Family Courts Jurisdiction is Limited to Family Offenses Committed Against Persons Listed in Family Court Act 812 Only
In Matter of Janet GG v Robert GG,--- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 5083241 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) in March 2010, petitioner (mother) filed a Family Ct Act article 8 petition alleging that respondent (father) committed a series of family offenses against her and their two children (born in 1996 and 1998). Specifically, she alleged that on March 2, 2010, the father telephoned the children's school, spoke to a guidance counselor and demanded to see his children. Because the counselor believed that an order of protection was in place that barred the father from having such contact with his children, the counselor informed the father that he should not come to the school and, in any event, would not be allowed by school authorities to visit with his children. The father, despite this admonition, went to the school and, upon entering the premises, confronted the school superintendent demanding to see his children. After he became loud and boisterous and refused to leave the premises, the police were notified and the father was placed under arrest. The mother subsequently filed a petition claiming that this conduct qualified as a family offense and, on that basis, sought an order of protection for herself and the children. The father argued that what had occurred, even if true, did not constitute a family offense and, therefore, Family Court did not have jurisdiction. The court agreed and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed. It observed that Family Court's jurisdiction over family offense proceedings is limited to those acts between family members that 'would constitute disorderly conduct, harassment in the first degree, harassment in the second degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree, ...stalking, menacing in the second degree, menacing in the third degree, reckless endangerment, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree or an attempted assault (Family Ct Act 812[1] ). Family Court determined that while the father's actions may have constituted disorderly conduct, they did not amount to a family offense because, when committed, the father was not in contact with the mother or either of their children. Instead, the father's actions were directed at school personnel and not any member of his family. The Appellate Division agreed. The father's actions were directed not at the mother or the children, but at school personnel, and what occurred did not constitute a family offense. As such, Family Court was without jurisdiction to entertain this petition (Family Ct Act 812).
Second Department Construes Parties' Stipulation Providing for the Distribution of "Any Pension," to Refer Only to the Portion of Pension Representing Deferred Compensation.
In Nugent-Schubert v Schubert, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 5085506 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the plaintiff former wife and the defendant former husband were divorced by judgment incorporating a stipulation of settlement. The stipulation of settlement provided for a 50% distribution to the plaintiff of the value of "any pension" received by the defendant. The plaintiff thereafter submitted to the Supreme Court a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ( QDRO), which included a provision entitling her to receive a share of any future disability pension, but limited to any portion thereof representing the defendant's earnings and years of credited service. However, the Supreme Court struck that provision of the QDRO. Subsequently, the defendant, who was employed by the New York City Police Department, retired on an accidental disability pension as a result of a line-of-duty injury. Pursuant to the QDRO in its current form, the plaintiff was receiving a portion of the defendant's accidental disability pension that represented compensation for personal injuries. The defendant moved to amend the QDRO so as to exclude this portion of his accidental disability pension from distribution to the plaintiff. The Appellate Division held that the motion should have been granted. It observed that where a QDRO is inconsistent with the provisions of a stipulation or judgment of divorce, courts possess the authority to amend the QDRO to accurately reflect the provisions of the stipulation pertaining to the pension benefits. A proper QDRO obtained pursuant to a stipulation of settlement can convey only those rights to which the parties stipulated as a basis for the judgment. Under controlling law, pension benefits, "except to the extent that they are earned or acquired before marriage or after commencement of a matrimonial action, constitute marital property" because they are "in essence, a form of deferred compensation derived from employment" during the marriage. However, any compensation a spouse receives for personal injuries is not considered marital property and is not subject to equitable distribution. Thus, to the extent [a] disability pension represents deferred compensation, it is subject to equitable distribution while to the extent that a disability pension constitutes compensation for personal injuries, that compensation is "separate property" which is not subject to equitable distribution. In Berardi v. Berardi, 54 A.D.3d at 984-985, 865 N.Y.S.2d 245 this Court concluded that, absent a provision in the stipulation specifically awarding the [wife] accident disability benefits, the Supreme Court had erred in amending the QDRO to award the wife a portion of the husband's pension representing compensation for personal injuries, as such a provision in the QDRO expanded the rights granted to the wife under the stipulation. Similarly, here, the parties' stipulation providing for the distribution of "any pension," which was entered into before the defendant became entitled to or applied for an accidental disability pension, must likewise be construed to refer only to the portion of the defendant's pension representing deferred compensation. The Appellate Division distinguished this case from its decisions in Rosenberger v. Rosenberger (63 A.D.3d 898, 882 N.Y.S.2d 426) and Pulaski v. Pulaski (22 A.D.3d 820, 820-821, 804 N.Y.S.2d 404). In those cases, the husbands had applied for disability benefits, based upon line-of-duty injuries, prior to execution of the stipulation such that they were "chargeable with knowledge of the prospect of [an] eventual disability retirement when [they] entered into the stipulation". Thus, in Pulaski and Rosenberger, where the husbands were aware, before entering into a stipulation, of the specific potential for receipt of pension benefits that they would be entitled to treat as separate property, the broad language in the stipulation referring to distribution of a pension generally, with no provision for separate-property treatment of the pension, was reasonably interpreted as intending to distribute the entire disability pension. Here, as in Berardi, where it was unknown and unanticipated that the defendant would qualify for a disability pension, there was no reason to conclude that a general provision providing for equal distribution of "any pension" was intended to opt out of the controlling law in order to distribute portions of any such pension that would not ordinarily be subject to equitable distribution. The fact that the plaintiff submitted a QDRO which would have limited the distribution of any future disability pension to that portion representing deferred compensation further evinced the parties' understanding that separate-property portions of "any pension" received by the husband would not be subject to distribution.
Third Department Affirms Initial Custody Award Made without Evidentary Hearing
In Matter of Cole v Cole, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975299, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 07328
(NYAD 3 Dept) Petitioner (father) and respondent (mother) were the parents of two sons (born in 2007 and 2008). In June 2010, the father filed a petition for custody of the children. He thereafter left the marital residence at the home of the maternal grandmother, and relocated to the paternal grandmother's home. In July 2010, the mother filed a petition seeking custody of the children. At the initial appearance, Family Court assigned an attorney for the children and temporarily ordered joint legal custody of the children with physical custody to the mother and, when the mother was working, childcare provided by the father at the maternal grandmother's home. At the next appearance, the father requested shared physical custody of the children and Family Court granted this as to weekends, when the mother was working. At the third and final appearance, in November 2010, Family Court issued a final order essentially based upon this same arrangement. The Appellate Division affirmed. It rejected the mother’s argument that Family Court erred by issuing a final order without conducting a hearing or engaging in other formalities such as placing stipulations or consent of the parties upon the record. An evidentiary hearing is generally necessary to determine custody matters, but it is not obligatory where, as here, no request is made and the court has sufficient information to undertake a comprehensive independent review of the [children's] best interests. Although no sworn testimony was taken, all three appearances before Family Court were attended by each of the parents, their respective attorneys, and both grandmothers, and the court invited and received input from all involved. The attorney for the children attended the two later
appearances, and advocated a position based on interviews with the mother, her
employer, the father and various service providers for the children. Further, the
Chemung County Department of Social Services provided Family Court with a report
assessing the needs of the children and the current family circumstances. The two
parents, with the support of the two grandmothers, were essentially collaborating
relative to the matters of sharing time and the responsibilities of caring for their children during the course of the proceedings, and Family Court found this structure in the best interests of the children. Although the mother was represented by counsel at all three appearances, at no time did she or her counsel request a hearing or other formalities. Upon review, it found that Family Court had sufficient information before it to support the determination.
Third Department Holds that In Neglect Proceeding Attorney for Children May Advocate a Different Position When the Children's Wishes Would Likely "Result in a Substantial Risk of Imminent, Serious Harm to the Children
In Matter of Alyson J, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 5083950 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) a neglect proceeding, the Appellate Division disagreed with respondent's contention that the attorney for the children failed to adequately represent the children's interests. It pointed out that the duty of the attorney for the children is to advocate and express the children's wishes to the court, but on occasion it is acceptable for counsel to deviate from this obligation; the attorney is specifically allowed to advocate a different position when the children's wishes would likely "result in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to the child[ren]" (Citing (22 NYCRR 7.2 [d][3]; see Matter of Mark T. v. Joyanna U., 64 A.D.3d 1092, 1093-1094 [2009], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 715 [2010] ). Here, counsel had been involved with the children for several years and was well aware of their conditions, and the Appellate Division accepted the contrary position as in the best interests of the children. At the fact-finding hearing, the attorney for the children did indicate his clients' wishes, and properly informed Family Court that
he was deviating from them.
Friday, November 04, 2011
Wednesday, November 02, 2011
Important New Decisions - November 1, 2011
Factors Set Forth in Family Court Act 413(1)(F) Should Be Considered Only Where Court Is Able to Calculate Basic Child Support Obligation Pursuant to Family Court Act 413(1)(C), Not Where Calculated Pursuant to Family Court Act 413[1][K]
In Salvatore D. V Shyou H., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975542 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.), the Appellate Division affirmed an order which directed respondent to pay $950 a month for the support of the parties' child. It held that the Support Magistrate properly ordered child support based on the needs of the child, since respondent presented insufficient evidence to determine her gross income ( Family Court Act 413[1][k]). Respondent's stated expenses were more than twice the income reflected on her tax return. The Support Magistrate found incredible respondent's testimony regarding her employment, her living situation and loans from her employer and brother. The Support Magistrate properly declined to consider the factors set forth in Family Court Act 413(1)(f), including the child's receipt of Social Security disability benefits. Such factors should be considered only where, unlike here, the court is able to calculate the basic child support obligation pursuant to Family Court Act 413(1)(c). Respondent's testimony, including that she was a well-known esthetician with celebrity clients and 22 years of experience, supported the Support Magistrate's determination that she is able to pay the child support obligation. The Support Magistrate was not required to rely on respondent's account of her finances.
Third Department Holds That Emancipation by Employment Occurs Only When Child Attains Economic Independence. Fact That Child May Work Full Time Is Not Determinative Even Where Child Lives on His/her Own.
In Drumm v Drumm, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975452 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.)
Petitioner ( mother) and respondent (father) were the divorced parents of three children, Miranda, Nicholas and Matthew (born in 1990, 1994 and 1997, respectively). In May 2006, the parties entered into a separation agreement, pursuant to the terms of which they agreed to share physical custody of their children and to divide equally, among other things, the cost of the children's health insurance and any uncovered medical expenses. In apparent contemplation of that arrangement, the parties agreed to waive any child support "at [that] time." Although not entirely clear from the record, it appeared that Miranda and Nicholas thereafter elected to reside primarily with the mother, prompting the parties to enter into stipulations of settlement that referred various issues to Family Court, including child support for Miranda and Nicholas and the parties' respective obligations for the children's health care costs. The
separation agreement, as modified, was incorporated but not merged into the
parties' May 2009 amended judgment of divorce. In September 2009, the mother and the father entered into an order on consent wherein they agreed to, among other things, grant each other a "right of first refusal" during any period of time when the parent having physical custody of Matthew would be absent for five hours or longer. As the father often was required to work on weekends, he offered--and the mother frequently accepted-- the additional parenting time with Matthew. Shortly after entering into this stipulation, the mother commenced s modification proceeding contending that, having availed herself of the opportunity to spend more time with Matthew, she now had physical custody of him more than 50% of the time and, as such, was entitled to child support. Following a hearing, the Support Magistrate found that the mother's decision to exercise her right of first refusal did not alter the parties' shared custody arrangement as to Matthew and, therefore, the mother was not entitled to child support for him. The Support Magistrate further determined that Miranda became emancipated in June 2008 when she graduated from high school and obtained full-time employment and limited any award of support for Miranda accordingly. Family Court, sua sponte, dismissed the mother's subsequent objections to the Support Magistrate's order as untimely and, upon reargument, adhered to its prior decision. The Appellate Division reversed. It found that the record did not support Family Court's finding that the mother's objections were filed outside the 35-day window set forth in Family Ct Act 439(e) and held that Family Court erred in refusing to entertain the mother's objections on the merits. The Appellate Division held that with regard to the mother's request for child support for Matthew, the mere fact that the mother elected to exercise her right of first refusal with respect to this particular child did not fundamentally alter the parties' shared custody arrangement. At best, the mother's election resulted in her choosing to spend an additional three or four days each month with her son. In its view, regardless of the burden of proof employed, this minor and entirely voluntary "change in circumstances" was insufficient to warrant the mother's request for child support as to this child.
However, it found merit to the mother's objection regarding Miranda's alleged emancipation. A parent is statutorily obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act 413[1] ) unless the child is sooner emancipated, which occurs, insofar as is relevant here, when the child attains economic independence through employment. The fact that a child may work full time is not determinative, as
a child cannot be deemed economically independent if he or she still relies upon a
parent for significant economic support. This remains true even where, as here, the child in question no longer resides with one of the parties, for long as the child is still
dependent on one of them for a significant portion of his or her support. Here, although the father testified that Miranda went to work full time after graduating from high school, the record fell short of establishing that she had achieved economic independence. Notably, there was no documentation of Miranda's salary or expenses or the degree to which she continued to receive financial support from her mother. Accordingly, the Support Magistrate's determination in this regard could not stand. The Court was also persuaded that the Support Magistrate erred in failing to achieve some level of parity between the parties by consistently using their respective projected incomes for 2009 in computing child support. Although the Support Magistrate's decision to utilize the mother's projected income for 2009 instead of her actual income for 2008 was well founded (due to nonrecurring income that the mother received in the prior year), no similar explanation was offered for electing to use the father's actual 2008 income instead of his projected--and presumably higher--income for 2009. The record failed to disclose a valid reason for failing to utilize similar income valuations for both parties
when computing their respective support obligations for Miranda and Nicholas. The orders were reversed, on the law and the matter remitted to the Family Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's decision.
In a footnote the Court pointed out that to the extent that the parties' separation agreement defined emancipation as, among other things, a "child establishing a permanent residence away from his or her custodial parent," it noted that "the parties cannot contract away the duty of child support" (Matter of Thomas B. v. Lydia D., 69 A.D.3d 24, 30 [2009] ).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Requires Reversal of Neglect Orders
In Matter of Jaikob O., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4974840 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) the Appellate Division reversed an order which granted petitioner's application to adjudicate the children to be neglected. The Appellate Division held that as a result of deficiencies in the representation provided by his assigned trial counsel at the fact-finding hearing, he was denied meaningful representation. It found that counsel's ineffectiveness permeated the proceedings. At the fact-finding hearing, counsel failed to make an opening statement or to cross-examine petitioner's witnesses on relevant matters such as the children's exposure to respondent's allegedly neglectful conduct during the relevant time period (i.e., February to June 2008). Counsel's cross-examination of the mother and the wife, both clearly young victims of disturbing domestic violence, was at points tasteless and irrelevant, even prurient. Counsel made no motions at the close of petitioner's case and no closing arguments, stating only, "I think everything's been said." Counsel never submitted, as directed by Family Court, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Likewise, petitioner submitted no findings or conclusions of law. Notably, at the close of the fact-finding hearing, Family Court merely stated that it found petitioner's witnesses to be "credible," but made no finding of neglect, deferring its decision thereon. Surprisingly, counsel then consented to immediately proceeding to a dispositional hearing. Particularly disturbing on the issue of whether counsel provided meaningful representation was a letter sent by counsel to respondent in prison after the fact-finding hearing, but before a neglect determination was issued, in response to his request for a new attorney. The letter contained a not-so-subtle threat that counsel would not send respondent anything, or convey any information to or cooperate with his next attorney, if he pursued a change of attorneys; counsel also flaunted that he had achieved financial success, upon which he elaborated, with his "clients who have money" and essentially did not need this assignment. The Appellate Division found that the letter was inappropriate and served to undermine any confidence respondent might have had in counsel effectively representing him. Accordingly, the fact-finding order was reversed. In light of the foregoing, all proceedings at which counsel represented respondent subsequent to the fact-finding hearing and order were invalid.
It also deemed it important to point out that, with regard to the dispositional hearing, counsel failed to object to petitioner's oral motion to dispense with its duty to make diligent reunification efforts for respondent and the children based upon the termination, years earlier, of respondent's (and the wife's) parental rights to their three oldest children. Such a motion by petitioner was required to be "in writing " and on notice to respondent, allowing him "the opportunity to gather evidence and raise issues of fact in answering papers and prepare for an evidentiary hearing". Moreover, absolutely no proof was offered by any party at the dispositional hearing addressing the children's "best interests" either on the propriety of terminating reasonable reunification efforts (see Family Ct. Act 1039-b[b][6] [last paragraph] ) or on the ultimate disposition upon the neglect finding (see Family Ct. Act 1045, 1052); the current status and placement of the children was not disclosed at the hearing or in the dispositional order. Counsel filed no notice of appeal from the resulting dispositional order. As respondent was denied meaningful representation by trial counsel at the fact-finding hearing, the fact-finding order, as well as the subsequent resulting orders of Family Court, could not stand.
Third Department Holds That Evidence of Child’s Needs Not Necessary in Fixing Child Support. CSSA Creates Rebuttable Presumption Guidelines Contained Will Yield Correct Amount of Child Support.
In Matter of Marcklinger v Liebert, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975510 (NYAD 3 Dept)
in a prior appeal in this child support case, the Appellate Division rejected petitioner's contention that the Support Magistrate improperly considered the parties' combined income exceeding $80,000 in the calculation of the basic child support obligation for their unemancipated child, but remitted the matter to Family Court for an articulation of a rationale for using the statutory percentage rather than the so-called "paragraph (f)" factors or a combination of both (72 A.D.3d 1431 [2010] ). Upon remittal, the Support Magistrate recalculated petitioner's support obligation, using a higher adjusted gross income for respondent as petitioner had previously requested and in accordance with Family Court's prior order, which reflected respondent's receipt of maintenance payments from petitioner. This resulted in petitioner's pro rata share being decreased to 57.65% and respondent's share being increased to 42.35%. The Support Magistrate then applied the statutory percentage set forth in the Child Support Standards Act to the parties' total combined income--first to the portion up to $80,000 and then to the portion that exceeds that amount--and determined that petitioner's pro rata share amounted to $256 per week. The Appellate Division affirmed. It noted that in his amended order, the Support Magistrate reasoned that the application of the statutory percentage yielded an amount that was "neither unjust nor inappropriate" considering that (1) the child would have enjoyed an enhanced standard of living had the parties remained married, (2) the $80,000 cap had not been adjusted for inflation since 1989, (3) the income disparity between the parties, and (4) petitioner did not offer any reason for a contrary finding. This articulation of reasoning indicated that the Support Magistrate carefully considered the parties' circumstances and found no reason to depart from the prescribed percentage. Although petitioner faulted respondent for not submitting evidence of the child's needs, application of the CSSA "creates a rebuttable presumption that the guidelines contained therein will yield the correct amount of child support" and, if petitioner believed that his presumptive pro rata share was unjust or inappropriate, it was his burden to establish such.
Appellate Division Holds Family Court Has Jurisdiction to Determine Paternity of Child Born to Married Woman Rejecting Argument Based upon Statutory Definitions of "Child," "Mother" and "Father" Limiting Those Terms to Situations Involving "A Child Born out of Wedlock"
In Matter of Nathan O v Jennifer P, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975692 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) up until at least April 6, 2009, petitioner and respondent Jennifer P.
( mother) engaged in a sexual relationship, although they disputed when that relationship ended. In mid-April 2009, the mother engaged in a sexual relationship and began cohabiting with respondent Uwe P. The mother married Uwe P. in June 2009 and gave birth to a child on December 6, 2009. At the time of the birth, Uwe P. was listed as the child's father on the birth certificate. Shortly after the child's birth, petitioner filed two petitions seeking a declaration of paternity and either custody or visitation. Uwe P. cross-petitioned for a declaration of paternity. Family Court denied the mother's motion to dismiss the petitions and ordered the parties and child to submit to DNA testing, with the results sealed pending further proceedings. During a hearing to address whether the presumption of legitimacy should preclude DNA testing (see Family Ct Act 532 [a] ), the parties consented to unsealing the DNA test results, which revealed a high likelihood that petitioner was the biological father. The parties then stipulated to an order of parenting time for petitioner, subject to respondents'
right to appeal the court's ruling on jurisdiction and standing. Over respondents'
objections, Family Court declared that petitioner was the father of the child, entered an order of filiation to that effect, and dismissed Uwe P.'s paternity petition. The Appellate Division affirmed.
Respondents argued on appeal that the court had no jurisdiction to determine paternity of a child born to a married woman. The argument was based upon statutory definitions of "child," "mother" and "father" limiting those terms to situations involving "a
child born out of wedlock" (Family Ct Act 512). The Appellate Division held that Respondents' interpretation could not not be harmonized with other aspects of Family Ct Act article 5. For example, their interpretation is belied by the statutory phrase "presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman" (Family Ct Act 532[a] ); the use of the word "married" would be unnecessary and superfluous under respondents' view. Considering the broad grant of jurisdiction in the N.Y. Constitution and in Family Ct Act 511, along with the numerous cases where courts have addressed paternity of children born to married mothers and the conflict between the definitions in Family Ct Act 512 and other aspects of Family Ct Act article 5, it held that Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to address the paternity of a child born to a married woman. As a "person alleging to be the father," petitioner had standing to
commence a paternity proceeding (Family Ct Act 522). Family Ct Act 523 only requires
the petition to allege that a certain individual is the father of the subject child. A party seeking paternity testing under the Family Ct Act need not provide factual support for the allegations of paternity or nonpaternity; he or she need only articulate some basis for them," sufficient to show that a nonfrivolous controversy exists regarding paternity. In his application filed less than a month after the child's birth, petitioner alleged that he engaged in a sexual relationship with the mother during the probable time of conception, that the mother was not married at that time, and that he was the child's father. This information was sufficient to commence the paternity proceeding. Respondents consented--during the middle of a hearing--to Family Court unsealing the DNA test results. Upon learning of those results, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order of visitation to petitioner, subject to respondents' reservation of the right to appeal based on the court's ruling regarding jurisdiction and standing. In light of their consent, with this limited reservation of rights, respondents waived their argument that Family Court was required to conduct a full hearing concerning the child's best interests (see Family Ct Act 532[a] ) before issuing an order of filiation. Hence, it did not address that argument.
Family Court Erred by Granting the Father's Motion for Summary Judgment Modifying Custody Order Without Allowing Mother Opportunity to Present Evidence. Due Process Requires That a Parent Be Afforded "A Full and Fair Opportunity to Be Heard
In Matter of Jeffrey JJ v Stephanie KK, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975012 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) Petitioner ( father) and respondent (mother) were the parents of a daughter (born in 2003). Pursuant to a prior order of custody, the parties' apparently shared legal custody of the child; the mother had primary physical custody and the father had liberal visitation time. The father commenced a proceeding seeking primary physical custody of the child after the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services commenced a neglect proceeding against the mother and her husband (stepfather) after receiving a report that the stepfather had been intoxicated while driving with the mother, the subject child and another child in the vehicle. At the fact-finding hearing, the father presented evidence of an existing order of protection that prohibited the stepfather from having any contact with the subject child until July 30, 2010. The father then made an oral motion for Family Court to award him custody, which the court granted over the mother's objection, after it concluded that it was "impossible [for] ... the child's primary residence to be with the mother[,] who is living with [the stepfather,] against whom there is an order of protection." The court further concluded that the issue of the child's best interests had "almost been determined by virtue of the fact that there is an order of protection against" the stepfather. The court then awarded the father primary physical custody of the child with parenting time to the mother. The Appellate Division agreed with the mother that Family Court erred by granting the father's motion without allowing her an opportunity to present any evidence. In a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct. Act article 6 seeking modification of a prior custody order, a full and comprehensive hearing is required. At such hearing, due process requires that a parent be afforded "a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Family Court violated the mother's due process rights when it granted the father's motion for summary judgment on the petition without permitting the mother an opportunity to present any evidence, call any witnesses, or even testify on her own behalf. While the court believed that the order of protection against the stepfather rendered it impossible for it to award the mother primary physical custody, on cross-examination the stepfather indicated that he was willing to move out of the mother's residence until that order expired. However, the mother was denied an opportunity to present evidence regarding the feasibility of this plan when the court granted the father's motion. In a footnote the court observed that the prior order was not included in the record on appeal, which omission ordinarily results in dismissal of the appeal (see Matter of Pratt v. Anthony, 30 A.D.3d 708, 815 N.Y.S.2d 832 [2006] ). However, since there was no dispute as to the terms of the prior order, which were put on the record in open court by Family Court, it decided to reach the merits of this appeal.
In Salvatore D. V Shyou H., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975542 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.), the Appellate Division affirmed an order which directed respondent to pay $950 a month for the support of the parties' child. It held that the Support Magistrate properly ordered child support based on the needs of the child, since respondent presented insufficient evidence to determine her gross income ( Family Court Act 413[1][k]). Respondent's stated expenses were more than twice the income reflected on her tax return. The Support Magistrate found incredible respondent's testimony regarding her employment, her living situation and loans from her employer and brother. The Support Magistrate properly declined to consider the factors set forth in Family Court Act 413(1)(f), including the child's receipt of Social Security disability benefits. Such factors should be considered only where, unlike here, the court is able to calculate the basic child support obligation pursuant to Family Court Act 413(1)(c). Respondent's testimony, including that she was a well-known esthetician with celebrity clients and 22 years of experience, supported the Support Magistrate's determination that she is able to pay the child support obligation. The Support Magistrate was not required to rely on respondent's account of her finances.
Third Department Holds That Emancipation by Employment Occurs Only When Child Attains Economic Independence. Fact That Child May Work Full Time Is Not Determinative Even Where Child Lives on His/her Own.
In Drumm v Drumm, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975452 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.)
Petitioner ( mother) and respondent (father) were the divorced parents of three children, Miranda, Nicholas and Matthew (born in 1990, 1994 and 1997, respectively). In May 2006, the parties entered into a separation agreement, pursuant to the terms of which they agreed to share physical custody of their children and to divide equally, among other things, the cost of the children's health insurance and any uncovered medical expenses. In apparent contemplation of that arrangement, the parties agreed to waive any child support "at [that] time." Although not entirely clear from the record, it appeared that Miranda and Nicholas thereafter elected to reside primarily with the mother, prompting the parties to enter into stipulations of settlement that referred various issues to Family Court, including child support for Miranda and Nicholas and the parties' respective obligations for the children's health care costs. The
separation agreement, as modified, was incorporated but not merged into the
parties' May 2009 amended judgment of divorce. In September 2009, the mother and the father entered into an order on consent wherein they agreed to, among other things, grant each other a "right of first refusal" during any period of time when the parent having physical custody of Matthew would be absent for five hours or longer. As the father often was required to work on weekends, he offered--and the mother frequently accepted-- the additional parenting time with Matthew. Shortly after entering into this stipulation, the mother commenced s modification proceeding contending that, having availed herself of the opportunity to spend more time with Matthew, she now had physical custody of him more than 50% of the time and, as such, was entitled to child support. Following a hearing, the Support Magistrate found that the mother's decision to exercise her right of first refusal did not alter the parties' shared custody arrangement as to Matthew and, therefore, the mother was not entitled to child support for him. The Support Magistrate further determined that Miranda became emancipated in June 2008 when she graduated from high school and obtained full-time employment and limited any award of support for Miranda accordingly. Family Court, sua sponte, dismissed the mother's subsequent objections to the Support Magistrate's order as untimely and, upon reargument, adhered to its prior decision. The Appellate Division reversed. It found that the record did not support Family Court's finding that the mother's objections were filed outside the 35-day window set forth in Family Ct Act 439(e) and held that Family Court erred in refusing to entertain the mother's objections on the merits. The Appellate Division held that with regard to the mother's request for child support for Matthew, the mere fact that the mother elected to exercise her right of first refusal with respect to this particular child did not fundamentally alter the parties' shared custody arrangement. At best, the mother's election resulted in her choosing to spend an additional three or four days each month with her son. In its view, regardless of the burden of proof employed, this minor and entirely voluntary "change in circumstances" was insufficient to warrant the mother's request for child support as to this child.
However, it found merit to the mother's objection regarding Miranda's alleged emancipation. A parent is statutorily obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act 413[1] ) unless the child is sooner emancipated, which occurs, insofar as is relevant here, when the child attains economic independence through employment. The fact that a child may work full time is not determinative, as
a child cannot be deemed economically independent if he or she still relies upon a
parent for significant economic support. This remains true even where, as here, the child in question no longer resides with one of the parties, for long as the child is still
dependent on one of them for a significant portion of his or her support. Here, although the father testified that Miranda went to work full time after graduating from high school, the record fell short of establishing that she had achieved economic independence. Notably, there was no documentation of Miranda's salary or expenses or the degree to which she continued to receive financial support from her mother. Accordingly, the Support Magistrate's determination in this regard could not stand. The Court was also persuaded that the Support Magistrate erred in failing to achieve some level of parity between the parties by consistently using their respective projected incomes for 2009 in computing child support. Although the Support Magistrate's decision to utilize the mother's projected income for 2009 instead of her actual income for 2008 was well founded (due to nonrecurring income that the mother received in the prior year), no similar explanation was offered for electing to use the father's actual 2008 income instead of his projected--and presumably higher--income for 2009. The record failed to disclose a valid reason for failing to utilize similar income valuations for both parties
when computing their respective support obligations for Miranda and Nicholas. The orders were reversed, on the law and the matter remitted to the Family Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's decision.
In a footnote the Court pointed out that to the extent that the parties' separation agreement defined emancipation as, among other things, a "child establishing a permanent residence away from his or her custodial parent," it noted that "the parties cannot contract away the duty of child support" (Matter of Thomas B. v. Lydia D., 69 A.D.3d 24, 30 [2009] ).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Requires Reversal of Neglect Orders
In Matter of Jaikob O., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4974840 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) the Appellate Division reversed an order which granted petitioner's application to adjudicate the children to be neglected. The Appellate Division held that as a result of deficiencies in the representation provided by his assigned trial counsel at the fact-finding hearing, he was denied meaningful representation. It found that counsel's ineffectiveness permeated the proceedings. At the fact-finding hearing, counsel failed to make an opening statement or to cross-examine petitioner's witnesses on relevant matters such as the children's exposure to respondent's allegedly neglectful conduct during the relevant time period (i.e., February to June 2008). Counsel's cross-examination of the mother and the wife, both clearly young victims of disturbing domestic violence, was at points tasteless and irrelevant, even prurient. Counsel made no motions at the close of petitioner's case and no closing arguments, stating only, "I think everything's been said." Counsel never submitted, as directed by Family Court, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Likewise, petitioner submitted no findings or conclusions of law. Notably, at the close of the fact-finding hearing, Family Court merely stated that it found petitioner's witnesses to be "credible," but made no finding of neglect, deferring its decision thereon. Surprisingly, counsel then consented to immediately proceeding to a dispositional hearing. Particularly disturbing on the issue of whether counsel provided meaningful representation was a letter sent by counsel to respondent in prison after the fact-finding hearing, but before a neglect determination was issued, in response to his request for a new attorney. The letter contained a not-so-subtle threat that counsel would not send respondent anything, or convey any information to or cooperate with his next attorney, if he pursued a change of attorneys; counsel also flaunted that he had achieved financial success, upon which he elaborated, with his "clients who have money" and essentially did not need this assignment. The Appellate Division found that the letter was inappropriate and served to undermine any confidence respondent might have had in counsel effectively representing him. Accordingly, the fact-finding order was reversed. In light of the foregoing, all proceedings at which counsel represented respondent subsequent to the fact-finding hearing and order were invalid.
It also deemed it important to point out that, with regard to the dispositional hearing, counsel failed to object to petitioner's oral motion to dispense with its duty to make diligent reunification efforts for respondent and the children based upon the termination, years earlier, of respondent's (and the wife's) parental rights to their three oldest children. Such a motion by petitioner was required to be "in writing " and on notice to respondent, allowing him "the opportunity to gather evidence and raise issues of fact in answering papers and prepare for an evidentiary hearing". Moreover, absolutely no proof was offered by any party at the dispositional hearing addressing the children's "best interests" either on the propriety of terminating reasonable reunification efforts (see Family Ct. Act 1039-b[b][6] [last paragraph] ) or on the ultimate disposition upon the neglect finding (see Family Ct. Act 1045, 1052); the current status and placement of the children was not disclosed at the hearing or in the dispositional order. Counsel filed no notice of appeal from the resulting dispositional order. As respondent was denied meaningful representation by trial counsel at the fact-finding hearing, the fact-finding order, as well as the subsequent resulting orders of Family Court, could not stand.
Third Department Holds That Evidence of Child’s Needs Not Necessary in Fixing Child Support. CSSA Creates Rebuttable Presumption Guidelines Contained Will Yield Correct Amount of Child Support.
In Matter of Marcklinger v Liebert, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975510 (NYAD 3 Dept)
in a prior appeal in this child support case, the Appellate Division rejected petitioner's contention that the Support Magistrate improperly considered the parties' combined income exceeding $80,000 in the calculation of the basic child support obligation for their unemancipated child, but remitted the matter to Family Court for an articulation of a rationale for using the statutory percentage rather than the so-called "paragraph (f)" factors or a combination of both (72 A.D.3d 1431 [2010] ). Upon remittal, the Support Magistrate recalculated petitioner's support obligation, using a higher adjusted gross income for respondent as petitioner had previously requested and in accordance with Family Court's prior order, which reflected respondent's receipt of maintenance payments from petitioner. This resulted in petitioner's pro rata share being decreased to 57.65% and respondent's share being increased to 42.35%. The Support Magistrate then applied the statutory percentage set forth in the Child Support Standards Act to the parties' total combined income--first to the portion up to $80,000 and then to the portion that exceeds that amount--and determined that petitioner's pro rata share amounted to $256 per week. The Appellate Division affirmed. It noted that in his amended order, the Support Magistrate reasoned that the application of the statutory percentage yielded an amount that was "neither unjust nor inappropriate" considering that (1) the child would have enjoyed an enhanced standard of living had the parties remained married, (2) the $80,000 cap had not been adjusted for inflation since 1989, (3) the income disparity between the parties, and (4) petitioner did not offer any reason for a contrary finding. This articulation of reasoning indicated that the Support Magistrate carefully considered the parties' circumstances and found no reason to depart from the prescribed percentage. Although petitioner faulted respondent for not submitting evidence of the child's needs, application of the CSSA "creates a rebuttable presumption that the guidelines contained therein will yield the correct amount of child support" and, if petitioner believed that his presumptive pro rata share was unjust or inappropriate, it was his burden to establish such.
Appellate Division Holds Family Court Has Jurisdiction to Determine Paternity of Child Born to Married Woman Rejecting Argument Based upon Statutory Definitions of "Child," "Mother" and "Father" Limiting Those Terms to Situations Involving "A Child Born out of Wedlock"
In Matter of Nathan O v Jennifer P, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975692 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) up until at least April 6, 2009, petitioner and respondent Jennifer P.
( mother) engaged in a sexual relationship, although they disputed when that relationship ended. In mid-April 2009, the mother engaged in a sexual relationship and began cohabiting with respondent Uwe P. The mother married Uwe P. in June 2009 and gave birth to a child on December 6, 2009. At the time of the birth, Uwe P. was listed as the child's father on the birth certificate. Shortly after the child's birth, petitioner filed two petitions seeking a declaration of paternity and either custody or visitation. Uwe P. cross-petitioned for a declaration of paternity. Family Court denied the mother's motion to dismiss the petitions and ordered the parties and child to submit to DNA testing, with the results sealed pending further proceedings. During a hearing to address whether the presumption of legitimacy should preclude DNA testing (see Family Ct Act 532 [a] ), the parties consented to unsealing the DNA test results, which revealed a high likelihood that petitioner was the biological father. The parties then stipulated to an order of parenting time for petitioner, subject to respondents'
right to appeal the court's ruling on jurisdiction and standing. Over respondents'
objections, Family Court declared that petitioner was the father of the child, entered an order of filiation to that effect, and dismissed Uwe P.'s paternity petition. The Appellate Division affirmed.
Respondents argued on appeal that the court had no jurisdiction to determine paternity of a child born to a married woman. The argument was based upon statutory definitions of "child," "mother" and "father" limiting those terms to situations involving "a
child born out of wedlock" (Family Ct Act 512). The Appellate Division held that Respondents' interpretation could not not be harmonized with other aspects of Family Ct Act article 5. For example, their interpretation is belied by the statutory phrase "presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman" (Family Ct Act 532[a] ); the use of the word "married" would be unnecessary and superfluous under respondents' view. Considering the broad grant of jurisdiction in the N.Y. Constitution and in Family Ct Act 511, along with the numerous cases where courts have addressed paternity of children born to married mothers and the conflict between the definitions in Family Ct Act 512 and other aspects of Family Ct Act article 5, it held that Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to address the paternity of a child born to a married woman. As a "person alleging to be the father," petitioner had standing to
commence a paternity proceeding (Family Ct Act 522). Family Ct Act 523 only requires
the petition to allege that a certain individual is the father of the subject child. A party seeking paternity testing under the Family Ct Act need not provide factual support for the allegations of paternity or nonpaternity; he or she need only articulate some basis for them," sufficient to show that a nonfrivolous controversy exists regarding paternity. In his application filed less than a month after the child's birth, petitioner alleged that he engaged in a sexual relationship with the mother during the probable time of conception, that the mother was not married at that time, and that he was the child's father. This information was sufficient to commence the paternity proceeding. Respondents consented--during the middle of a hearing--to Family Court unsealing the DNA test results. Upon learning of those results, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order of visitation to petitioner, subject to respondents' reservation of the right to appeal based on the court's ruling regarding jurisdiction and standing. In light of their consent, with this limited reservation of rights, respondents waived their argument that Family Court was required to conduct a full hearing concerning the child's best interests (see Family Ct Act 532[a] ) before issuing an order of filiation. Hence, it did not address that argument.
Family Court Erred by Granting the Father's Motion for Summary Judgment Modifying Custody Order Without Allowing Mother Opportunity to Present Evidence. Due Process Requires That a Parent Be Afforded "A Full and Fair Opportunity to Be Heard
In Matter of Jeffrey JJ v Stephanie KK, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4975012 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) Petitioner ( father) and respondent (mother) were the parents of a daughter (born in 2003). Pursuant to a prior order of custody, the parties' apparently shared legal custody of the child; the mother had primary physical custody and the father had liberal visitation time. The father commenced a proceeding seeking primary physical custody of the child after the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services commenced a neglect proceeding against the mother and her husband (stepfather) after receiving a report that the stepfather had been intoxicated while driving with the mother, the subject child and another child in the vehicle. At the fact-finding hearing, the father presented evidence of an existing order of protection that prohibited the stepfather from having any contact with the subject child until July 30, 2010. The father then made an oral motion for Family Court to award him custody, which the court granted over the mother's objection, after it concluded that it was "impossible [for] ... the child's primary residence to be with the mother[,] who is living with [the stepfather,] against whom there is an order of protection." The court further concluded that the issue of the child's best interests had "almost been determined by virtue of the fact that there is an order of protection against" the stepfather. The court then awarded the father primary physical custody of the child with parenting time to the mother. The Appellate Division agreed with the mother that Family Court erred by granting the father's motion without allowing her an opportunity to present any evidence. In a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct. Act article 6 seeking modification of a prior custody order, a full and comprehensive hearing is required. At such hearing, due process requires that a parent be afforded "a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Family Court violated the mother's due process rights when it granted the father's motion for summary judgment on the petition without permitting the mother an opportunity to present any evidence, call any witnesses, or even testify on her own behalf. While the court believed that the order of protection against the stepfather rendered it impossible for it to award the mother primary physical custody, on cross-examination the stepfather indicated that he was willing to move out of the mother's residence until that order expired. However, the mother was denied an opportunity to present evidence regarding the feasibility of this plan when the court granted the father's motion. In a footnote the court observed that the prior order was not included in the record on appeal, which omission ordinarily results in dismissal of the appeal (see Matter of Pratt v. Anthony, 30 A.D.3d 708, 815 N.Y.S.2d 832 [2006] ). However, since there was no dispute as to the terms of the prior order, which were put on the record in open court by Family Court, it decided to reach the merits of this appeal.
Wednesday, October 19, 2011
Important New Decisions - October 19, 2011
Maintenance Award Should Not Provide for an Automatic Increase upon the Prospective Emancipation of Each of Parties' Children
In O’Brien v O’Brien, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4839062 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff former wife had an annual income of $33,262 from all sources, and the defendant former husband had an annual income of $115,747 from all sources. The parties were divorced by judgment dated November 30, 2009. In addition to child support of $2,625 per month, plus support arrears, the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff maintenance in the amount of $1,375 per month over a period of 10 years, to increase as each of the parties' six children becomes emancipated, so that the plaintiff would receive the total sum of $4,000 per month in combined child support and maintenance for a period of 10 years, plus maintenance arrears. The Supreme Court also awarded the plaintiff an attorney's fee in the amount of $10,000. The plaintiff was to remain in the marital residence and pay all carrying costs. The Appellate Division pointed out that the awards of child support, maintenance, arrears, and an attorney's fee were based upon the Supreme Court's calculation of the parties' respective incomes. It found that Supreme Court made a mathematical error in calculating the plaintiff's income. The numbers reflecting the various components of the plaintiff's annual income, as set forth by the Supreme Court in its decision, added up to a total of $54,163, not $33,262, as erroneously stated by the Supreme Court. It pointed out that a court has the inherent power to relieve a party from judgments taken through mistake or inadvertence in the interest of justice, and directed that the awards of child support, maintenance, arrears, and an attorney's fee had to be recalculated based on the correct figures. It also found that with respect to one of the components of the defendant's annual income, the Supreme Court attributed an incorrect amount. Three of the components were supported by the record. However, the record did not support the Supreme Court's calculation and imputation of $15,376 in annual benefits from the defendant's employer for use of an automobile and cell phone, along with the employer's payment of expenses attributable to the use of those items. It observed that Domestic Relations Law 240(1-b)(b)(5)(iv)(B) provides that the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, "attribute or impute income from ... automobiles or other perquisites that are provided as part of compensation for employment to the extent [they] constitute expenditures for personal use, or ... directly or indirectly confer personal economic benefits." Here, although the defendant's employer expended the sum of $15,376 in 2007 for the defendant's use of an automobile and cell phone and related expenses, the amount attributable to income was considerably smaller in light of the defendant's testimony that only 10% of his use of the automobile, and only a "portion" of his use of the cell phone, were personal uses. The Appellate Division observed that upon remittal for recalculation, the discrepancy between the parties' incomes would necessarily be smaller than previously calculated, and, the defendant's pro rata share of the basic child support obligation had to be recalculated. It also directed that upon remittal, the Supreme Court had to recalculate the award of maintenance based upon factors including the parties' respective incomes as recalculated, their pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the plaintiff's needs with the defendant's ability to pay. The Appellate Division held that that the maintenance award should not provide for an automatic increase upon the prospective emancipation of each of the parties' children. Maintenance is designed to give the spouse economic independence and should continue only as long as necessary to render the recipient self-supporting. The award should meet the recipient spouse's reasonable needs while providing an appropriate incentive for the recipient to become financially independent. The amount of the maintenance award is a discretionary determination based upon a number of interrelated facts then in existence; unless a future event is imminent and measurable, an award of maintenance should not include a provision for increase or decrease upon the happening of a particular future event. Here, the provision for automatic increase of maintenance upon the emancipation of each of the parties' children ignored other factors which may come into existence at the time of each child's emancipation. Therefore, the parties' changing needs are best addressed in a future application for modification of the amount of maintenance.
The Appellate Division found, based upon the apparent discrepancy between the parties' income and other circumstances, that Supreme Court did not improvidently award the plaintiff an attorney's fee. However, the amount of the award was premised upon an erroneous calculation of the parties' respective incomes. It directed that upon remittal, the Supreme Court should recalculate an appropriate award to the plaintiff of an attorney's fee.
Deprivation of Right to Counsel In a Custody or Visitation Proceeding is Denial of a Fundamental Right Which Requires Reversal
In Matter of Rosof v Mallory, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4839081 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) at the commencement of a hearing to determine whether the father should have only supervised visitation with his daughter, the father's attorney asked to be relieved, and the father consented to her discharge. The father asked that new counsel be appointed, but the Family Court declined to do so, and the father represented himself. The Appellate Division held that the father, as a respondent in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, had the right to be represented by counsel. To determine whether a party is validly waiving the right to counsel, the court must conduct a "searching inquiry" in order to be reasonably certain that the party understands the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel. Here, the Family Court conducted no inquiry at all to determine whether the father was waiving the right to counsel. Requiring the father to try the matter without the benefit of counsel impermissibly placed the Family Court's interest in preventing delay above the interests of the parents and the child, and violated the father's right to be represented by counsel. The deprivation of a party's fundamental right to counsel in a custody or visitation proceeding is a denial of due process which requires reversal, regardless of the merits of the unrepresented party's position . The matter was remitted to the Family Court for a new hearing on the mother's petition and a new determination.
Supreme Court Finds No Basis for a Presumption That a Parent's Obligation to Pay for College Is to Be Limited to the Cost of a Suny Education Unless Proven Otherwise
In Pamela T v Marc B., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4861584 (N.Y.Sup.) the Supreme Court concluded that the proposition that before a parent can be compelled to contribute towards the cost of a private college there must be a showing that a child cannot receive an adequate education at a state college is a doctrine that in many cases is harmful to the children of divorced parents, acts to discriminate against them, and is largely unworkable.
The parties were divorced on December 23, 2008. They had two sons, one who was 18 and one who was 16. The judgment of divorce incorporated a custody agreement and a stipulation of settlement by which the parties had resolved all issues of the divorce except for those concerning child support. No mention was made in either the decision, the custody agreement or the stipulation of settlement as to the payment of the children's college tuition and expenses. In 2007, the elder child was diagnosed with "moderate emotional difficulty" and learning/anxiety disorders, which necessitated certain educational accommodations. Despite this diagnosis, he graduated in 2011 from Beacon High School, a selective public high school in Manhattan. He was accepted at Syracuse University, SUNY Binghamton and SUNY Buffalo, along with a number of other schools. Syracuse, which awarded him $3,000 in financial aid, cost approximately $53,000 a year to attend as an undergraduate, while SUNY Binghamton and SUNY Buffalo cost only about $18,000 a year. Although the child visited Binghamton and gave serious consideration to going there, he ultimately decided to attend Syracuse. He was now a freshman there studying computer engineering and computer graphics.
The parties were both practicing attorneys in New York City. Plaintiff worked for
the Metropolitan Transit Authority Inspector General's Office and defendant was
self-employed as a solo practitioner. Plaintiff's 2010 federal income tax return reported adjusted gross income of $109,896. Defendant's 2010 federal income tax return reported adjusted gross income of $105,135. Plaintiff's net worth statement showed she had assets of approximately $1,230,000. Defendant's net worth statement showed he had approximately $580,000. Both plaintiff and defendant went to private undergraduate colleges and law schools, with plaintiff graduating from Northwestern University and New York University School of Law, and defendant graduating from Columbia University and Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Defendant did not oppose an order directing him to contribute to his older child's college education, but he asked the court to apply the SUNY cap and limit his responsibility to a percentage of the costs of a state university education rather than to a percentage of a private college education. Defendant's position was based on his claim that he was unable to meet the financial demands of paying for private college and on his belief that his son could receive as good an education at SUNY Binghamton as he could at Syracuse.
Supreme Court observed that Domestic Relations Law 240(1- b)(c)(7) conferred upon the courts of this state the authority to "direct a parent to contribute to a child's private college education, even in the absence of special circumstances or a voluntary agreement. The statute provides that when a court exercises its discretion to direct such a contribution from a parent, it is to do so "having regard for the circumstances of the case and the parties, the best interests of the child, and the requirements of justice." Case law augmented the provisions of DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) by setting forth specific factors that are to be considered in determining whether to award college expenses. These factors include the educational background of the parents and their financial ability to provide the necessary funds, the child's academic ability and endeavors, and the type of college that would be most suitable for the child. (See Rosado v. Hughes, 23 AD3d 318 (1st Dept 2005); Naylor v. Gastler, 48 AD3d 951 (3d Dept 2008); Reiss v. Reiss, 56 AD3d 1293 (4th Dept 2008).
The Court observed that DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) does not provide for is a SUNY cap. The SUNY cap is a concept that has been judicially created by way of a string of decisions rendered since the enactment of the statute. The problem with these cases was that they provided little in the way of instruction as to when a SUNY cap might be properly applied over the objection of the parent who is seeking an award for college
expenses. The Supreme Court found that Berliner v. Berliner, 33 AD3d 745, 749 (2d Dept 2006) was instructive because the Second Department’s statement that there "is no basis in this record" for imposing the SUNY cap implied that the burden falls on the proponent of the cap to demonstrate that it is warranted. The inference to be drawn is that there is no presumption that a parent's obligation to pay for college is to be limited to the cost of a SUNY education unless proven otherwise; if anything, the presumption goes the other direction. It was also instructive because the decision's reference to the "so-called SUNY cap' "can be seen as an indication that even the Second Department views the SUNY cap as something less than an established doctrine firmly ensconced in the fabric of family law.
Supreme Court rejected defendants argument that plaintiff be required to prove that Syracuse was a better school than SUNY Binghamton in order for him to be required to pay Syracuse's higher expenses. He noted that it is difficult to conceive of a workable procedure, let alone a methodology, for a court to make a finding that one college is "better" than another. He stated that the real issue is what college or university is the best for the individual child in question in the ways that matter most to that particular child. The Court found that it had been shown that there was ample reason to support the child's choice of Syracuse, irrespective of whether it is ranked lower, higher or the same as SUNY Binghamton or any other SUNY school. Provided that the funds are available to finance the child's education, the fact that Syracuse was a private school and cost more than a public school was not a reason to interfere with the child going to the school he chose and he wanted to attend. This was particularly so in light of the fact that both his parents went to private colleges. One of the
factors to be considered when making a determination under DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) is the parents educational background. Inasmuch as plaintiff attended Northwestern and defendant attended Columbia, it could reasonably be assumed that there would exist an expectation in the family, and in the child himself, that he too could attend a private college.
Having found that the child's academic ability and endeavors, the type of college
that would be most suitable for him, and the educational background of the parents
were all factors that called for plaintiff to contribute to his son's education at
Syracuse University, the court had to consider the defendant's ability to pay. It was defendant's position that even though plaintiff may have the means to pay the high cost of their son attending Syracuse, he lacked the means to do so. Consequently, he contended that he should have to pay no more than $9,000 a year towards his son's education, an amount that is roughly 50% of the present annual cost of a SUNY school.
The court rejected defendant's contention as to his inability to pay a significant
share of the child's actual educational expenses being incurred at Syracuse. It was true that plaintiff has considerable more savings than defendant and that she had a pension plan through her employment. But it was equally true that defendant's net income the past year was over $100,000, which was only about $5,000 less than plaintiff's net income for the same period, and that he benefitted from the substantial tax deductions and write offs that come from being self-employed. Also, defendant, although remarried for a number of years, had chosen to keep a second apartment in addition to the residence he shared with his new wife. Defendant had paid and continued to pay a very small amount in basic child support and child support add-ons. If defendant's child support obligation were to be recalculated using his 2010 income, it would be far higher than the $686 monthly that he paid.
Supreme Court held that there was no basis to impose the SUNY cap, to the extent that it should be imposed at all, where the party seeking to invoke the cap has the financial ability to contribute towards the actual amount of his or her child's college expenses. (Citing R.E. v. S.E., 27 Misc.3d 1216(A); Bonnie B. v. Michael B., 6 Misc.3d 1004(A), 2004 WL 3050804 (Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2004). It found that the defendant had the income and the assets, as well as the ability to keep producing substantial income through his law practice, to make a significant contribution to his sons's college education. Although defendant's contribution should be less than plaintiff's, based on the difference between their net assets, and in particular what each of them had available for eventual retirement, that contribution should not be subject to some artificial construct like the SUNY cap. Rather, it should be based, as with all other child support obligations, on the respective finances of the parties. On this basis, the court concluded that defendant shall be obligated to contribute 40% of the total cost of the elder child attending Syracuse University, with those costs to include tuition, room and board, fees and books.
The Court observed that it has the discretion to direct parents to pay the
costs of their children's college expenses when the separation agreement or other
stipulation between the parents is silent in this respect. However, such a directive is premature when college is several years away, the choice of college and the cost of tuition are uncertain, and the child's academic interests and abilities are not supported by evidence. (Citing Gilkes v. Gilkes, 150 A.D.2d 200, 201 (1st Dept 1989); see also LaBombardi v. LaBombardi, 220 A.D.2d 642, 644 (2d Dept 1995). Here, college was more than a year and a half away for the younger child. It was therefore premature and unduly speculative to attempt to assess what the child's plans are with regard to college and the what the costs will be. As a result, plaintiff's application for this relief was denied without prejudice to renew at a subsequent date when the child has committed to attend college and the costs of attendance are supported by evidence.
In O’Brien v O’Brien, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4839062 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff former wife had an annual income of $33,262 from all sources, and the defendant former husband had an annual income of $115,747 from all sources. The parties were divorced by judgment dated November 30, 2009. In addition to child support of $2,625 per month, plus support arrears, the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff maintenance in the amount of $1,375 per month over a period of 10 years, to increase as each of the parties' six children becomes emancipated, so that the plaintiff would receive the total sum of $4,000 per month in combined child support and maintenance for a period of 10 years, plus maintenance arrears. The Supreme Court also awarded the plaintiff an attorney's fee in the amount of $10,000. The plaintiff was to remain in the marital residence and pay all carrying costs. The Appellate Division pointed out that the awards of child support, maintenance, arrears, and an attorney's fee were based upon the Supreme Court's calculation of the parties' respective incomes. It found that Supreme Court made a mathematical error in calculating the plaintiff's income. The numbers reflecting the various components of the plaintiff's annual income, as set forth by the Supreme Court in its decision, added up to a total of $54,163, not $33,262, as erroneously stated by the Supreme Court. It pointed out that a court has the inherent power to relieve a party from judgments taken through mistake or inadvertence in the interest of justice, and directed that the awards of child support, maintenance, arrears, and an attorney's fee had to be recalculated based on the correct figures. It also found that with respect to one of the components of the defendant's annual income, the Supreme Court attributed an incorrect amount. Three of the components were supported by the record. However, the record did not support the Supreme Court's calculation and imputation of $15,376 in annual benefits from the defendant's employer for use of an automobile and cell phone, along with the employer's payment of expenses attributable to the use of those items. It observed that Domestic Relations Law 240(1-b)(b)(5)(iv)(B) provides that the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, "attribute or impute income from ... automobiles or other perquisites that are provided as part of compensation for employment to the extent [they] constitute expenditures for personal use, or ... directly or indirectly confer personal economic benefits." Here, although the defendant's employer expended the sum of $15,376 in 2007 for the defendant's use of an automobile and cell phone and related expenses, the amount attributable to income was considerably smaller in light of the defendant's testimony that only 10% of his use of the automobile, and only a "portion" of his use of the cell phone, were personal uses. The Appellate Division observed that upon remittal for recalculation, the discrepancy between the parties' incomes would necessarily be smaller than previously calculated, and, the defendant's pro rata share of the basic child support obligation had to be recalculated. It also directed that upon remittal, the Supreme Court had to recalculate the award of maintenance based upon factors including the parties' respective incomes as recalculated, their pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the plaintiff's needs with the defendant's ability to pay. The Appellate Division held that that the maintenance award should not provide for an automatic increase upon the prospective emancipation of each of the parties' children. Maintenance is designed to give the spouse economic independence and should continue only as long as necessary to render the recipient self-supporting. The award should meet the recipient spouse's reasonable needs while providing an appropriate incentive for the recipient to become financially independent. The amount of the maintenance award is a discretionary determination based upon a number of interrelated facts then in existence; unless a future event is imminent and measurable, an award of maintenance should not include a provision for increase or decrease upon the happening of a particular future event. Here, the provision for automatic increase of maintenance upon the emancipation of each of the parties' children ignored other factors which may come into existence at the time of each child's emancipation. Therefore, the parties' changing needs are best addressed in a future application for modification of the amount of maintenance.
The Appellate Division found, based upon the apparent discrepancy between the parties' income and other circumstances, that Supreme Court did not improvidently award the plaintiff an attorney's fee. However, the amount of the award was premised upon an erroneous calculation of the parties' respective incomes. It directed that upon remittal, the Supreme Court should recalculate an appropriate award to the plaintiff of an attorney's fee.
Deprivation of Right to Counsel In a Custody or Visitation Proceeding is Denial of a Fundamental Right Which Requires Reversal
In Matter of Rosof v Mallory, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4839081 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) at the commencement of a hearing to determine whether the father should have only supervised visitation with his daughter, the father's attorney asked to be relieved, and the father consented to her discharge. The father asked that new counsel be appointed, but the Family Court declined to do so, and the father represented himself. The Appellate Division held that the father, as a respondent in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, had the right to be represented by counsel. To determine whether a party is validly waiving the right to counsel, the court must conduct a "searching inquiry" in order to be reasonably certain that the party understands the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel. Here, the Family Court conducted no inquiry at all to determine whether the father was waiving the right to counsel. Requiring the father to try the matter without the benefit of counsel impermissibly placed the Family Court's interest in preventing delay above the interests of the parents and the child, and violated the father's right to be represented by counsel. The deprivation of a party's fundamental right to counsel in a custody or visitation proceeding is a denial of due process which requires reversal, regardless of the merits of the unrepresented party's position . The matter was remitted to the Family Court for a new hearing on the mother's petition and a new determination.
Supreme Court Finds No Basis for a Presumption That a Parent's Obligation to Pay for College Is to Be Limited to the Cost of a Suny Education Unless Proven Otherwise
In Pamela T v Marc B., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4861584 (N.Y.Sup.) the Supreme Court concluded that the proposition that before a parent can be compelled to contribute towards the cost of a private college there must be a showing that a child cannot receive an adequate education at a state college is a doctrine that in many cases is harmful to the children of divorced parents, acts to discriminate against them, and is largely unworkable.
The parties were divorced on December 23, 2008. They had two sons, one who was 18 and one who was 16. The judgment of divorce incorporated a custody agreement and a stipulation of settlement by which the parties had resolved all issues of the divorce except for those concerning child support. No mention was made in either the decision, the custody agreement or the stipulation of settlement as to the payment of the children's college tuition and expenses. In 2007, the elder child was diagnosed with "moderate emotional difficulty" and learning/anxiety disorders, which necessitated certain educational accommodations. Despite this diagnosis, he graduated in 2011 from Beacon High School, a selective public high school in Manhattan. He was accepted at Syracuse University, SUNY Binghamton and SUNY Buffalo, along with a number of other schools. Syracuse, which awarded him $3,000 in financial aid, cost approximately $53,000 a year to attend as an undergraduate, while SUNY Binghamton and SUNY Buffalo cost only about $18,000 a year. Although the child visited Binghamton and gave serious consideration to going there, he ultimately decided to attend Syracuse. He was now a freshman there studying computer engineering and computer graphics.
The parties were both practicing attorneys in New York City. Plaintiff worked for
the Metropolitan Transit Authority Inspector General's Office and defendant was
self-employed as a solo practitioner. Plaintiff's 2010 federal income tax return reported adjusted gross income of $109,896. Defendant's 2010 federal income tax return reported adjusted gross income of $105,135. Plaintiff's net worth statement showed she had assets of approximately $1,230,000. Defendant's net worth statement showed he had approximately $580,000. Both plaintiff and defendant went to private undergraduate colleges and law schools, with plaintiff graduating from Northwestern University and New York University School of Law, and defendant graduating from Columbia University and Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Defendant did not oppose an order directing him to contribute to his older child's college education, but he asked the court to apply the SUNY cap and limit his responsibility to a percentage of the costs of a state university education rather than to a percentage of a private college education. Defendant's position was based on his claim that he was unable to meet the financial demands of paying for private college and on his belief that his son could receive as good an education at SUNY Binghamton as he could at Syracuse.
Supreme Court observed that Domestic Relations Law 240(1- b)(c)(7) conferred upon the courts of this state the authority to "direct a parent to contribute to a child's private college education, even in the absence of special circumstances or a voluntary agreement. The statute provides that when a court exercises its discretion to direct such a contribution from a parent, it is to do so "having regard for the circumstances of the case and the parties, the best interests of the child, and the requirements of justice." Case law augmented the provisions of DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) by setting forth specific factors that are to be considered in determining whether to award college expenses. These factors include the educational background of the parents and their financial ability to provide the necessary funds, the child's academic ability and endeavors, and the type of college that would be most suitable for the child. (See Rosado v. Hughes, 23 AD3d 318 (1st Dept 2005); Naylor v. Gastler, 48 AD3d 951 (3d Dept 2008); Reiss v. Reiss, 56 AD3d 1293 (4th Dept 2008).
The Court observed that DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) does not provide for is a SUNY cap. The SUNY cap is a concept that has been judicially created by way of a string of decisions rendered since the enactment of the statute. The problem with these cases was that they provided little in the way of instruction as to when a SUNY cap might be properly applied over the objection of the parent who is seeking an award for college
expenses. The Supreme Court found that Berliner v. Berliner, 33 AD3d 745, 749 (2d Dept 2006) was instructive because the Second Department’s statement that there "is no basis in this record" for imposing the SUNY cap implied that the burden falls on the proponent of the cap to demonstrate that it is warranted. The inference to be drawn is that there is no presumption that a parent's obligation to pay for college is to be limited to the cost of a SUNY education unless proven otherwise; if anything, the presumption goes the other direction. It was also instructive because the decision's reference to the "so-called SUNY cap' "can be seen as an indication that even the Second Department views the SUNY cap as something less than an established doctrine firmly ensconced in the fabric of family law.
Supreme Court rejected defendants argument that plaintiff be required to prove that Syracuse was a better school than SUNY Binghamton in order for him to be required to pay Syracuse's higher expenses. He noted that it is difficult to conceive of a workable procedure, let alone a methodology, for a court to make a finding that one college is "better" than another. He stated that the real issue is what college or university is the best for the individual child in question in the ways that matter most to that particular child. The Court found that it had been shown that there was ample reason to support the child's choice of Syracuse, irrespective of whether it is ranked lower, higher or the same as SUNY Binghamton or any other SUNY school. Provided that the funds are available to finance the child's education, the fact that Syracuse was a private school and cost more than a public school was not a reason to interfere with the child going to the school he chose and he wanted to attend. This was particularly so in light of the fact that both his parents went to private colleges. One of the
factors to be considered when making a determination under DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) is the parents educational background. Inasmuch as plaintiff attended Northwestern and defendant attended Columbia, it could reasonably be assumed that there would exist an expectation in the family, and in the child himself, that he too could attend a private college.
Having found that the child's academic ability and endeavors, the type of college
that would be most suitable for him, and the educational background of the parents
were all factors that called for plaintiff to contribute to his son's education at
Syracuse University, the court had to consider the defendant's ability to pay. It was defendant's position that even though plaintiff may have the means to pay the high cost of their son attending Syracuse, he lacked the means to do so. Consequently, he contended that he should have to pay no more than $9,000 a year towards his son's education, an amount that is roughly 50% of the present annual cost of a SUNY school.
The court rejected defendant's contention as to his inability to pay a significant
share of the child's actual educational expenses being incurred at Syracuse. It was true that plaintiff has considerable more savings than defendant and that she had a pension plan through her employment. But it was equally true that defendant's net income the past year was over $100,000, which was only about $5,000 less than plaintiff's net income for the same period, and that he benefitted from the substantial tax deductions and write offs that come from being self-employed. Also, defendant, although remarried for a number of years, had chosen to keep a second apartment in addition to the residence he shared with his new wife. Defendant had paid and continued to pay a very small amount in basic child support and child support add-ons. If defendant's child support obligation were to be recalculated using his 2010 income, it would be far higher than the $686 monthly that he paid.
Supreme Court held that there was no basis to impose the SUNY cap, to the extent that it should be imposed at all, where the party seeking to invoke the cap has the financial ability to contribute towards the actual amount of his or her child's college expenses. (Citing R.E. v. S.E., 27 Misc.3d 1216(A); Bonnie B. v. Michael B., 6 Misc.3d 1004(A), 2004 WL 3050804 (Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2004). It found that the defendant had the income and the assets, as well as the ability to keep producing substantial income through his law practice, to make a significant contribution to his sons's college education. Although defendant's contribution should be less than plaintiff's, based on the difference between their net assets, and in particular what each of them had available for eventual retirement, that contribution should not be subject to some artificial construct like the SUNY cap. Rather, it should be based, as with all other child support obligations, on the respective finances of the parties. On this basis, the court concluded that defendant shall be obligated to contribute 40% of the total cost of the elder child attending Syracuse University, with those costs to include tuition, room and board, fees and books.
The Court observed that it has the discretion to direct parents to pay the
costs of their children's college expenses when the separation agreement or other
stipulation between the parents is silent in this respect. However, such a directive is premature when college is several years away, the choice of college and the cost of tuition are uncertain, and the child's academic interests and abilities are not supported by evidence. (Citing Gilkes v. Gilkes, 150 A.D.2d 200, 201 (1st Dept 1989); see also LaBombardi v. LaBombardi, 220 A.D.2d 642, 644 (2d Dept 1995). Here, college was more than a year and a half away for the younger child. It was therefore premature and unduly speculative to attempt to assess what the child's plans are with regard to college and the what the costs will be. As a result, plaintiff's application for this relief was denied without prejudice to renew at a subsequent date when the child has committed to attend college and the costs of attendance are supported by evidence.
Friday, October 14, 2011
Important New Decisions - October 14, 2011
Supreme Court May Not Determine Whether the Marriage Is Irretrievably Broken until All Ancillary Issues Are Resolved.
In Schiffer v Schiffer, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4790060 (N.Y.Sup.) plaintiff husband moved for an order directing that summary judgment be granted in his favor of divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). The defendant wife opposed the application and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The parties were married in Massachusetts on March 25, 1990 and had three unemancipated children of the marriage. On November 29, 2010, Mr. Schiffer commenced the action for divorce, claiming irretrievable breakdown of the marriage for a period of more than six months prior to the commencement of the action. On December 21, 2010, Mrs. Schiffer served her verified answer, contesting these allegations, specifically claiming that Mr. Schiffer's actions belied his claims that the marriage was irretrievably broken. The Supreme Court observed that Domestic Relations Law § 170 [7] allows parties to seek a judgment of divorce when "the relationship between the husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath" also provides that "no judgment of divorce shall be granted under this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the
payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or determined by the court and incorporated into this judgment of divorce".
The Supreme Court agreed with the wife’s argument that the husband was not entitled to summary judgment since no judgment of divorce can be made unless and until the economic and custodial issues are determined or resolved by the parties. The statute clearly states that a judgment may only be granted after economic and custodial issues were resolved. In this case, all of the conditions of the statute had not been met since the economic and custodial issues were yet to be addressed. Mr. Schiffer had failed to meet his prima facie burden, and his motion for summary judgment was denied.
Mrs. Schiffer's motion for summary judgment was also denied, but for a different reason. Supreme Court observed that in Strack v. Strack (31 Misc.3d 258 [Sup Ct, Essex County 2011] ), Justice Muller held that the "determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question to be determined by the finder of fact." This holding demonstrably agreed with fundamental concepts of due process and comported with similar interpretations of no-fault statutes from our sister states. Since the sole means of procuring a divorce in New York is by judicial process (N.Y. Const, art I, s 9), precluding a party from contesting a ground for divorce "must be regarded as the equivalent of denying [him or her] an opportunity to be heard ...and in the absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due process". A contrary finding would merely reduce the court to a rubber stamp whenever presented with an action for divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). While Mrs. Schiffer had established that the ancillary issues were not resolved and that her marriage to Mr. Schiffer had not broken down irretrievably, Mr. Schiffer raised a triable issue of fact that the marriage was irretrievably broken for at least six months. The proof bared by the parties sufficed to establish a true issue of fact as to whether this marriage was irretrievably broken, which the finder of fact would undoubtedly resolve after the other issues were resolved.
A Court May Not Delegate to a Parenting Coordinator the Authority to Resolve Issues Affecting the Best Interests of the Children
In Silbowitz v Silbowitz, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4599852 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Supreme Court which, in effect, granted the defendant former husband's motion to appoint a parenting coordinator to assist the parties in implementing the terms of their existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007.
It observed that although a court may properly appoint a parenting coordinator to mediate between parties and oversee the implementation of their court-ordered parenting plan a court may not delegate to a parenting coordinator the authority to resolve issues affecting the best interests of the children. Here, despite the expansive scope of the issues entrusted to the parenting coordinator by the Supreme Court's order, his power was properly limited to implementing the terms of the existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007, subject to the Supreme Court's oversight. Although the parenting coordinator was empowered to issue a written decision resolving a conflict where he was unable to broker an agreement between the parties, the Supreme Court's order also provided that the parties may seek to have the parenting coordinator's decision so-ordered by the Supreme Court and that they "retain their right to return to Court and seek a modification of their parenting plan at any time." Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly limited the role of the parenting coordinator and properly provided that his resolutions remained subject to court oversight.
The plaintiff also contended that the order insufficiently protected the confidential and privileged information of the parties and the children because it required the parties to execute authorizations and releases allowing the parenting coordinator to obtain information which was otherwise confidential or privileged. However, the order required that the parenting coordinator maintain the confidentiality of the information and when read as a whole, clearly limited his authority to request authorizations or releases and use information only in furtherance of his duty to mediate between the parties in the implementation of their parenting plan. Accordingly, no further limitation was necessary.
Supreme Court Properly Declined to Imply a Term Which the Parties Did Not Insert into Their Stipulation, for the Purpose of Determining the Contempt Motion. Court Has Discretion to Decide If it Will Consider New Argument in Reply Papers.
In Penavic v Penavic, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600442 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the the plaintiff moved, pursuant to Judiciary Law 756 to hold the defendant in civil contempt. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Divison affirmed. It held that to prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party charged with contempt willfully violated a clear and unequivocal mandate of a court's order, with knowledge of that order's terms, thereby prejudicing the movant's rights. Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying her motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to remove her name from a home equity line of credit ( HELOC) or closing it. While the plaintiff was aware of the HELOC at the time that she executed the stipulation, no provision was included in the stipulation requiring that her name be removed from it or that it be closed, even though the defendant was precluded from continuing to use the HELOC pursuant to the provision which prohibited him from incurring additional debt upon the plaintiff's credit. Since the terms of the stipulation with respect to whether the HELOC had to be closed were unambiguous, the Supreme Court properly declined to imply a term which the parties did not insert into the stipulation, for the purpose of determining the contempt motion. The plaintiff raised, for the first time in her reply papers, the argument that the defendant was also in contempt of the judgment by increasing the balance of the HELOC from $25,000, the amount of the balance at the time that the parties executed the stipulation, to $750,000, which he disclosed in his affidavit opposing the plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division held that it was within the Supreme Court's discretion to decide if it would consider this new argument. Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not address this provision in her motion papers and relied solely upon the provisions concerning the acknowledgment that the bills or accounts for the former marital residence were solely in the husband's individual name as the basis for her motion, Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion to disregard that argument in connection with the motion before it (citing Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, 52 AD3d 826, 827).
Authors Note: In Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, the Appellate Division said: “The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant, not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments or new grounds for the requested relief (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]). Further, Dawkins was not afforded an opportunity to address the new argument (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]).”
Court May Not Order a Parent Undergo Counseling or Treatment as a Condition of Future Visitation or Re-application for Visitation Rights but May Direct a Party to Submit to a Mental Health Evaluation for Use in Any Future Determination of Visitation.
In Matter of Smith ex rel Hunter v Dawn F.B., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600469 (2d Dept 2011) Family Court granted the petition of the attorney for the child alleging that the mother violated an order of custody and visitation, prohibited her from having
any contact with her son, directed that she submit to a mental health evaluation,
directed her to follow treatment recommendations resulting from that evaluation,
and conditioned her application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance
with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional.
The Appellate Division modified the order by deleting the provision conditioning the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. It found that Family Court's determination that it was in the child's best interest to suspend supervised visitation and prohibit all contact with the mother had a sound and substantial basis in the record. The mother, by her own admission, violated the express terms of the Family Court's previous order, which only permitted visitation supervised by designated individuals, by having unsupervised contact with the child at two separate little league baseball games. Moreover, the mother contributed to certain events at a recent therapeutic visit which adversely affected the child and undermined the progress of the therapeutic visitation.
The Appellate Division pointed out that a court may not order that a parent undergo counseling or treatment as a condition of future visitation or re-application for visitation rights, but may only direct a party to submit to counseling or treatment as a component of visitation. Here, the Family Court improperly conditioned the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. However, the Family Court properly directed the mother to submit to a mental health evaluation for use in any future determination of visitation.
Family Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Article 8 Proceeding Where There Is No Intimate Relationship Between Parties
In Matter of Riedel v Vasquez, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600481 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Family Court which, without a hearing, granted Respondents motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 10, 2010, the petitioner commenced an Article 8 proceeding seeking an order of protection against Milagros Carranza Vasquez (respondent), who was the estranged wife of the petitioner's live-in boyfriend. The petitioner had two children with the boyfriend, and the respondent had one child with him. The petitioner alleged that she and the respondent, who did not reside together, had an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1). The Family Court, without a hearing, dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Appellate Division affirmed. It pointed out that the Family Court is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction, and "cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute" (Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 N.Y.3d 364). Pursuant to Family Court Act 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household". Members of the same family or household include, among others, "persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time" (Family Ct Act 812[1])(e). Expressly excluded from the ambit of "intimate relationship," are "casual acquaintance[s]" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts". Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis. Relevant factors include the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship. Here, the parties had no direct relationship and were only connected through a third party, who was the biological father of the parties' respective children. The parties never resided together and did not take care of each other's children. The respondent's contact with the petitioner and/or her children had been minimal. Given these undisputed facts, no hearing was required, as the Family Court possessed sufficient information to determine that the parties were not and never had been in an "intimate relationship" as defined by Family Court Act s 812(1)(e).
Family Court Lacked Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Order Where Neither the Child Nor the Father Maintained a Significant Connection with New York, and Substantial Evidence Regarding the Child's Present and Future Welfare Was No Longer Available in this State.
In Knight v Morgan, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600549 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the the Family Court issued an order of custody on consent, on August 24, 2009, in connection with the father's petition seeking joint custody of the subject child with the mother, awarding joint legal custody to both parents, with primary residential custody to the father. Accordingly, the child, who was born in 2000, and had resided with his mother in New York since his birth, moved to California in September 2009 to live with his father. After moving to California with the father, the child was diagnosed by a psychologist in California with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and, possibly, a bipolar disorder. The child received treatment from healthcare providers in California, and was not permitted to travel until his condition was stabilized. The child had not returned to New York since moving to California. In December 2009 the mother filed a cross petition in the Family Court, to modify the prior order of custody so as to award her sole custody of the child, in which she alleged that the father had falsely accused her of abusing the child. In January 2010 the father separately cross-petitioned to modify the prior custody order so as to award him sole custody of the child. Subsequently, in May 2010, while both cross petitions were pending, the father moved, inter alia, to dismiss the mother's cross petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction, the Family Court granted that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the mother's cross petition on that ground. The Family Court did not address the father's separate cross petition.
The Appellate Division reversed. It held that the Family Court correctly determined that it lacked exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(1), since neither the child nor the father maintained a significant connection with New York, and substantial evidence regarding the child's present and future welfare was no longer available in this State (Domestic Relations Law 76-a[1][a]). However, the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear the mother's cross petition for modification pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(2) since it would have had jurisdiction for an initial child custody determination under Domestic Relations Law 76(1)(a). New York was the child's "home state" within the six months immediately preceding the commencement of this proceeding, and the mother continued to reside in this State. The matter was be remitted to the Family Court for further proceedings on the cross petitions.
New York Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Where it Is Not State in Which Child Lived for at Least Six Consecutive Months Before Commencement of Custody Proceeding
In Jablonsky-Urso v Urso, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600550 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division held that Family Court properly granted the father's motion to dismiss the mother’s petition for custody of the parties' son for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Domestic Relations Law 75-a (7) defines a child's home state as "the state in which a child lived with a parent ... for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding". Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, "[h]ome state jurisdiction is paramount and whether to accept jurisdiction is a home state prerogative" (Matter of Navarrete v. Wyatt, 52 A.D.3d at 836, 861 N.Y.S.2d 393). Here, the Family Court properly determined that New York was not the child's home state and, therefore, that New York did not have jurisdiction over this custody dispute (see Domestic Relations Law 76). However, it held that the Family Court erred in refusing to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over the family offense petition (see Domestic Relations Law 76-c) and in summarily dismissing the family offense petition upon its finding that the allegations contained in the mother's family offense petition were insufficient to sustain a family offense. The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court and the allegations asserted in a petition seeking the issuance of an order of protection must be supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The Family Court improperly determined that the mother failed to demonstrate that the father possessed the intent required to sustain any of the family offenses alleged in the petition, as it did so without the benefit of a hearing. Based on the foregoing, that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the family offense petition had to be denied and the matter remitted to the Family Court, for a fact-finding hearing and a determination of the family offense petition with respect to the allegations contained therein.
In Schiffer v Schiffer, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4790060 (N.Y.Sup.) plaintiff husband moved for an order directing that summary judgment be granted in his favor of divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). The defendant wife opposed the application and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The parties were married in Massachusetts on March 25, 1990 and had three unemancipated children of the marriage. On November 29, 2010, Mr. Schiffer commenced the action for divorce, claiming irretrievable breakdown of the marriage for a period of more than six months prior to the commencement of the action. On December 21, 2010, Mrs. Schiffer served her verified answer, contesting these allegations, specifically claiming that Mr. Schiffer's actions belied his claims that the marriage was irretrievably broken. The Supreme Court observed that Domestic Relations Law § 170 [7] allows parties to seek a judgment of divorce when "the relationship between the husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath" also provides that "no judgment of divorce shall be granted under this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the
payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or determined by the court and incorporated into this judgment of divorce".
The Supreme Court agreed with the wife’s argument that the husband was not entitled to summary judgment since no judgment of divorce can be made unless and until the economic and custodial issues are determined or resolved by the parties. The statute clearly states that a judgment may only be granted after economic and custodial issues were resolved. In this case, all of the conditions of the statute had not been met since the economic and custodial issues were yet to be addressed. Mr. Schiffer had failed to meet his prima facie burden, and his motion for summary judgment was denied.
Mrs. Schiffer's motion for summary judgment was also denied, but for a different reason. Supreme Court observed that in Strack v. Strack (31 Misc.3d 258 [Sup Ct, Essex County 2011] ), Justice Muller held that the "determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question to be determined by the finder of fact." This holding demonstrably agreed with fundamental concepts of due process and comported with similar interpretations of no-fault statutes from our sister states. Since the sole means of procuring a divorce in New York is by judicial process (N.Y. Const, art I, s 9), precluding a party from contesting a ground for divorce "must be regarded as the equivalent of denying [him or her] an opportunity to be heard ...and in the absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due process". A contrary finding would merely reduce the court to a rubber stamp whenever presented with an action for divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). While Mrs. Schiffer had established that the ancillary issues were not resolved and that her marriage to Mr. Schiffer had not broken down irretrievably, Mr. Schiffer raised a triable issue of fact that the marriage was irretrievably broken for at least six months. The proof bared by the parties sufficed to establish a true issue of fact as to whether this marriage was irretrievably broken, which the finder of fact would undoubtedly resolve after the other issues were resolved.
A Court May Not Delegate to a Parenting Coordinator the Authority to Resolve Issues Affecting the Best Interests of the Children
In Silbowitz v Silbowitz, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4599852 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Supreme Court which, in effect, granted the defendant former husband's motion to appoint a parenting coordinator to assist the parties in implementing the terms of their existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007.
It observed that although a court may properly appoint a parenting coordinator to mediate between parties and oversee the implementation of their court-ordered parenting plan a court may not delegate to a parenting coordinator the authority to resolve issues affecting the best interests of the children. Here, despite the expansive scope of the issues entrusted to the parenting coordinator by the Supreme Court's order, his power was properly limited to implementing the terms of the existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007, subject to the Supreme Court's oversight. Although the parenting coordinator was empowered to issue a written decision resolving a conflict where he was unable to broker an agreement between the parties, the Supreme Court's order also provided that the parties may seek to have the parenting coordinator's decision so-ordered by the Supreme Court and that they "retain their right to return to Court and seek a modification of their parenting plan at any time." Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly limited the role of the parenting coordinator and properly provided that his resolutions remained subject to court oversight.
The plaintiff also contended that the order insufficiently protected the confidential and privileged information of the parties and the children because it required the parties to execute authorizations and releases allowing the parenting coordinator to obtain information which was otherwise confidential or privileged. However, the order required that the parenting coordinator maintain the confidentiality of the information and when read as a whole, clearly limited his authority to request authorizations or releases and use information only in furtherance of his duty to mediate between the parties in the implementation of their parenting plan. Accordingly, no further limitation was necessary.
Supreme Court Properly Declined to Imply a Term Which the Parties Did Not Insert into Their Stipulation, for the Purpose of Determining the Contempt Motion. Court Has Discretion to Decide If it Will Consider New Argument in Reply Papers.
In Penavic v Penavic, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600442 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the the plaintiff moved, pursuant to Judiciary Law 756 to hold the defendant in civil contempt. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Divison affirmed. It held that to prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party charged with contempt willfully violated a clear and unequivocal mandate of a court's order, with knowledge of that order's terms, thereby prejudicing the movant's rights. Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying her motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to remove her name from a home equity line of credit ( HELOC) or closing it. While the plaintiff was aware of the HELOC at the time that she executed the stipulation, no provision was included in the stipulation requiring that her name be removed from it or that it be closed, even though the defendant was precluded from continuing to use the HELOC pursuant to the provision which prohibited him from incurring additional debt upon the plaintiff's credit. Since the terms of the stipulation with respect to whether the HELOC had to be closed were unambiguous, the Supreme Court properly declined to imply a term which the parties did not insert into the stipulation, for the purpose of determining the contempt motion. The plaintiff raised, for the first time in her reply papers, the argument that the defendant was also in contempt of the judgment by increasing the balance of the HELOC from $25,000, the amount of the balance at the time that the parties executed the stipulation, to $750,000, which he disclosed in his affidavit opposing the plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division held that it was within the Supreme Court's discretion to decide if it would consider this new argument. Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not address this provision in her motion papers and relied solely upon the provisions concerning the acknowledgment that the bills or accounts for the former marital residence were solely in the husband's individual name as the basis for her motion, Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion to disregard that argument in connection with the motion before it (citing Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, 52 AD3d 826, 827).
Authors Note: In Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, the Appellate Division said: “The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant, not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments or new grounds for the requested relief (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]). Further, Dawkins was not afforded an opportunity to address the new argument (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]).”
Court May Not Order a Parent Undergo Counseling or Treatment as a Condition of Future Visitation or Re-application for Visitation Rights but May Direct a Party to Submit to a Mental Health Evaluation for Use in Any Future Determination of Visitation.
In Matter of Smith ex rel Hunter v Dawn F.B., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600469 (2d Dept 2011) Family Court granted the petition of the attorney for the child alleging that the mother violated an order of custody and visitation, prohibited her from having
any contact with her son, directed that she submit to a mental health evaluation,
directed her to follow treatment recommendations resulting from that evaluation,
and conditioned her application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance
with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional.
The Appellate Division modified the order by deleting the provision conditioning the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. It found that Family Court's determination that it was in the child's best interest to suspend supervised visitation and prohibit all contact with the mother had a sound and substantial basis in the record. The mother, by her own admission, violated the express terms of the Family Court's previous order, which only permitted visitation supervised by designated individuals, by having unsupervised contact with the child at two separate little league baseball games. Moreover, the mother contributed to certain events at a recent therapeutic visit which adversely affected the child and undermined the progress of the therapeutic visitation.
The Appellate Division pointed out that a court may not order that a parent undergo counseling or treatment as a condition of future visitation or re-application for visitation rights, but may only direct a party to submit to counseling or treatment as a component of visitation. Here, the Family Court improperly conditioned the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. However, the Family Court properly directed the mother to submit to a mental health evaluation for use in any future determination of visitation.
Family Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Article 8 Proceeding Where There Is No Intimate Relationship Between Parties
In Matter of Riedel v Vasquez, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600481 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Family Court which, without a hearing, granted Respondents motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 10, 2010, the petitioner commenced an Article 8 proceeding seeking an order of protection against Milagros Carranza Vasquez (respondent), who was the estranged wife of the petitioner's live-in boyfriend. The petitioner had two children with the boyfriend, and the respondent had one child with him. The petitioner alleged that she and the respondent, who did not reside together, had an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1). The Family Court, without a hearing, dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Appellate Division affirmed. It pointed out that the Family Court is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction, and "cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute" (Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 N.Y.3d 364). Pursuant to Family Court Act 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household". Members of the same family or household include, among others, "persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time" (Family Ct Act 812[1])(e). Expressly excluded from the ambit of "intimate relationship," are "casual acquaintance[s]" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts". Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis. Relevant factors include the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship. Here, the parties had no direct relationship and were only connected through a third party, who was the biological father of the parties' respective children. The parties never resided together and did not take care of each other's children. The respondent's contact with the petitioner and/or her children had been minimal. Given these undisputed facts, no hearing was required, as the Family Court possessed sufficient information to determine that the parties were not and never had been in an "intimate relationship" as defined by Family Court Act s 812(1)(e).
Family Court Lacked Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Order Where Neither the Child Nor the Father Maintained a Significant Connection with New York, and Substantial Evidence Regarding the Child's Present and Future Welfare Was No Longer Available in this State.
In Knight v Morgan, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600549 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the the Family Court issued an order of custody on consent, on August 24, 2009, in connection with the father's petition seeking joint custody of the subject child with the mother, awarding joint legal custody to both parents, with primary residential custody to the father. Accordingly, the child, who was born in 2000, and had resided with his mother in New York since his birth, moved to California in September 2009 to live with his father. After moving to California with the father, the child was diagnosed by a psychologist in California with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and, possibly, a bipolar disorder. The child received treatment from healthcare providers in California, and was not permitted to travel until his condition was stabilized. The child had not returned to New York since moving to California. In December 2009 the mother filed a cross petition in the Family Court, to modify the prior order of custody so as to award her sole custody of the child, in which she alleged that the father had falsely accused her of abusing the child. In January 2010 the father separately cross-petitioned to modify the prior custody order so as to award him sole custody of the child. Subsequently, in May 2010, while both cross petitions were pending, the father moved, inter alia, to dismiss the mother's cross petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction, the Family Court granted that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the mother's cross petition on that ground. The Family Court did not address the father's separate cross petition.
The Appellate Division reversed. It held that the Family Court correctly determined that it lacked exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(1), since neither the child nor the father maintained a significant connection with New York, and substantial evidence regarding the child's present and future welfare was no longer available in this State (Domestic Relations Law 76-a[1][a]). However, the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear the mother's cross petition for modification pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(2) since it would have had jurisdiction for an initial child custody determination under Domestic Relations Law 76(1)(a). New York was the child's "home state" within the six months immediately preceding the commencement of this proceeding, and the mother continued to reside in this State. The matter was be remitted to the Family Court for further proceedings on the cross petitions.
New York Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Where it Is Not State in Which Child Lived for at Least Six Consecutive Months Before Commencement of Custody Proceeding
In Jablonsky-Urso v Urso, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600550 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division held that Family Court properly granted the father's motion to dismiss the mother’s petition for custody of the parties' son for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Domestic Relations Law 75-a (7) defines a child's home state as "the state in which a child lived with a parent ... for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding". Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, "[h]ome state jurisdiction is paramount and whether to accept jurisdiction is a home state prerogative" (Matter of Navarrete v. Wyatt, 52 A.D.3d at 836, 861 N.Y.S.2d 393). Here, the Family Court properly determined that New York was not the child's home state and, therefore, that New York did not have jurisdiction over this custody dispute (see Domestic Relations Law 76). However, it held that the Family Court erred in refusing to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over the family offense petition (see Domestic Relations Law 76-c) and in summarily dismissing the family offense petition upon its finding that the allegations contained in the mother's family offense petition were insufficient to sustain a family offense. The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court and the allegations asserted in a petition seeking the issuance of an order of protection must be supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The Family Court improperly determined that the mother failed to demonstrate that the father possessed the intent required to sustain any of the family offenses alleged in the petition, as it did so without the benefit of a hearing. Based on the foregoing, that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the family offense petition had to be denied and the matter remitted to the Family Court, for a fact-finding hearing and a determination of the family offense petition with respect to the allegations contained therein.
Thursday, October 13, 2011
Important New Decisions - October 13, 2011
Supreme Court May Not Determine Whether the Marriage Is Irretrievably Broken until All Ancillary Issues Are Resolved.
In Schiffer v Schiffer, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4790060 (N.Y.Sup.) plaintiff husband moved for an order directing that summary judgment be granted in his favor of divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). The defendant wife opposed the application and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The parties were married in Massachusetts on March 25, 1990 and had three unemancipated children of the marriage. On November 29, 2010, Mr. Schiffer commenced the action for divorce, claiming irretrievable breakdown of the marriage for a period of more than six months prior to the commencement of the action. On December 21, 2010, Mrs. Schiffer served her verified answer, contesting these allegations, specifically claiming that Mr. Schiffer's actions belied his claims that the marriage was irretrievably broken. The Supreme Court observed that Domestic Relations Law § 170 [7] allows parties to seek a judgment of divorce when "the relationship between the husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath" also provides that "no judgment of divorce shall be granted under this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the
payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or determined by the court and incorporated into this judgment of divorce".
The Supreme Court agreed with the wife’s argument that the husband was not entitled to summary judgment since no judgment of divorce can be made unless and until the economic and custodial issues are determined or resolved by the parties. The statute clearly states that a judgment may only be granted after economic and custodial issues were resolved. In this case, all of the conditions of the statute had not been met since the economic and custodial issues were yet to be addressed. Mr. Schiffer had failed to meet his prima facie burden, and his motion for summary judgment was denied.
Mrs. Schiffer's motion for summary judgment was also denied, but for a different reason. Supreme Court observed that in Strack v. Strack (31 Misc.3d 258 [Sup Ct, Essex County 2011] ), Justice Muller held that the "determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question to be determined by the finder of fact." This holding demonstrably agreed with fundamental concepts of due process and comported with similar interpretations of no-fault statutes from our sister states. Since the sole means of procuring a divorce in New York is by judicial process (N.Y. Const, art I, s 9), precluding a party from contesting a ground for divorce "must be regarded as the equivalent of denying [him or her] an opportunity to be heard ...and in the absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due process". A contrary finding would merely reduce the court to a rubber stamp whenever presented with an action for divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). While Mrs. Schiffer had established that the ancillary issues were not resolved and that her marriage to Mr. Schiffer had not broken down irretrievably, Mr. Schiffer raised a triable issue of fact that the marriage was irretrievably broken for at least six months. The proof bared by the parties sufficed to establish a true issue of fact as to whether this marriage was irretrievably broken, which the finder of fact would undoubtedly resolve after the other issues were resolved.
A Court May Not Delegate to a Parenting Coordinator the Authority to Resolve Issues Affecting the Best Interests of the Children
In Silbowitz v Silbowitz, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4599852 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Supreme Court which, in effect, granted the defendant former husband's motion to appoint a parenting coordinator to assist the parties in implementing the terms of their existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007. It observed that although a court may properly appoint a parenting coordinator to mediate between parties and oversee the implementation of their court-ordered parenting plan a court may not delegate to a parenting coordinator the authority to resolve issues affecting the best interests of the children. Here, despite the expansive scope of the issues entrusted to the parenting coordinator by the Supreme Court's order, his power was properly limited to implementing the terms of the existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007, subject to the Supreme Court's oversight. Although the parenting coordinator was empowered to issue a written decision resolving a conflict where he was unable to broker an agreement between the parties, the Supreme Court's order also provided that the parties may seek to have the parenting coordinator's decision so-ordered by the Supreme Court and that they "retain their right to return to Court and seek a modification of their parenting plan at any time." Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly limited the role of the parenting coordinator and properly provided that his resolutions remained subject to court oversight.
The plaintiff also contended that the order insufficiently protected the confidential and privileged information of the parties and the children because it required the parties to execute authorizations and releases allowing the parenting coordinator to obtain information which was otherwise confidential or privileged. However, the order required that the parenting coordinator maintain the confidentiality of the information and when read as a whole, clearly limited his authority to request authorizations or releases and use information only in furtherance of his duty to mediate between the parties in the implementation of their parenting plan. Accordingly, no further limitation was necessary.
Supreme Court Properly Declined to Imply a Term Which the Parties Did Not Insert into Their Stipulation, for the Purpose of Determining the Contempt Motion. Court Has Discretion to Decide If it Will Consider New Argument in Reply Papers.
In Penavic v Penavic, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600442 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the the plaintiff moved, pursuant to Judiciary Law 756 to hold the defendant in civil contempt. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Divison affirmed. It held that to prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party charged with contempt willfully violated a clear and unequivocal mandate of a court's order, with knowledge of that order's terms, thereby prejudicing the movant's rights. Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying her motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to remove her name from a home equity line of credit ( HELOC) or closing it. While the plaintiff was aware of the HELOC at the time that she executed the stipulation, no provision was included in the stipulation requiring that her name be removed from it or that it be closed, even though the defendant was precluded from continuing to use the HELOC pursuant to the provision which prohibited him from incurring additional debt upon the plaintiff's credit. Since the terms of the stipulation with respect to whether the HELOC had to be closed were unambiguous, the Supreme Court properly declined to imply a term which the parties did not insert into the stipulation, for the purpose of determining the contempt motion. The plaintiff raised, for the first time in her reply papers, the argument that the defendant was also in contempt of the judgment by increasing the balance of the HELOC from $25,000, the amount of the balance at the time that the parties executed the stipulation, to $750,000, which he disclosed in his affidavit opposing the plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division held that it was within the Supreme Court's discretion to decide if it would consider this new argument. Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not address this provision in her motion papers and relied solely upon the provisions concerning the acknowledgment that the bills or accounts for the former marital residence were solely in the husband's individual name as the basis for her motion, Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion to disregard that argument in connection with the motion before it (citing Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, 52 AD3d 826, 827).
Authors Note: In Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, the Appellate Division said: “The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant, not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments or new grounds for the requested relief (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]). Further, Dawkins was not afforded an opportunity to address the new argument (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]).”
Court May Not Order a Parent Undergo Counseling or Treatment as a Condition of Future Visitation or Re-application for Visitation Rights but May Direct a Party to Submit to a Mental Health Evaluation for Use in Any Future Determination of Visitation.
In Matter of Smith ex rel Hunter v Dawn F.B., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600469 (2d Dept 2011) Family Court granted the petition of the attorney for the child alleging that the mother violated an order of custody and visitation, prohibited her from having any contact with her son, directed that she submit to a mental health evaluation, directed her to follow treatment recommendations resulting from that evaluation,
and conditioned her application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional.
The Appellate Division modified the order by deleting the provision conditioning the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. It found that Family Court's determination that it was in the child's best interest to suspend supervised visitation and prohibit all contact with the mother had a sound and substantial basis in the record. The mother, by her own admission, violated the express terms of the Family Court's previous order, which only permitted visitation supervised by designated individuals, by having unsupervised contact with the child at two separate little league baseball games. Moreover, the mother contributed to certain events at a recent therapeutic visit which adversely affected the child and undermined the progress of the therapeutic visitation.
The Appellate Division pointed out that a court may not order that a parent undergo counseling or treatment as a condition of future visitation or re-application for visitation rights, but may only direct a party to submit to counseling or treatment as a component of visitation. Here, the Family Court improperly conditioned the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. However, the Family Court properly directed the mother to submit to a mental health evaluation for use in any future determination of visitation.
Family Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Article 8 Proceeding Where There Is No Intimate Relationship Between Parties
In Matter of Riedel v Vasquez, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600481 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Family Court which, without a hearing, granted Respondents motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 10, 2010, the petitioner commenced an Article 8 proceeding seeking an order of protection against Milagros Carranza Vasquez (respondent), who was the estranged wife of the petitioner's live-in boyfriend. The petitioner had two children with the boyfriend, and the respondent had one child with him. The petitioner alleged that she and the respondent, who did not reside together, had an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1). The Family Court, without a hearing, dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Appellate Division affirmed. It pointed out that the Family Court is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction, and "cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute" (Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 N.Y.3d 364). Pursuant to Family Court Act 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household". Members of the same family or household include, among others, "persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time" (Family Ct Act 812[1])(e). Expressly excluded from the ambit of "intimate relationship," are "casual acquaintance[s]" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts". Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis. Relevant factors include the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship. Here, the parties had no direct relationship and were only connected through a third party, who was the biological father of the parties' respective children. The parties never resided together and did not take care of each other's children. The respondent's contact with the petitioner and/or her children had been minimal. Given these undisputed facts, no hearing was required, as the Family Court possessed sufficient information to determine that the parties were not and never had been in an "intimate relationship" as defined by Family Court Act s 812(1)(e).
Family Court Lacked Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Order Where Neither the Child Nor the Father Maintained a Significant Connection with New York, and Substantial Evidence Regarding the Child's Present and Future Welfare Was No Longer Available in this State.
In Knight v Morgan, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600549 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the
the Family Court issued an order of custody on consent, on August 24, 2009, in connection with the father's petition seeking joint custody of the subject child with the mother, awarding joint legal custody to both parents, with primary residential custody to the father. Accordingly, the child, who was born in 2000, and had resided with his mother in New York since his birth, moved to California in September 2009 to live with his father. After moving to California with the father, the child was diagnosed by a psychologist in California with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and, possibly, a bipolar disorder. The child received treatment from healthcare providers in California, and was not permitted to travel until his condition was stabilized. The child had not returned to New York since moving to California. In December 2009 the mother filed a cross petition in the Family Court, to modify the prior order of custody so as to award her sole custody of the child, in which she alleged that the father had falsely accused her of abusing the child. In January 2010 the father separately cross-petitioned to modify the prior custody order so as to award him sole custody of the child. Subsequently, in May 2010, while both cross petitions were pending, the father moved, inter alia, to dismiss the mother's cross petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction, the Family Court granted that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the mother's cross petition on that ground. The Family Court did not address the father's separate cross petition.
The Appellate Division reversed. It held that the Family Court correctly determined that it lacked exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(1), since neither the child nor the father maintained a significant connection with New York, and substantial evidence regarding the child's present and future welfare was no longer available in this State (Domestic Relations Law 76-a[1][a]). However, the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear the mother's cross petition for modification pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(2) since it would have had jurisdiction for an initial child custody determination under Domestic Relations Law 76(1)(a). New York was the child's "home state" within the six months immediately preceding the commencement of this proceeding, and the mother continued to reside in this State. The matter was be remitted to the Family Court for further proceedings on the cross petitions.
New York Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Where it Is Not State in Which Child Lived for at Least Six Consecutive Months Before Commencement of Custody Proceeding
In Jablonsky-Urso v Urso, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600550 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division held that Family Court properly granted the father's motion to dismiss the mother’s petition for custody of the parties' son for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Domestic Relations Law 75-a (7) defines a child's home state as "the state in which a child lived with a parent ... for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding". Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, "[h]ome state jurisdiction is paramount and whether to accept jurisdiction is a home state prerogative" (Matter of Navarrete v. Wyatt, 52 A.D.3d at 836, 861 N.Y.S.2d 393). Here, the Family Court properly determined that New York was not the child's home state and, therefore, that New York did not have jurisdiction over this custody dispute (see Domestic Relations Law 76). However, it held that the Family Court erred in refusing to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over the family offense petition (see Domestic Relations Law 76-c) and in summarily dismissing the family offense petition upon its finding that the allegations contained in the mother's family offense petition were insufficient to sustain a family offense. The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court and the allegations asserted in a petition seeking the issuance of an order of protection must be supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The Family Court improperly determined that the mother failed to demonstrate that the father possessed the intent required to sustain any of the family offenses alleged in the petition, as it did so without the benefit of a hearing. Based on the foregoing, that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the family offense petition had to be denied and the matter remitted to the Family Court, for a fact-finding hearing and a determination of the family offense petition with respect to the allegations contained therein.
In Schiffer v Schiffer, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4790060 (N.Y.Sup.) plaintiff husband moved for an order directing that summary judgment be granted in his favor of divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). The defendant wife opposed the application and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The parties were married in Massachusetts on March 25, 1990 and had three unemancipated children of the marriage. On November 29, 2010, Mr. Schiffer commenced the action for divorce, claiming irretrievable breakdown of the marriage for a period of more than six months prior to the commencement of the action. On December 21, 2010, Mrs. Schiffer served her verified answer, contesting these allegations, specifically claiming that Mr. Schiffer's actions belied his claims that the marriage was irretrievably broken. The Supreme Court observed that Domestic Relations Law § 170 [7] allows parties to seek a judgment of divorce when "the relationship between the husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath" also provides that "no judgment of divorce shall be granted under this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the
payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or determined by the court and incorporated into this judgment of divorce".
The Supreme Court agreed with the wife’s argument that the husband was not entitled to summary judgment since no judgment of divorce can be made unless and until the economic and custodial issues are determined or resolved by the parties. The statute clearly states that a judgment may only be granted after economic and custodial issues were resolved. In this case, all of the conditions of the statute had not been met since the economic and custodial issues were yet to be addressed. Mr. Schiffer had failed to meet his prima facie burden, and his motion for summary judgment was denied.
Mrs. Schiffer's motion for summary judgment was also denied, but for a different reason. Supreme Court observed that in Strack v. Strack (31 Misc.3d 258 [Sup Ct, Essex County 2011] ), Justice Muller held that the "determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question to be determined by the finder of fact." This holding demonstrably agreed with fundamental concepts of due process and comported with similar interpretations of no-fault statutes from our sister states. Since the sole means of procuring a divorce in New York is by judicial process (N.Y. Const, art I, s 9), precluding a party from contesting a ground for divorce "must be regarded as the equivalent of denying [him or her] an opportunity to be heard ...and in the absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due process". A contrary finding would merely reduce the court to a rubber stamp whenever presented with an action for divorce under Domestic Relations Law 170 (7). While Mrs. Schiffer had established that the ancillary issues were not resolved and that her marriage to Mr. Schiffer had not broken down irretrievably, Mr. Schiffer raised a triable issue of fact that the marriage was irretrievably broken for at least six months. The proof bared by the parties sufficed to establish a true issue of fact as to whether this marriage was irretrievably broken, which the finder of fact would undoubtedly resolve after the other issues were resolved.
A Court May Not Delegate to a Parenting Coordinator the Authority to Resolve Issues Affecting the Best Interests of the Children
In Silbowitz v Silbowitz, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4599852 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Supreme Court which, in effect, granted the defendant former husband's motion to appoint a parenting coordinator to assist the parties in implementing the terms of their existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007. It observed that although a court may properly appoint a parenting coordinator to mediate between parties and oversee the implementation of their court-ordered parenting plan a court may not delegate to a parenting coordinator the authority to resolve issues affecting the best interests of the children. Here, despite the expansive scope of the issues entrusted to the parenting coordinator by the Supreme Court's order, his power was properly limited to implementing the terms of the existing child custody and visitation arrangement provided for in the parties' stipulation dated October 22, 2007, subject to the Supreme Court's oversight. Although the parenting coordinator was empowered to issue a written decision resolving a conflict where he was unable to broker an agreement between the parties, the Supreme Court's order also provided that the parties may seek to have the parenting coordinator's decision so-ordered by the Supreme Court and that they "retain their right to return to Court and seek a modification of their parenting plan at any time." Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly limited the role of the parenting coordinator and properly provided that his resolutions remained subject to court oversight.
The plaintiff also contended that the order insufficiently protected the confidential and privileged information of the parties and the children because it required the parties to execute authorizations and releases allowing the parenting coordinator to obtain information which was otherwise confidential or privileged. However, the order required that the parenting coordinator maintain the confidentiality of the information and when read as a whole, clearly limited his authority to request authorizations or releases and use information only in furtherance of his duty to mediate between the parties in the implementation of their parenting plan. Accordingly, no further limitation was necessary.
Supreme Court Properly Declined to Imply a Term Which the Parties Did Not Insert into Their Stipulation, for the Purpose of Determining the Contempt Motion. Court Has Discretion to Decide If it Will Consider New Argument in Reply Papers.
In Penavic v Penavic, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600442 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the the plaintiff moved, pursuant to Judiciary Law 756 to hold the defendant in civil contempt. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Divison affirmed. It held that to prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party charged with contempt willfully violated a clear and unequivocal mandate of a court's order, with knowledge of that order's terms, thereby prejudicing the movant's rights. Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying her motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to remove her name from a home equity line of credit ( HELOC) or closing it. While the plaintiff was aware of the HELOC at the time that she executed the stipulation, no provision was included in the stipulation requiring that her name be removed from it or that it be closed, even though the defendant was precluded from continuing to use the HELOC pursuant to the provision which prohibited him from incurring additional debt upon the plaintiff's credit. Since the terms of the stipulation with respect to whether the HELOC had to be closed were unambiguous, the Supreme Court properly declined to imply a term which the parties did not insert into the stipulation, for the purpose of determining the contempt motion. The plaintiff raised, for the first time in her reply papers, the argument that the defendant was also in contempt of the judgment by increasing the balance of the HELOC from $25,000, the amount of the balance at the time that the parties executed the stipulation, to $750,000, which he disclosed in his affidavit opposing the plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division held that it was within the Supreme Court's discretion to decide if it would consider this new argument. Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not address this provision in her motion papers and relied solely upon the provisions concerning the acknowledgment that the bills or accounts for the former marital residence were solely in the husband's individual name as the basis for her motion, Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion to disregard that argument in connection with the motion before it (citing Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, 52 AD3d 826, 827).
Authors Note: In Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, the Appellate Division said: “The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant, not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments or new grounds for the requested relief (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]). Further, Dawkins was not afforded an opportunity to address the new argument (see Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677 [2005]; Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v Pellegrini, 258 AD2d 658 [1999]).”
Court May Not Order a Parent Undergo Counseling or Treatment as a Condition of Future Visitation or Re-application for Visitation Rights but May Direct a Party to Submit to a Mental Health Evaluation for Use in Any Future Determination of Visitation.
In Matter of Smith ex rel Hunter v Dawn F.B., --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600469 (2d Dept 2011) Family Court granted the petition of the attorney for the child alleging that the mother violated an order of custody and visitation, prohibited her from having any contact with her son, directed that she submit to a mental health evaluation, directed her to follow treatment recommendations resulting from that evaluation,
and conditioned her application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional.
The Appellate Division modified the order by deleting the provision conditioning the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. It found that Family Court's determination that it was in the child's best interest to suspend supervised visitation and prohibit all contact with the mother had a sound and substantial basis in the record. The mother, by her own admission, violated the express terms of the Family Court's previous order, which only permitted visitation supervised by designated individuals, by having unsupervised contact with the child at two separate little league baseball games. Moreover, the mother contributed to certain events at a recent therapeutic visit which adversely affected the child and undermined the progress of the therapeutic visitation.
The Appellate Division pointed out that a court may not order that a parent undergo counseling or treatment as a condition of future visitation or re-application for visitation rights, but may only direct a party to submit to counseling or treatment as a component of visitation. Here, the Family Court improperly conditioned the mother's application for resumption of visitation upon her compliance with treatment, including medication, recommended by a mental health professional. However, the Family Court properly directed the mother to submit to a mental health evaluation for use in any future determination of visitation.
Family Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Article 8 Proceeding Where There Is No Intimate Relationship Between Parties
In Matter of Riedel v Vasquez, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600481 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), the Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Family Court which, without a hearing, granted Respondents motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 10, 2010, the petitioner commenced an Article 8 proceeding seeking an order of protection against Milagros Carranza Vasquez (respondent), who was the estranged wife of the petitioner's live-in boyfriend. The petitioner had two children with the boyfriend, and the respondent had one child with him. The petitioner alleged that she and the respondent, who did not reside together, had an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1). The Family Court, without a hearing, dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Appellate Division affirmed. It pointed out that the Family Court is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction, and "cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute" (Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 N.Y.3d 364). Pursuant to Family Court Act 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household". Members of the same family or household include, among others, "persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time" (Family Ct Act 812[1])(e). Expressly excluded from the ambit of "intimate relationship," are "casual acquaintance[s]" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts". Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis. Relevant factors include the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship. Here, the parties had no direct relationship and were only connected through a third party, who was the biological father of the parties' respective children. The parties never resided together and did not take care of each other's children. The respondent's contact with the petitioner and/or her children had been minimal. Given these undisputed facts, no hearing was required, as the Family Court possessed sufficient information to determine that the parties were not and never had been in an "intimate relationship" as defined by Family Court Act s 812(1)(e).
Family Court Lacked Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Order Where Neither the Child Nor the Father Maintained a Significant Connection with New York, and Substantial Evidence Regarding the Child's Present and Future Welfare Was No Longer Available in this State.
In Knight v Morgan, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600549 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the
the Family Court issued an order of custody on consent, on August 24, 2009, in connection with the father's petition seeking joint custody of the subject child with the mother, awarding joint legal custody to both parents, with primary residential custody to the father. Accordingly, the child, who was born in 2000, and had resided with his mother in New York since his birth, moved to California in September 2009 to live with his father. After moving to California with the father, the child was diagnosed by a psychologist in California with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and, possibly, a bipolar disorder. The child received treatment from healthcare providers in California, and was not permitted to travel until his condition was stabilized. The child had not returned to New York since moving to California. In December 2009 the mother filed a cross petition in the Family Court, to modify the prior order of custody so as to award her sole custody of the child, in which she alleged that the father had falsely accused her of abusing the child. In January 2010 the father separately cross-petitioned to modify the prior custody order so as to award him sole custody of the child. Subsequently, in May 2010, while both cross petitions were pending, the father moved, inter alia, to dismiss the mother's cross petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction, the Family Court granted that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the mother's cross petition on that ground. The Family Court did not address the father's separate cross petition.
The Appellate Division reversed. It held that the Family Court correctly determined that it lacked exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(1), since neither the child nor the father maintained a significant connection with New York, and substantial evidence regarding the child's present and future welfare was no longer available in this State (Domestic Relations Law 76-a[1][a]). However, the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear the mother's cross petition for modification pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-a(2) since it would have had jurisdiction for an initial child custody determination under Domestic Relations Law 76(1)(a). New York was the child's "home state" within the six months immediately preceding the commencement of this proceeding, and the mother continued to reside in this State. The matter was be remitted to the Family Court for further proceedings on the cross petitions.
New York Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Where it Is Not State in Which Child Lived for at Least Six Consecutive Months Before Commencement of Custody Proceeding
In Jablonsky-Urso v Urso, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 4600550 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division held that Family Court properly granted the father's motion to dismiss the mother’s petition for custody of the parties' son for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Domestic Relations Law 75-a (7) defines a child's home state as "the state in which a child lived with a parent ... for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding". Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, "[h]ome state jurisdiction is paramount and whether to accept jurisdiction is a home state prerogative" (Matter of Navarrete v. Wyatt, 52 A.D.3d at 836, 861 N.Y.S.2d 393). Here, the Family Court properly determined that New York was not the child's home state and, therefore, that New York did not have jurisdiction over this custody dispute (see Domestic Relations Law 76). However, it held that the Family Court erred in refusing to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over the family offense petition (see Domestic Relations Law 76-c) and in summarily dismissing the family offense petition upon its finding that the allegations contained in the mother's family offense petition were insufficient to sustain a family offense. The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court and the allegations asserted in a petition seeking the issuance of an order of protection must be supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The Family Court improperly determined that the mother failed to demonstrate that the father possessed the intent required to sustain any of the family offenses alleged in the petition, as it did so without the benefit of a hearing. Based on the foregoing, that branch of the father's motion which was to dismiss the family offense petition had to be denied and the matter remitted to the Family Court, for a fact-finding hearing and a determination of the family offense petition with respect to the allegations contained therein.
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