after the child was born, E.T. ended the relationship. H.M., a Canadian citizen, moved into her parents' residence in Montreal with the child. An attempted reconciliation in 1997 failed, although E.T. continued to provide H.M. with gifts for the child and monetary contributions for the child's care at unspecified times after the parties' separation.

In 2006, H.M. filed an application in Ontario, Canada, seeking a declaration of parentage and an order of child support establishing monthly payments retroactive to the child's birth. Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), H.M.'s application was transferred to Family Court, Rockland County.

At an appearance before a Family Court Support Magistrate, E.T. moved to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The Support Magistrate dismissed the petition, agreeing with E.T. that no legal basis for jurisdiction existed. H.M. filed written objections to the Support Magistrate's order, and Family Court subsequently reversed the order of dismissal and ordered a hearing to determine whether E.T. should be equitably estopped from denying parentage and support obligations.

E.T. appealed. The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed and reinstated the Support Magistrate's order dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (see Matter of H.M. v E.T., 65 AD3d 119 [1st Dept 2009]).

H.M. appealed as of right pursuant to CPLR 5601 (a) from the Appellate Division order reinstating the Support Magistrate's order of dismissal, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

In 1996, the United States Congress required each state to enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), to ensure uniformity in interstate actions for the establishment, enforcement, and modification of spousal and child support orders (see 42 USC § 666 [f]; Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 10 NY3d 60, 65 [2008]). New York adopted UIFSA in 1997, designating Family Court as our UIFSA "tribunal" (see Family Ct Act § 580-102 ["The family court is the tribunal of this state."]). With respect to the law to be applied by Family Court, UIFSA states that "Except as otherwise provided by this article, a responding tribunal of this state: (1) shall apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings; and (2) shall determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state"(Family Court Act § 580-303).

Article VI of the state Constitution establishes "[t]he family court of the state of New York" (NY Const., art VI, § 13 [a]). Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, constrained to exercise only those powers granted to it by the state Constitution or by statute (see Matter of Johna M.S. v Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364, 366 [2008]). Thus, in addition to establishing Family Court, the Constitution enumerates the powers thereof. Among the "classes of actions and proceedings" over which the Constitution grants Family Court jurisdiction are proceedings to determine "the support of dependents except for support incidental to actions and proceedings in this state for marital separation, divorce, annulment of marriage or dissolution of marriage" (NY Const., art VI, § 13 [b] [4]).

Article 4 of the Family Court Act more specifically defines Family Court's role with respect to support. Family Court Act § 413 [1] [a] provides, among other things, that "the parents of a child under the age of twenty-one years are chargeable with the support of such child and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, shall be required to pay for child support a fair and reasonable sum as the court may deteermine".
Judge Ciparek held that Family Court indisputably has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual parent, regardless of gender,is responsible for the support of a child (see Family Court Act § 413 [1] [a]). Moreover, statutory jurisdiction, as Family Court has,carries with it such ancillary jurisdiction as is necessary to fulfill the court's core function. Thus, because Family Court unquestionably has the subject matter jurisdiction to ascertain the support obligations of a female parent, Family Court also has the inherent authority to ascertain in certain cases whether a female respondent is, in fact, a child's parent.
Article 4 of the Family Court Act establishes the public policy of the State in favor of obligating individuals, regardless of gender, to provide support for their children.
The dissent argued that such relief can be afforded only in Supreme Court, a court of original trial jurisdiction. However, family Court and Supreme Court have co-extensive authority, concurrent jurisdiction, in relation to child support matters. The Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court Act are identical in the establishment of statewide child support guidelines applicable to all child support proceedings, whether brought initially in Family Court or brought in Supreme Court as ancillary to a matrimonial action or custody proceeding. Moreover, under the guidelines adopted in New York as the Child Support Standards Act (L 1989, ch 567), both parents have an obligation to contribute to the economic well-being of their children. The relevant co-extensive statutes, Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240, are capable of being enforced in a fashion that does not disadvantage a litigant in Family Court.
The Court concluded that because H.M. asserted that E.T. was the child's parent, and was chargeable with the child's support, this case was within the Family Court's Article 4 jurisdiction. It did not decide whether it was also, as the Support Magistrate and the Appellate Division dissent concluded, within that Court's Article 5 jurisdiction. Nor did it decide the merits of H.M.'s support claim.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Smith and Pigott concured, Judge Smith in a separate concurring opinion. Judge Jones dissented and votes to affirm in an opinion in which Judges Graffeo and Read concurred.


Court of Appeals Holds Egregious Misconduct Must Be an Exceptional Situation, Due to Outrageous or Conscience-shocking Conduct. Absent Those Circumstances, Liberal Discovery on Issues of Marital Fault, Should Not Ordinarily Be Permitted.


In Howard S v Lillian S, ___NY3d ___, No. 71 (2010) the plaintiff husband and defendant wife were married in May 1997. Defendant had one child from a previous relationship, who was later adopted by plaintiff. Three other children were born during the marriage The youngest child, born in 2004, was the product of an extramarital affair between defendant and an unidentified man. Plaintiff, unaware of his wife's infidelity until the child was over three years old, raised that child as his own. Plaintiff alleged that, although defendant knew or should have known that the child was not plaintiff's, she withheld that information from him. In 2007, defendant allegedly commenced another extramarital affair with an individual who was initially named as a co-respondent in this action. Plaintiff confronted defendant with his suspicions of her infidelity, but she denied that she was unfaithful. Defendant maintained that there were no grounds for divorce and the parties entered into the collaborative law process at her suggestion. Several months later, plaintiff obtained the results of a DNA marker test revealing that he was not the biological father of the youngest child. Soon thereafter, plaintiff commenced an action for divorce, based on cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery, and he interposed a cause of action for fraud. The fraud allegations stated that defendant represented that she had been faithful to plaintiff and that he continued to participate in the marriage in reliance upon those representations to his financial detriment. He sought to recover damages under the fraud claim based upon costs he incurred due to defendant's failure to disclose her adultery. Plaintiff sought equitable distribution of the marital property, alleging that the bulk of the property should be awarded to him due to defendant's egregious fault. Defendant moved to dismiss or sever the fraud cause of action and plaintiff cross-moved for liberal discovery relating to his fraud claim and to the issue of defendant's egregious fault for purposes of equitable distribution. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and found that the complaint stated a cause of action for fraud, but limited plaintiff's available damages to his pecuniary loss in the form of collaborative law process fees. The court also denied plaintiff's cross motion for liberal discovery, finding that defendant's actions did not rise to the level of egregious fault. A majority of the Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that defendant's behavior did not constitute egregious fault such that it could be considered for purposes of equitable distribution (62 AD3d 187 [1st Dept 2009]). The Court further found that plaintiff could only pursue his claims of actual pecuniary loss under the fraud cause of action and rejected the claims for lost profits, child support and punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Lippman, affirmed noting that Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) sets forth the factors a court must consider when making an equitable distribution award. The statute does not specifically provide for consideration of marital fault, but does contain a catch-all provision that allows a court to consider "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][5][d][14]). He explained that in O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 589-590 [1985] the Court had previously rejected the notion that marital fault is a "just and proper" factor for consideration, except in egregious cases which shock the conscience of the court, This rule is based, in part, upon the recognition that marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership and that the marital estate should be divided accordingly. In O’Brien the Court also observed that "fault will usually be difficult to assign and that introduction of the issue may involve the courts in time-consuming procedural maneuvers relating to collateral issues. Judge Lippman observed that although the Court of Appeals had not had occasion to further define egregious conduct, courts have agreed that adultery, on its own, does not ordinarily suffice. This makes sense because adultery is a ground for divorce, a basis for ending the marital relationship, not for altering the nature of the economic partnership.
The Court of Appeals held that, at a minimum, in order to have any significance at all, egregious conduct must consist of behavior that falls well outside the bounds of the basis for an ordinary divorce action. This is not to say that there can never be a situation where grounds for divorce and egregious conduct will overlap. However, it should be only a truly exceptional situation, due to outrageous or conscience-shocking conduct on the part of one spouse, that will require the court to consider whether to adjust the equitable distribution of the assets. The Court cited, as examples, a case involving the attempted bribery of the trial judge and a case involving a vicious assault of spouse in presence of the children. Absent these types of extreme circumstances, courts are not in the business of regulating how spouses treat one another. In a footnote the Court pointed out that to the extent that the Appellate Division opinion can be read to limit egregious conduct to behavior involving extreme violence, the definition should not be so restrictive.
The majority opinion appears to have adopted the rule of the First and Second Departments that a party is not entitled to discovery on the issue of fault. Judge Lippman pointed out that although CPLR 3101 provides for "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action," Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B)(5)(d) is the specific statutory provision that governs equitable distribution in marital actions. He explained despite the general policy in favor of liberal discovery, the Court has interpreted the more specific section of the Domestic Relations Law to allow for consideration of marital fault in only a limited set of circumstances involving egregious conduct. In the absence of those circumstances, liberal discovery on issues of marital fault, at variance with O'Brien, should not ordinarily be permitted, though there may be exceptions in rare circumstances. The rationale behind this conclusion was that despite the availability of protective orders, if courts were to consider these matters on a case by case basis, there remains significant potential for abuse and harassment as a result of such discovery, as well as the possibility that parties will be induced to enter into disadvantageous settlements rather than litigate these types of intensely personal issues.
Judge Pigott dissented in an opinion. In his view it was premature to rule that wife's behavior did not, as a matter of law, constitute egregious misconduct for purpose of equitable distribution under the Domestic Relations Law. Therefore, the husband was entitled to discovery on his claim.