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Saturday, December 28, 2013

Important New Decisions - December 28, 2013




First Department Holds Parents Who Are Directed to Pay Fees of Attorney Appointed to Represent Child May Raise Defense of Legal Malpractice to Attorney's Claim For Fees.

In Venecia C. v. August V., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2013 WL 6325172 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.), the divorced parents had three children, age 17, 14 and 11. In the divorce action, although the parties stipulated to joint custody, it was left to the trial court to direct that plaintiff mother would have primary residential custody in the marital apartment in Manhattan. In 2009, the mother moved for an order allowing her to relocate with the children to Demarest, New Jersey, approximately 12 miles outside Manhattan, and the father responded by moving for a change of custody. The motion court appointed the attorney for the children in this context. On November 22, 2011, the attorney for the children moved for an order directing the father to pay the outstanding fees he owed in the amount of $2,034.60, and for an additional sum covering the cost of making the enforcement application. The attorney for the children stated that the father never objected to any of her bills and had previously paid his 30% share of the fees billed. The motion court granted the motion by the attorney for the children, ordering the father to pay the sum of $2,034.60 for his share of outstanding fees, as well as $1,500 for fees she incurred in making the application. It rejected the argument that the Court's ruling in Mars v. Mars (19 AD3d at 196), gave a parent the right to challenge the fee of an attorney for the child on the ground of malpractice. In any event, it found no factual basis for the malpractice claim.

The Appellate Division, in an opinion by Justice Saxe, held that parents who are directed to pay the fees of the attorney appointed to represent the children may raise the defense of legal malpractice to that attorney's claim for fees. He observed that in Mars v. Mars (19 AD3d at 196), the Court held that a parent may assert legal malpractice as an affirmative defense to a Law Guardian's fee application "to the extent of challenging that portion of the fees attributable to advocacy, as opposed to guardianship." He noted that the ruling was limited by the then-prevailing view that attorneys appointed as law guardians for children in divorce cases often functioned in a role similar to a guardian ad litem, advocating for what they believed to be the best interests of the child, as opposed to what the child desired. The Court reaffirmed the essence of the Mars v. Mars ruling, namely that a parent may assert legal malpractice as an affirmative defense to the fee claim of an attorney for a child. The attorney for the child, no less than the attorneys for the parties, is serving as a professional and must be equally accountable to professional standards. That the children cannot hire and pay for their own attorneys, leaving it to the court to make the necessary appointment, does not alter the applicable standards, or the means by which they may be raised. 

Notwithstanding that the father may have standing to assert such a defense, Justice Saxe agreed with the motion court that the father's accusations here did not establish a prima facie showing of legal malpractice and disciplinary violations. He also found that the father never objected to any of the bills presented by the attorney for the children despite the fact that they were in his possession for a significant amount of time (Pedreira v. Pedreira, 34 AD3d 225 [1st Dept 2006] ). The court therefore acted properly in ordering him to pay the fees under an account stated theory (Shaw v. Silver, 95 AD3d 416, 416 [1st Dept 2010] ).



Second Department Holds Petitioner must Demonstrate Respondent’s Conduct Was Intended to Cause, or Recklessly Created a Risk of Causing, Public Inconvenience, Annoyance, or Alarm.

In Casie v Casie, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2013 WL 3813824 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Second Department, in an opinion by Judge Skelos, held that to establish the family offense of disorderly conduct, a petitioner must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was intended to cause, or recklessly created a risk of causing, public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.

On February 15, 2012, the petitioner, Dionne Cassie, filed a family offense petition against her husband, Richard Cassie which alleged that, on February 11, 2012, the parties engaged in a dispute or altercation because the husband had promised that he was going to leave the marital home and had "reneged on his promise." According to the wife, the husband attempted, unsuccessfully, to push her down a flight of stairs, twisted her arm, causing pain, and pushed her against a wall. Based upon this alleged conduct, the wife asserted that the husband had committed the family offenses of, among others, attempted assault, assault in the second or third degree, harassment in the first or second degree, and disorderly conduct. The wife requested an order of protection requiring the husband to stay away from her and the marital home.
At the close of the evidence, the Family Court found that the husband "engaged in the offense of disorderly conduct in the home, in that he fought with [the wife]." The court thereupon issued a two-year order of protection , directing the husband to refrain from various forms of conduct, such as harassment and disorderly conduct.

The Appellate Division reversed in an opinion by Justice Skelos. He observed that in a family offense proceeding, the petitioner has the burden of establishing, by a "fair preponderance of the evidence," that the charged conduct was committed as alleged in the petition. (Family Ct Act § 832). Under the Penal Law, "A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: 1. He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or 2. He makes unreasonable noise; or 3. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture;..."(Penal Law § 240.20). Justice Skelos pointed out that critical to a charge of disorderly conduct is a finding that the disruptive statements and behavior were of a public rather than an individual dimension". In that respect, a person may be guilty of disorderly conduct only when the situation extends beyond the exchange between the individual disputants to a point where it becomes a potential or immediate public problem. In assessing whether an act carries public ramifications, relevant factors to consider are the time and place of the episode under scrutiny; the nature and character of the conduct; the number of other people in the vicinity; whether they are drawn to the disturbance and, if so, the nature and number of those attracted; and any other relevant circumstances. The complicating factor in this case, which was a family offense proceeding rather than a criminal action, is that Family Court Act § 812 provides: "For purposes of this article, 'disorderly conduct' includes disorderly conduct not in a public place" (Family Ct Act §812[1] ). The husband contended that, even though the Family Court Act specifies that the conduct need not occur in a public place, the petitioner must nonetheless prove either an intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or the reckless creation of a risk thereof.

Justice Skelos pointed out that the First and Fourth Departments had held, albeit summarily, that lack of proof of an intent to cause, or reckless creation of a risk of causing, public ramifications, required dismissal of those branches of family offense petitions that charged the respondent with disorderly conduct. Matter of Janice M. v. Terrance J. ,96 A.D.3d 482, 945 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1st Dept); Matter of Brazie v. Zenisek, 99 A.D.3d 1258, 951 N.Y.S.2d 458(4th Dept). Here, the Court now held that even where the conduct at issue is alleged to have occurred in a private residence, in order for a petitioner to meet his or her burden of establishing the family offense of disorderly conduct, there must be a prima facie showing that the conduct was either intended to cause, or recklessly created a risk of causing, public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. The intent to cause, or recklessness in causing, public harm, is the mens rea of the offense of disorderly conduct. The plain language of the provision of Family Court Act § 812, in contrast, provides only that the conduct need not occur in a public place. The plain language of Family Court Act § 812 therefore pertains only to the actus reus of the offense-specifically, the place where it is committed-and does not speak to the mens rea of the offense. Indeed, since Family Court Act § 812 does not specify an alternative culpable mental state, if the mens rea provided for in the Penal Law were not applicable in family offense proceedings, it is unclear what the mens rea of this family offense would be.

The Court held that that the wife was required to prove that the husband's conduct was committed with the intent to cause, or recklessly posed a risk of causing, public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. The wife did not sustain that burden. Accordingly, the order of protection was reversed, on the facts, the petition was denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

2013 New York Legislature Enacts Laws Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence

The 2013 New York Legislature amended  Domestic Relations Law, the Family Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Law, to protect victims of domestic abuse by recognizing, as family offenses, some forms of economic abuse perpetrated against victims by their abusers. 

Family Court Act, §812 (1), Family Court Act § 821 (1) (a), Criminal Procedure Law § 530.11, were amended to add as family offenses, identity theft in the first degree, identity theft in the second degree and identity theft in the third degree (Penal Law §190.80, §190.79 and §190.38), grand larceny in the third degree and grand larceny in the forth degree ( Penal Law §155.35 and §155 30), and coercion in the second degree (Penal Law § 135.60, subdivisions one, two and three.) Laws of 2013, Ch 526, effective December 18, 2013. See NY Legis Memo 526 (2013)


Domestic Relations Law § 240 (3) (a), Domestic Relations Law § 252, Family Court Act § 446, Family Court Act § 551, Family Court Act § 656, Family Court Act § 842, Family Court Act § 1056, and Criminal Procedure Law § 530.12 were amended to provide that an order of protection may require the petitioner or respondent to promptly return specified identification documents to the protected party, in whose favor the order of protection or temporary order of protection is issued. "Identification document" means any of the following exclusively in the name of the protected party: birth certificate, passport, social security card, health insurance or other benefits card, a card or document used to access bank, credit or other financial accounts or records, tax returns, any driver's license, and immigration documents including but not limited to a United States permanent resident card and employment authorization document. Upon motion and after notice and an opportunity to be heard, "Identification document" means any of the following, including those that may reflect joint use or ownership, that the court determines are necessary and are appropriately transferred to the protected party: any card or document used to access bank, credit or other financial accounts or records, tax returns, and any other identifying cards and documents. The order may include any appropriate provision designed to ensure that any such document is available for use as evidence in the proceeding, and available if necessary for legitimate use by the party against whom the order is issued; and specify the manner in which such return shall be accomplished. Laws of 2013, Ch 526, effective December 18, 2013. See NY Legis Memo 526 (2013)

The 2013 legislature amended the domestic relations law, the family court act and the criminal procedure law to protect victims of domestic violence from being charged with and prosecuted for violating their own order of protection.

Among other statutes amended Domestic Relations Law § 240, (3) (b) was amended and a new paragraph i was added. Domestic Relations Law §252 (2) was amended and a new subdivision 9-a was added. The amendments make it clear that victims cannot be prosecuted for violating orders of protection issued in their favor, and are intended to clarify that the protected party in whose favor the order of protection or temporary order of protection is issued may not be held to violate an order issued in his or her favor and that such protected party may not be arrested for violating such an order. The amendments require a notice in orders of protection that make it clear that the order of protection will remain in effect even if the protected party has, or consents to have, contact or communication with the restrained party and that the protected party cannot be held to violate an order issued in his/her favor nor can such party be arrested for violating such an order. The amendments were enacted November 13, 2013 and apply to all orders of protection regardless of when such orders were issued, except for sections of the law that require the addition of a notice on the order of protection, which sections are effective on January 12, 2013, and shall apply to orders issued on or after such effective date. Laws of 2013, Ch 480, effective November 13, 2013.


2013 New York Legislation Restricts Parental Rights of Sexual Perpetrators When a Child Is Born as a Result of Sexual Offenses.

Domestic Relations Law 240 (1-c) was amended to provide that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests of the child to be placed in the custody of or to visit with a person who has been convicted (in this state or in another jurisdiction) of one or more of the following sexual offenses, when a child who is subject of the proceeding was conceived as a result: rape in the first or second degree; course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree; predatory sexual assault; or predatory sexual assault against a child. Laws of 2013, Ch 371, §1, effective immediately.



Domestic Relations Law 111-a (1) was amended to provide that a person who has been convicted (in this state or in another jurisdiction) of rape in the first or second degree; course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree; predatory sexual assault; or predatory sexual assault against a child shall not be entitled to receive notice of adoption proceedings, when the child subject to these proceedings was conceived as the result of the sexual offenses committed. Laws of 2013, Ch 371, §2, effective immediately.

Wednesday, August 14, 2013

Second Department Clarifies CPLR 2215 Rule Regarding Cross Motions

In Fried v. Holding, 2011-00620, NYLJ 1202614927053, at *1 (App. Div., 2nd, Decided August 7, 2013) Justice Balkin, in an opinion for the court clarified the rules with regard to the service of a notice of cross motion. She pointed out that before 1981, CPLR 2215 ("Relief demanded by other than moving party") said: "At least three days prior to the time at which the motion is noticed to be heard, a party may serve upon the moving party a notice demanding relief, with or without supporting papers. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded; relief need not be responsive to that demanded by the moving party."

This vaguely worded provision caused uncertainty about what, exactly, was "a notice demanding relief." The Judicial Conference and the Chief Administrator proposed a solution, namely, the insertion of the phrase "of cross-motion" into the first sentence of CPLR 2215, so that it would say: "[a]t least three days prior to the time at which the motion is noticed to be heard, a party may serve upon the moving party a notice of cross-motion demanding relief, with or without supporting papers." A memorandum submitted in support of the statutory amendment indicated that the proposed amendment was "strictly intended to clarify the obligations of a cross-movant [and] is not intended to place any restriction on the court's powers to grant affirmative relief" (Mem. Office of Court Admin., McKinney's Session Laws 1980, at 1965). The Legislature adopted the change (see L 1980, ch 132). Despite the hope and intent to clarify the "obligations" of a cross movant, the Memorandum itself led to some confusion over whether a notice of cross motion is mandatory 3. Precedent on the issue has not been consistent (see Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac CPLR ¶2215.01 at 22-89).

Justice Balkin concluded that given the language of CPLR 2215, and the contexts in which it is applicable, the most reasonable interpretation of the statute is that a party seeking relief in connection with another party's motion is, as a general rule, required to do so by way of a cross motion, at least to have a right that the request be determined on the merits. Otherwise, a party who seeks relief by way of a notice of cross motion would be in a position less favorable than that of a party who merely makes the request without a notice of cross motion: the party who makes a formal cross motion would be required to comply with the notice and service requirements and deadlines imposed by the statute, but a party seeking relief merely by requesting it would enjoy greater flexibility. Nonetheless, courts retain discretion to entertain requests for affirmative relief that do not meet the requirements of CPLR 2215. Litigants, however, must be cognizant of an important distinction between the two situations: a party in compliance with CPLR 2215 is entitled to have its cross motion considered; a party not in compliance with the statute must hope that the court opts, in the exercise of its discretion, to entertain the request. Thus, the Second Department was in agreement with the Appellate Division, Third Department, who, in Fox Wander W. Neighborhood Assn. v. Luther Forest Community Assn. (178 AD2d at 872), held that, even in the absence of an explicit notice of cross motion, the Supreme Court is not "prohibited" from entertaining the nonmoving party's request for relief.

Justice Balkin emphasized that as with most matters addressed to a court's discretion, more than one factor is relevant, including the need to encourage careful, forthright practice. Other relevant factors include the interrelatedness of the relief requested by the nonmoving party and the relief requested in the main motion, the prominence in the opposition papers of the affirmative request for relief and the movant's opportunity to address that request, and the interest of judicial economy. Another consideration for careful practitioners is the availability of appellate review. A request for relief made in the absence of a notice of cross motion is not a "motion made upon notice", so an order granting or denying the request is not appealable as of right, and permission to appeal is necessary. By contrast, generally, a party may appeal as of right to challenge the disposition of a motion or cross motion made on notice.

http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/CaseDecisionNY.jsp?id=1202614927053

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Uniform Rules Amended to Encourage Court Conferences By Telephone

The Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court, were amended by adding a new section 202.10, relating to appearances at conferences, to provide that any party may request to appear at a conference by telephonic or other electronic means. It appears that “other electronic means” refers to video conference or computer video services such as “skype”. The rule encourages the court to grant the request where “feasible and appropriate”. See NYS Register/June 19, 2013 Court Notices, 80

Monday, July 08, 2013

Important New Decisions - July 8, 2013

Court of Appeals Agreements - Prenuptial - Validity - Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (3) - Court of Appeals Holds That Because Affidavit of Notary Was Insufficient to Raise a Question of Fact Precluding Summary Judgment the Court Did Not Need to “Definitively Resolve the Question of Whether a Cure Is Possible” Where There Is Omission in the Requisite Language of the Certificate of Acknowledgment, Signatures on the Prenuptial Agreement Are Authentic, and No Claims of Fraud or Duress. In Galetta v Galletta, __NY3d__, 2013 WL 2338421 (2013) a matrimonial action, plaintiff Michelle Galetta sought a determination that a prenuptial agreement she and defendant Gary Galetta signed was invalid due to a defective acknowledgment. The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment declaring the agreement to be unenforceable under Domestic Relations Law § 236B(3), and reversed the order of the Appellate Division, which held there was a triable question of fact on that issue. Michelle Galetta and Gary Galetta were married in July 1997. About a week before the wedding, they each separately signed a prenuptial agreement. Neither party was present when the other executed the document and the signatures were witnessed by different notaries public. The parties' signatures and the accompanying certificates of acknowledgment were set forth on a single page of the document. The certificates appeared to have been typed at the same time, with spaces left blank for dates and signatures that were to be filled in by hand. The certificate of acknowledgment relating to Michelle's signature contained the boilerplate language typical of the time. However, in the acknowledgment relating to Gary's signature, a key phrase was omitted and, as a result, the certificate failed to indicate that the notary public confirmed the identity of the person executing the document or that the person was the individual described in the document. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Graffeo, observed that Prenuptial agreements are addressed in Domestic Relations Law § 236B(3), which provides: “An agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded.” In Matisoff v. Dobi (90 N.Y.2d 127 [1997] ), where it held that an unacknowledged postnuptial agreement was invalid, the Court observed that the statute recognizes no exception to the requirement that a nuptial agreement be executed in the same manner as a recorded deed and “that the requisite formality explicitly specified in DRL 236B(3) is essential” (id. at 132, 659 N.Y.S.2d 209, 681 N.E.2d 376). Judge Graffeo noted that Real Property Law § 291, governing the recording of deeds, states that “[a] conveyance of real property ... on being duly acknowledged by the person executing the same, or proved as required by this chapter, ... may be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county where such real property is situated.” Thus, a deed may be recorded if it is either “duly acknowledged” or “proved” by use of a subscribing witness. The Court pointed out that an acknowledgment serves to prove the identity of the person whose name appears on an instrument and to authenticate the signature of such person and it imposes on the signer a measure of deliberation in the act of executing the document. The Court noted in Matisoff that the acknowledgment requirement imposed by Domestic Relations Law § 236B(3) is onerous and, in some respects, more exacting than the burden imposed when a deed is signed. Although an unacknowledged deed cannot be recorded (rendering it invalid against a subsequent good faith purchaser for value) it may still be enforceable between the parties to the document (i.e., the grantor and the purchaser). The same is not true for a nuptial agreement which is unenforceable in a matrimonial action, even when the parties acknowledge that the signatures are authentic and the agreement was not tainted by fraud or duress. In the certificate of acknowledgment relating to the husband's signature, the “to me known and known to me” phrase was omitted, leaving only the following statement: “On the 8[sic] day of July, 1997, before me came Gary Galetta described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.” Absent the omitted language, the certificate does not indicate either that the notary public knew the husband or had ascertained through some form of proof that he was the person described in the prenuptial agreement. As New York courts have long held that an acknowledgment that fails to include a certification to this effect is defective, the Court agreed the Appellate Division, which unanimously concluded that the certificate of acknowledgment did not conform with statutory requirements. Because the certificate of acknowledgment was defective, the Court of Appeals addressed the questions of (1) whether such a deficiency can be cured and, if so, (2) whether the affidavit of the notary public prepared in the course of litigation was sufficient to raise a question of fact precluding summary judgment in the wife's favor. Because the affidavit of the notary was insufficient to raise a question of fact precluding summary judgment the Court did not need to “definitively resolve the question of whether a cure is possible”. Judge Graffeo observed that in Matisoff, the Court found it was unnecessary to decide whether the absence of an acknowledgment could be cured. Since Matisoff, the Appellate Divisions have grappled with the “cure” issue, which has largely arisen in cases where a signature was not accompanied by any certificate of acknowledgment and the weight of Appellate Division authority is against permitting the absence of an acknowledgment to be cured after the fact, unless both parties engaged in a mutual “reaffirmation” of the agreement. When there is no acknowledgment at all, it is evident that one of the purposes of the acknowledgment requirement—to impose a measure of deliberation and impress upon the signer the significance of the document—has not been fulfilled. Thus, a rule precluding a party from attempting to cure the absence of an acknowledgment through subsequent submissions appeared to be sound. However, because this case did not involve the complete absence of an acknowledgment - there was an attempt to secure an acknowledged document but there was an omission in the requisite language of the certificate of acknowledgment - the Court noted that a compelling argument could be made that the door should be left open to curing a deficiency like the one that occurred here where the signatures on the prenuptial agreement are authentic, there are no claims of fraud or duress, and the parties believed their signatures were being duly acknowledged but, due to no fault of their own, the certificate of acknowledgment was defective or incomplete. The Court observed that the husband made a strong case for a rule permitting evidence to be submitted after the fact to cure a defect in a certificate of acknowledgment when that evidence consists of proof that the acknowledgment was properly made in the first instance—that at the time the document was signed the notary or other official did everything he or she was supposed to do, other than include the proper language in the certificate. By considering this type of evidence, courts would not be allowing a new acknowledgment to occur for a signature that was not properly acknowledged in the first instance; instead, parties who properly signed and acknowledged the document years before would merely be permitted to conform the certificate to reflect that fact. In this case, however, the proof submitted was insufficient. In his affidavit, the notary public did not state that he actually recalled having acknowledged the husband's signature, nor did he indicate that he knew the husband prior to acknowledging his signature. The notary averred only that he recognized his own signature on the certificate and that he had been employed at a particular bank at that time (corroborating the husband's statement concerning the circumstances under which he executed the document). As for the procedures followed, the notary had no independent recollection but maintained that it was his custom and practice “to ask and confirm that the person signing the document was the same person named in the document” and he was “confident” he had done so when witnessing the husband's signature. The affidavit by the notary public in this case merely paraphrased the requirement of the statute—he stated it was his practice to “ask and confirm” the identity of the signer—without detailing any specific procedure that he routinely followed to fulfill that requirement. Even assuming a defect in a certificate of acknowledgment could be cured under Domestic Relations Law § 236B(3), defendant's submission was insufficient to raise a triable question of fact as to the propriety of the original acknowledgment procedure. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to summary judgment declaring that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable. Child Custody - Visitation - Court of Appeals Holds That There Is a Rebuttable Presumption in New York That Visitation with Non-custodial Parent Is in Child's Best Interest. Parent’s Incarceration Not an Automatic Reason for Blocking Visitation In Matter of Granger v Miscercola, --- N.E.2d ----, 2013 WL 1798581 (N.Y.) Petitioner, an inmate in New York's correctional system, who had acknowledged paternity of a child prior to his imprisonment, commenced a Family Court proceeding seeking visitation with the child after respondent mother refused to bring the child to the prison. Family Court granted the petition, awarding petitioner periodic four-hour visits at the prison with the child, who was then three years old. It noted that "the law in New York presumes visitation with a non-custodial parent to be in the child's best interest and the fact that such parent is incarcerated is not an automatic reason for blocking visitation."The court found that petitioner had "demonstrated that he was involved in a meaningful way in the child's life prior to his incarceration and seeks to maintain a relationship." It further found that the child was old enough to travel to and from the prison by car without harm, and would "benefit from the visitation with his father."The court considered the length of petitioner's sentence and reasoned that "[l]osing contact for such a long period is felt to be detrimental to an established relationship."The court concluded that visitation with petitioner would be in the child's best interests. The Appellate Division affirmed Family Court's order, finding "a sound and substantial basis in the record to support the court's determination to grant the father visitation with the child in accordance with the schedule set forth in the order" ( 96 AD3d 1694, 1695 [4th Dept 2012] ). While his appeal was pending, petitioner had been moved to a different correctional facility, further from respondent's home. The Appellate Division made no finding of fact in this regard, ruling that any such change in circumstance was more appropriately the subject of a modification petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed rejecting Respondent's primary contention that the lower courts employed an incorrect legal standard in reviewing the petition for visitation. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Pigott, rejected Respondents contention that this presumption was contrary to this Court's holding in Tropea v. Tropea (87 N.Y.2d 727 [1996] ) pointing out that its holding was not that presumptions can never be relied upon, but that "each relocation request must be considered on its own merits ... and with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child". It observed that in Weiss v. Weiss (52 N.Y.2d 170 [1981] ), it held that "in initially prescribing or approving custodial arrangements, absent exceptional circumstances, such as those in which it would be inimical to the welfare of the child or where a parent in some manner has forfeited his or her right to such access, appropriate provision for visitation or other access by the noncustodial parent follows almost as a matter of course". Subsequent Appellate Division decisions have frequently referred to a rebuttable presumption that, in initial custodial arrangements, a noncustodial parent will be granted visitation. "[I]t is presumed that parental visitation is in the best interest of the child in the absence of proof that it will be harmful" or proof that the noncustodial parent has forfeited the right to visitation. Family Court noted that New York law "presumes visitation with a non-custodial parent to be in the child's best interest." The Court reiterated its holding in Weiss, that a rebuttable presumption that a noncustodial parent will be granted visitation is an appropriate starting point in any initial determination regarding custody and/or visitation. Moreover, the rebuttable presumption in favor of visitation applies when the parent seeking visitation is incarcerated. A parent who is in prison does not forfeit his or her visitation rights by being incarcerated. Petitioner's incarceration, standing alone, does not make a visitation order inappropriate," but a demonstration "that such visitation would be harmful to the child will justify denying such a request". In deciding whether the presumption is rebutted, the possibility that a visit to an incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child must be considered, together with other relevant facts. Visitation should be denied where it is demonstrated that under all the circumstances visitation would be harmful to the child's welfare, or that the right to visitation has been forfeited. The Court noted that In speaking of the manner in which the presumption of visitation may be rebutted, the Appellate Division has frequently used the terms "substantial proof" and "substantial evidence." "[T]he sweeping denial of the right of the father to visit or see the child is a drastic decision that should be based upon substantial evidence". This language is intended to convey to lower courts and practitioners that visitation will be denied only upon a demonstration-that visitation would be harmful to the child-that proceeds by means of sworn testimony or documentary evidence. It held that the "substantial proof" language should not be interpreted in such a way as to heighten the burden, of the party who opposes visitation, to rebut the presumption of visitation. The presumption in favor of visitation may be rebutted through demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeals concluded that the lower courts used the appropriate legal standard, applying the presumption in favor of visitation and considering whether respondent rebutted the presumption through showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that visitation would be harmful to the child. Termination of Parental Rights - Social Services Law § 384-b - Court of Appeals Holds that phrase "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" does not mean the same thing for purposes of Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (I) as it does under the Penal Law. In re Dashawn W., --- N.E.2d ----, 2013 WL 1759867 (N.Y.) the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Read, held that the phrase "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" does not mean the same thing for purposes of Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (I) as it does under the Penal Law. The Court also held that a showing of diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship is not prerequisite to a finding of severe abuse under Family Court Act § 1051 (e) where the fact-finder determines that such efforts would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. The Court of Appeals observed that at the conclusion of the fact-finding phase in an article 10 proceeding, Family Court may, "[i]n addition to a finding of abuse, . . . enter a finding of severe abuse as defined in [Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a)], which shall be admissible in a proceeding to terminate parental rights pursuant to [Social Services Law § 384-b]. If the court makes such additional finding of severe abuse . . ., the court shall state the grounds for its determination, which shall be based upon clear and convincing evidence" (Family Court Act § 1051 [e]. Section 384-b (8) (a) of the Social Services Law, in turn, specifies that "[f]or purposes of this section [384-b]," which governs termination of parental rights, a child is "severely abused" if "(I) the child has been found to be an abused child as a result of reckless or intentional acts of the parent committed under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, which result in serious physical injury to the child as defined in [Penal Law § 10.00 (10)]; or "(ii) the child has been found to be [a sexually abused child]; provided, however, the [parent] must have committed or knowingly allowed to be committed [one of 11 enumerated felony sex offenses] . . .; or "(iii) [the child's parent has been convicted of certain felony offenses under the Penal Law, and] the victim or intended victim was the child or another child of the parent or another child for whose care such parent is or has been legally responsible; or . . . the parent of such child has been convicted under the law in any other jurisdiction of an offense which includes all of the essential elements [of these crimes]; and "(iv) the agency has made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, including efforts to rehabilitate the respondent, when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the child, and such efforts have been unsuccessful and are unlikely to be successful in the foreseeable future. Where a court has previously determined in accordance with this chapter or the family court act that reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his or her home are not required, the agency shall not be required to demonstrate diligent efforts as set forth in this section" (Social Services Law § 384-b [8] [a] [i]-[iv] [emphases added]). In this appeal, the parties differed as to what is required to establish "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" within the meaning of Social Services Law 384-b (8) (a) (i); and whether the diligent efforts specified by subparagraph (iv) of this provision are prerequisite to a finding of severe abuse under Family Court Act § 1051 (e), or may be excused under Family Court Act §§ 1039-b and 1012 (j) or, alternatively, Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (iv) itself. ACS, joined by the attorney for the children, argued that the cases discussing "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" within the meaning of the Penal Law do not control the interpretation of the same phrase in Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (I). Judge Read pointed out that under the Penal Law, a person acts "intentionally" when "his conscious objective" is to cause a proscribed result (for example, death) or engage in conduct described by a statute (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]); and a person acts "recklessly" with respect to a proscribed result or a circumstance described by a statute "when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists" (Penal Law § 15.05 [3]). And "depraved indifference" bespeaks a state of mind reflecting "a depraved kind of wantonness: for example, shooting into a crowd, placing a time bomb in a public place, or opening the door of the lions' cage in the zoo" (Feingold, 7 NY3d at 293 ). It is "best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life — a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn't care whether grievous harm results or not[, and which reflects] wickedness, evil or inhumanity, as manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable acts" (Suarez, 6 NY3d at 214). The Penal Law establishes crimes that are mutually exclusive, depending on these distinctions of culpable state of mind; specifically, second-degree intentional murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [mens rea of intent to kill]), as contrasted with second-degree depraved indifference murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [2] [mens rea of recklessness plus mens rea of depraved indifference]), as contrasted with second-degree manslaughter (Penal Law § 125.15 [mens rea of recklessness]). Judge Read indicated that the same cannot be said of the child protective statutes. Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (i) provides that a child can be found to be severely abused "as a result of reckless or intentional acts of the parent committed under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" (emphases added). Under the Penal Law, however, a crime requiring proof of an intent to kill can never be committed with depraved indifference (see Policano, 7 NY3d at 600 ["[I]t has never been permissible in New York for a jury to convict a defendant of depraved indifference murder where the evidence produced at trial indicated that if the defendant committed homicide at all, he committed it with the conscious objective of killing the victim" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Additionally, "[a] defendant may be convicted of depraved indifference murder when but a single person is endangered in only a few rare circumstances" (Suarez, 6 NY3d at 212), whereas acts of child abuse necessarily involve one-on-one violence. In short, our depraved indifference jurisprudence under the Penal Law has no bearing on whether a child is severely abused within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (i). For purposes of that statute "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" refers to the risk intentionally or recklessly posed to the child by the parent's abusive conduct. Here, Antoine beat or struck a baby — an especially vulnerable victim because so tiny, defenseless and unformed. And the medical experts testimony about the age of Jayquan's injuries established that Antoine must have attacked him on at least two different occasions, separated by at least two weeks. Further, Antoine had to have been aware of the life-threatening risks he created when he applied brute force to Jayquan's chest and shoulder. After all, he knew that devastating injuries ensued when he brutalized his then four-month old namesake, Antoine, Jr. While this prior instance of abuse was too remote in time to support a finding of repeated abuse, it reflects Antoine's utter disregard for Jayquan's life, health and well-being. Additionally, Antoine neglected to summon medical aid for Jayquan's fractured ribs, even though the baby would have to have experienced and displayed continuous pain and distress; and he delayed seeking medical care for Jayquan on February 21, 2007 from 11:00 a.m., when he claimed to have first noticed the baby's suffering, until the early evening hours . Finally, Antoine offered unbelievable explanations for Jayquan's injuries to medical personnel and social workers, and he did not testify at the fact-finding hearing (see Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73, 79 [1995] [where the mother did not testify in a child protective proceeding, we noted that "[a] trier of fact may draw the strongest inference that the opposing evidence permits"]). Thus, there was record support for the Appellate Division's finding, based on clear and convincing evidence, that Antoine, acting under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, severely abused Jayquan. It was undisputed that at no time did ACS make "diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, including efforts to rehabilitate" Antoine (see Social Services Law § 384-b [8] [a] [iv]). The parties contested whether this omission was permissible in light of Family Court Act §§ 1051 (e), 1039-b and 1012 (j). The attorney for the children, joined by ACS, urged that a showing of diligent efforts is not required for a finding of severe abuse under Family Court Act § 1051 (e). Section 1039-b (a) of the Family Court Act states that "[i]n conjunction with, or at any time subsequent to, the filing of a[n abuse or neglect] petition . . ., the [presentment agency] may file a motion upon notice requesting a finding that reasonable efforts to return the child to his or her home are no longer required." The statute further provides that reasonable efforts "shall not be required" when "the parent of such child has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, as defined in" Family Court Act § 1012 (j) (Family Court Act § 1039-b [b] [1]. Family Court Act § 1012 (j) defines "aggravated circumstances" to include "where a child has been either severely or repeatedly abused, as defined in" Social Services Law § 384-b (8). The Court of Appeals concluded that Family Court Act §§ 1051 (e) and 1012 (j) necessarily import Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) in its entirety. It could not read subparagraph (iv) out of the definition of severe abuse incorporated in these provisions when the Legislature did not choose to create such an exclusion, as it easily might have. The Court also concluded that Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (iv) clearly states that Family Court may excuse diligent efforts when they are found to be detrimental to the best interests of the child. Judge Read recapitulated that Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) defines a child as "severely abused" if the victim of depraved indifference abuse (id. § 384-b [8] [a] [i]), or felony sex offense abuse (id. § 384-b [8] [a] [ii]), or other felony offense abuse (id. § 384-b [8] [a] [iii]), and "the agency has made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, including efforts to rehabilitate the respondent, when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the child, and such efforts have been unsuccessful and are unlikely to be successful in the foreseeable future. Where a court has previously determined in accordance with this chapter or the family court act that reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his or her home are not required, the agency shall not be required to demonstrate diligent efforts as set forth in this section" (id. § 384-b [8] [a] [iv] [emphases added]). Thus, for a court to find severe abuse under Family Court Act § 1051 (e), the presentment agency must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the parent committed an abusive act specified in subparagraphs (i), (ii) or (iii) of section 384-b (8) (a); and diligent efforts to reunite the family were not made because detrimental to the child's best interests; or such efforts were made but were unsuccessful and unlikely to succeed in the near term; or such efforts were not required because a court had previously determined that reasonable efforts to reunite the family were unnecessary. Judge Read concluded that Family Court in this case properly found that diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship would be detrimental to Jayquan's best interests, in accordance with Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (iv). The judge determined that, in light of Antoine's abuse of Antoine, Jr., followed by his severe abuse of Jayquan some 14 years later, there was little prospect that Antoine's "chronic, long-standing" violent behavior would improve anytime soon, if ever, and it was not in Jayquan's best interests to languish in foster care in the meantime.