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New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook

The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook by Joel R. Brandes is available online in the print edition at the Bookbaby Bookstore and other bookstores. It is now available in Kindle ebook editions and epub ebook editions in our website bookstore. It is also available at Amazon Kindle, Barnes & Noble and Goodreads.

The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook was written for both the attorney who has never tried a matrimonial action and for the experienced litigator. It is a “how to” book for lawyers. This 836 page handbook focuses on the procedural and substantive law, as well as the law of evidence, that an attorney must have at his or her fingertips when trying a matrimonial action. It is intended to be an aid for preparing for a trial and as a reference for the procedure in offering and objecting to evidence during a trial. The handbook deals extensively with the testimonial and documentary evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof. There are thousands of suggested questions for the examination of witnesses at trial to establish each cause of action and requests for ancillary relief, as well as for the cross-examination of difficult witnesses. Table of Contents

Tuesday, September 23, 2008

Fifth Circuit Holds Ne Exeat Rights Are Not "Rights of Custody"

In Abbott v Abbott, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 4210541 (5th Cir. 2008) the Fifth Circuit held that ne exeat rights do not constitute "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention and affirmed the district court's judgment. Petitioner Timothy Abbott was a British citizen, and Respondent Jacquelyn Abbott was a U.S. citizen. The parties married in November 1992 in England, and their son was born in Hawaii in June 1995. Beginning in 2002, the parties and their son resided in La Serena, Chile. After the parties separated in March 2003, they litigated in the Chilean family courts. The mother was awarded custody, and the father was granted visitation rights. The Chilean courts entered four separate orders. The first, entered in January 2004, provided visitation rights to the father. The second, entered in November 2004, required the parties and their son to undergo private therapy, denied the father's request for custody rights, and granted all custodial rights to the mother. The third, entered in February 2005, expanded the father's visitation rights, including visitation for an entire month of summer vacation. On January 13, 2004, at the mother's request, the Chilean court entered a fourth order prohibiting the child's removal from Chile by either the father or the mother without their mutual consent (the "ne exeat order"). In August 2005, the mother removed the child from Chile without the father's consent. She and the child departed without notice in the midst of disputes over visitation and other issues. Motions were pending before the Chilean family court at the time of the child's removal, but the Chilean court had previously awarded all custody rights to the mother in its November 2004 order. The father located his son in Texas and then filed suit in the District Court and sought an order requiring that the child be returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention. The district court held a bench trial in February 2007. The mother conceded that she had violated both the Chilean family court's ne exeat order and a Chilean statute that required the father's authorization before the child could leave Chile. The father argued that the ne exeat order and the statutory ne exeat provision gave him "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The father also argued that Article 229 of the Chilean Civil Code afforded him certain "residual custodial rights," but the district court concluded that the statute clearly provides only for "access" or visitation rights (the right to "maintain a direct and regular relationship with the child"), not custody rights. See Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, No. 06-5614, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 15299, at *13-14 (2d Cir. July 18, 2008, amended July 22, 2008) (holding in Hague Convention case that Article 229 of the Chilean Civil Code addresses only visitation rights, not custody rights). The district court denied return of the child, finding that the child's removal from Chile did not constitute a breach of the father's "rights of custody" as defined by the Hague Convention. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that a Chilean statute concerning the departure of minors from Chile provides that if a non-custodial parent has visitation rights, that parent's authorization is required before the custodial parent can take the child out of the country (although a custodial parent may apply to the court for permission to remove the child for an authorized period of time). The Chilean statute concerning the departure of minors from Chile, according to the father's expert witness, provides in relevant part:“If the judge has entrusted custody to one of the parents or to a third party, the legitimate child may not leave except under authorization of the person to whom he has been entrusted. Once the court has decreed the obligation to allow visits pursuant to thepreceding article, authorization of the father or mother who has the right to visit a child shall also be required .... If the authorization cannot be granted or is denied without good reason by one of those who must give it by virtue of this article, it may be grantedby the Family Court Judge in the location where the minor resides. MINORS LAW 16,618 OF CHILE art. 49. The mother conceded that she violated the ne exeat order by unilaterally removing the parties' son. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly found that the Chilean statute "does not confer rights distinguishable in any significant way from those conferred by the Chilean court's ne exeat order." Abbott v. Abbott, 495 F.Supp.2d 635, 638 n. 3 (W.D.Tex.2007). Therefore, in its analysis, any rights accruing to the father under the ne exeat order was treated the same as rights accruing under the statutory ne exeat provision. The Fifth Circuit noted that three federal appellate courts have determined that ne exeat orders and statutory ne exeat provisions do not create "rights of custody" under the Hague Convention. See Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir.2003); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir.2002); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir.2000). One federal appellate court, however, has reached the opposite conclusion. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 719 (11th Cir.2004). The issue was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. It noted that in Croll, the custodial mother removed the parties' child from Hong Kong without the consent of the child's father in violation of a Hong Kong court's custody order. The Second Circuit considered whether a ne exeat clause in the custody order coupled with rights of access (visitation) conferred "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. Recognizing that it was the first federal appellate court to consider the issue, the Second Circuit engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the purpose and design of the Hague Convention, its wording, the intent of its drafters and the case law of other signatory states. The Croll court considered the ordinary meaning of the phrase "rights of custody" and determined that the Hague Convention referred to a bundle of rights relating to custody, such that possessing only one of the rights did not amount to having "rights of custody." The Fifth Circuit found that the Second Circuit's analysis was consistent with the emphasis the Hague Convention places on "the right to determine the child's place of residence" because a ne exeat veto right is only a partial power--in other words, only one of a bundle of residence-determining rights. The Croll court stated that this "single veto power, even if leveraged, falls short of conferring a joint right to determine the child's residence, particularly since an earlier clause in the custody order awards 'custody[,] care and control' solely to the mother." The mother had the right to choose where the child would live within Hong Kong, and the father had no control over her choice. Furthermore, although the father could refuse to consent to the child's removal from Hong Kong, he could not require that the child live in another country; thus, he had only a veto right over the child's removal from Hong Kong rather than an affirmative right to determine the child's residence. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have followed Croll, holding that ne exeat rights are not "rights of custody" under the Hague Convention. See Fawcett, 326 F.3d at 500; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 948. The Fifth Circuit also noted that the Eleventh Circuit had explicitly rejected Croll. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 719. The Furnes court determined that the custodial mother (who could determine where the child lived within Norway) and the non-custodial father (who could veto the child's removal from Norway) "each possessed elements of [the] place-of-residence right, which they exercised jointly." The Eleventh Circuit then held that a ne exeat right alone is sufficient to constitute a custody right: "We conclude that this ne exeat right grants [the father] a right of custody under the Hague Convention." The court explained, [E]ven if [the father's] ne exeat right is (we believe incorrectly) viewed as a mere "veto right" or limitation on [the mother's] right to determine [the child's] place of residence, we nevertheless believe that the ne exeat right under Norwegian law is a right of custody under the Convention .... [E]ven assuming arguendo that [the father] does not have the right to determine [the child's] place of residence, he has at the very least a veto right relating to the determination of her place of residence--that is, a right "relating to the care of the person" of [the child]. As such, the ne exeat right ... provides [the father] with a right of custody over [the child] as defined by the Hague Convention. The District Court found that although Ms. Abbott's removal of [the parties' son] violated and frustrated the Chilean court's order, so too would the removal of a child from a country in which any parent with rights of access resided. Mr. Abbott's right of access, however enhanced and protected by the ne exeat order, was simply not sufficient to create rights of custody that warrant the greater protection intended under the Hague Convention. This Court in no way condoned Ms. Abbott's action .... [The child's] residence in the United States obviously interferes with Mr. Abbott's visitation rights, as established by the Chilean court. However, the Hague Convention explicitly creates a different set of remedies for those parents whose rights of access are frustrated by the custodial parent's removal of a child .... Id. at 640-41 (citation and footnotes omitted). The district court denied return of the child, finding that the father did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his son's removal constituted a breach of "rights of custody" as defined by the Hague Convention. The Fifth Circuit noted that the ne exeat order prohibited either parent from removing the child from Chile without the consent of the other. The ne exeat order thus gave the father a veto right over his son's departure from Chile, but it did not give him any rights to determine where in Chile his child would live. Furthermore, the Chilean family court, in its second order, expressly denied the father's request for custody rights and awarded all custody rights to the mother. The Fifth Circuit found persuasive Croll's reasoning that the Hague Convention clearly distinguishes between "rights of custody" and "rights of access" and that ordering the return of a child in the absence of "rights of custody" in an effort to serve the overarching purposes of the Hague Convention would be an impermissible judicial amendment of the Convention. It held that ne exeat rights, even when coupled with "rights of access," do not constitute "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention.

Monday, September 15, 2008

Eighth Circuit Concludes Abstention Inappropriate in Hague Convention Cases.

In Barzilay v Barzilay, 536 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2008) Sagi and Tamar Barzilay were both Israeli citizens. They had three children, all of whom were Israeli citizens. None of the children lived in Israel for an extended period of time. In 2001 the family moved to Missouri from the Netherlands, and Tamar and the children lived there since that time. On January 6, 2005 a Missouri state court entered a divorce decree in accordance with an agreement reached by the parties. It established joint custody of the children. In the decree the parties agreed that upon the repatriation of one parent to Israel, the other parent would "forthwith" return to Israel with the minor children to live. On September 15, 2005 Sagi repatriated to Israel, but Tamar and the children remained in Missouri. In June 2006 Tamar took the children to Israel for a visit, intending to return to the United States on July 9, 2006. On July 3, 2006 Sagi filed an ex parte request for stay of exit of minors in the family court of K'far Saba, Israel and argued that Tamar had violated the Missouri court decree by failing to repatriate to Israel with the children. The parties entered into a consent agreement in which Tamar agreed to an interim international parenting agreement pending her repatriation to Israel consistent with the Missouri divorce decree and to repatriate to Israel with the children by August 1, 2009. The parties agreed, among other things, that Tamar's repatriation by the appointed date was an "irrevocable commitment" and that the "sole and only international authority in regards to the minors' immigration, repatriation and custody" was the court in K'far Saba. The consent agreement was formalized in a verdict of the Israeli court. Tamar testified in an affidavit submitted to the federal district court that she only signed the Israeli consent agreement so that she would be permitted to leave the country with the children and that she had no intention of complying with its terms. On December 3, 2006, Sagi sued Tamar in the Israeli court, on the grounds that she had not complied with the consent decree by refusing to permit the children to visit Israel as agreed upon in the consent agreement. On July 3, 2007, the Israeli court issued a judgment holding Tamar in contempt of court for failing to return the children to Israel for a visit as required under the agreement and ordered her to do so by July 10, 2007. She appealed, but the lower court was affirmed on November 26, 2007. Meanwhile on June 6, 2007, Tamar filed a petition in Missouri state court to modify the couple's divorce decree to restrict Sagi's visitation rights with the children and a month later she moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the Israeli judgment requiring her to send the children to Israel by July 10. Sagi entered an appearance for limited purpose in state court to challenge its jurisdiction, but at no time did he file a Hague petition there. On October 16, 2007, the state court issued an order denying Sagi's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to decline jurisdiction. In its two page order the court stated that "[t]he mere presence of the minor children on vacation in Israel is insufficient to establish a 'habitual presence' [under ICARA]." Sagi filed suit in the Eastern District of Missouri on October 18, 2007, seeking immediate access to the children and their return to Israel under ICARA.3(b). The district court abstained from hearing the case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971 to avoid interfering with a state court ruling on what it considered the merits of a Hague Convention claim.
The Eighth Circuit reversed. It pointed out that Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has articulated several abstention doctrines as exceptions to this rule, one of which is the Younger doctrine. In order for a federal court to abstain under the Younger doctrine there must be an ongoing state proceeding which implicates important state interests and which affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal issues. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Silverman I, 267 F.3d at 792. It noted that the Hague Convention requires that state court custody proceedings be stayed until the resolution of the Hague litigation. ("[T]he judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention.") Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir.2005). It is consistent with this purpose that it is the custody determination, not the Hague Convention Petition, that should be held in abeyance if proceedings are going forward in both state and federal courts." The pendency of state custody proceedings does not support Younger abstention in the Hague Convention context. Moreover, given that Sagi obtained a custody determination from an Israeli court and Tamar obtained a custody determination from a state court in this country, the federal district court was uniquely situated to adjudicate the question of whether Israel or Missouri was the habitual residence of the Barzilay children and whether they were wrongfully removed from that residence. Although the state clearly has an important interest in child custody matters, that interest has not been considered to be a significant factor in terms of abstention where ICARA is involved. See Yang, 416 F.3d at 204 ("It would make the Hague Convention and ICARA meaningless if a federal court abstained in a Hague Convention Petition because child custody was being disputed in state court."). The Court found that the state court proceedings did not afford Sagi an adequate opportunity to raise the Hague Convention issues. The controlling case in the Eighth Circuit was Silverman I, which concluded that abstention was inappropriate in Hague Convention cases. 267 F.3d at 792. The district court sought to distinguish Silverman I, citing the Third Circuit's decision in Yang which recognized situations in which the Hague Convention issues could be litigated in state court. The Eighth Circuit noted that it is the "petitioner [who] is free to choose between state or federal court." Yang, 416 F.3d at 203. Neither Tamar nor Sagi filed a Hague petition in state court. Tamar merely referenced the Hague Convention twice, in her motion to modify the divorce decree, and in her motion for a temporary restraining order. At no time did Tamar file a Hague petition in the Missouri court. She did not request the state court to make a habitual residence determination under the Hague Convention. She did not allege or ask the state court to rule that Sagi had wrongfully removed the children to Israel or wrongfully retained them there. Sagi's special appearance in Missouri was for the "limited purpose of opposing [the state court's] jurisdiction." Sagi restricted his state court arguments to jurisdictional issues. He never raised the Hague Convention before the state court except to contest its exercise of jurisdiction. Sagi never engaged in an argument in the state court on the merits of the Hague Convention considerations--habitual residence and wrongful removal. Rather, he informed the state court that he intended to file a Hague petition in federal district court to litigate the merits of the Hague issues in that forum. Because neither parent filed a Hague petition in state court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Hague Convention issues were not properly or fully raised in that proceeding. The parties did not litigate the merits of such issues, and any statement by the state court touching on an issue under the Hague Convention inquiry is not controlling. It is "the petitioner [who] is free to choose between state or federal court," Yang, 416 F.3d at 203, and in the absence of a Hague petition the state court proceeding did not present an adequate opportunity to litigate ICARA issues. It was therefore an abuse of discretion for the district court to abstain.

Good Faith Allegation of Abuse Cannot Be Held Against Accuser in Custody Proceedings

Domestic Relations Law § 240, subdivision 1 (a) was amended to provide that a good faith allegation of abuse cannot be held against the accuser in child custody proceedings. The amendment to the statute is intended to ensure that the accuser engaging in a good faith effort to protect or seek treatment for the child due to the child abuse or neglect cannot have these actions used against them when determining custody or visitation. If a parent makes a good faith allegation based on a reasonable belief which is supported by facts that the child is the victim of child abuse, child neglect, or the effects of domestic violence, and if that parent acts lawfully and in good faith in response to that reasonable belief to protect the child or seek treatment for the child, then that parent may not be deprived of custody, visitation or contact with the child, or restricted in custody, visitation or contact, based solely on that belief or the reasonable actions taken based on that belief. If an allegation that a child is abused is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court must consider such evidence of abuse in determining the visitation arrangement that is in the best interest of the child, and the court may not place a child in the custody of a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm to that child. Laws of 2008, Ch 538, effective September 4, 2008.