In Barzilay v Barzilay, 536 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2008) Sagi and Tamar Barzilay were both Israeli citizens. They had three children, all of whom were Israeli citizens. None of the children lived in Israel for an extended period of time. In 2001 the family moved to Missouri from the Netherlands, and Tamar and the children lived there since that time. On January 6, 2005 a Missouri state court entered a divorce decree in accordance with an agreement reached by the parties. It established joint custody of the children. In the decree the parties agreed that upon the repatriation of one parent to Israel, the other parent would "forthwith" return to Israel with the minor children to live. On September 15, 2005 Sagi repatriated to Israel, but Tamar and the children remained in Missouri. In June 2006 Tamar took the children to Israel for a visit, intending to return to the United States on July 9, 2006. On July 3, 2006 Sagi filed an ex parte request for stay of exit of minors in the family court of K'far Saba, Israel and argued that Tamar had violated the Missouri court decree by failing to repatriate to Israel with the children. The parties entered into a consent agreement in which Tamar agreed to an interim international parenting agreement pending her repatriation to Israel consistent with the Missouri divorce decree and to repatriate to Israel with the children by August 1, 2009. The parties agreed, among other things, that Tamar's repatriation by the appointed date was an "irrevocable commitment" and that the "sole and only international authority in regards to the minors' immigration, repatriation and custody" was the court in K'far Saba. The consent agreement was formalized in a verdict of the Israeli court. Tamar testified in an affidavit submitted to the federal district court that she only signed the Israeli consent agreement so that she would be permitted to leave the country with the children and that she had no intention of complying with its terms. On December 3, 2006, Sagi sued Tamar in the Israeli court, on the grounds that she had not complied with the consent decree by refusing to permit the children to visit Israel as agreed upon in the consent agreement. On July 3, 2007, the Israeli court issued a judgment holding Tamar in contempt of court for failing to return the children to Israel for a visit as required under the agreement and ordered her to do so by July 10, 2007. She appealed, but the lower court was affirmed on November 26, 2007. Meanwhile on June 6, 2007, Tamar filed a petition in Missouri state court to modify the couple's divorce decree to restrict Sagi's visitation rights with the children and a month later she moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the Israeli judgment requiring her to send the children to Israel by July 10. Sagi entered an appearance for limited purpose in state court to challenge its jurisdiction, but at no time did he file a Hague petition there. On October 16, 2007, the state court issued an order denying Sagi's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to decline jurisdiction. In its two page order the court stated that "[t]he mere presence of the minor children on vacation in Israel is insufficient to establish a 'habitual presence' [under ICARA]." Sagi filed suit in the Eastern District of Missouri on October 18, 2007, seeking immediate access to the children and their return to Israel under ICARA.3(b). The district court abstained from hearing the case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971 to avoid interfering with a state court ruling on what it considered the merits of a Hague Convention claim.
The Eighth Circuit reversed. It pointed out that Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has articulated several abstention doctrines as exceptions to this rule, one of which is the Younger doctrine. In order for a federal court to abstain under the Younger doctrine there must be an ongoing state proceeding which implicates important state interests and which affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal issues. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Silverman I, 267 F.3d at 792. It noted that the Hague Convention requires that state court custody proceedings be stayed until the resolution of the Hague litigation. ("[T]he judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention.") Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir.2005). It is consistent with this purpose that it is the custody determination, not the Hague Convention Petition, that should be held in abeyance if proceedings are going forward in both state and federal courts." The pendency of state custody proceedings does not support Younger abstention in the Hague Convention context. Moreover, given that Sagi obtained a custody determination from an Israeli court and Tamar obtained a custody determination from a state court in this country, the federal district court was uniquely situated to adjudicate the question of whether Israel or Missouri was the habitual residence of the Barzilay children and whether they were wrongfully removed from that residence. Although the state clearly has an important interest in child custody matters, that interest has not been considered to be a significant factor in terms of abstention where ICARA is involved. See Yang, 416 F.3d at 204 ("It would make the Hague Convention and ICARA meaningless if a federal court abstained in a Hague Convention Petition because child custody was being disputed in state court."). The Court found that the state court proceedings did not afford Sagi an adequate opportunity to raise the Hague Convention issues. The controlling case in the Eighth Circuit was Silverman I, which concluded that abstention was inappropriate in Hague Convention cases. 267 F.3d at 792. The district court sought to distinguish Silverman I, citing the Third Circuit's decision in Yang which recognized situations in which the Hague Convention issues could be litigated in state court. The Eighth Circuit noted that it is the "petitioner [who] is free to choose between state or federal court." Yang, 416 F.3d at 203. Neither Tamar nor Sagi filed a Hague petition in state court. Tamar merely referenced the Hague Convention twice, in her motion to modify the divorce decree, and in her motion for a temporary restraining order. At no time did Tamar file a Hague petition in the Missouri court. She did not request the state court to make a habitual residence determination under the Hague Convention. She did not allege or ask the state court to rule that Sagi had wrongfully removed the children to Israel or wrongfully retained them there. Sagi's special appearance in Missouri was for the "limited purpose of opposing [the state court's] jurisdiction." Sagi restricted his state court arguments to jurisdictional issues. He never raised the Hague Convention before the state court except to contest its exercise of jurisdiction. Sagi never engaged in an argument in the state court on the merits of the Hague Convention considerations--habitual residence and wrongful removal. Rather, he informed the state court that he intended to file a Hague petition in federal district court to litigate the merits of the Hague issues in that forum. Because neither parent filed a Hague petition in state court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Hague Convention issues were not properly or fully raised in that proceeding. The parties did not litigate the merits of such issues, and any statement by the state court touching on an issue under the Hague Convention inquiry is not controlling. It is "the petitioner [who] is free to choose between state or federal court," Yang, 416 F.3d at 203, and in the absence of a Hague petition the state court proceeding did not present an adequate opportunity to litigate ICARA issues. It was therefore an abuse of discretion for the district court to abstain.
Monday, September 15, 2008
Domestic Relations Law § 240, subdivision 1 (a) was amended to provide that a good faith allegation of abuse cannot be held against the accuser in child custody proceedings. The amendment to the statute is intended to ensure that the accuser engaging in a good faith effort to protect or seek treatment for the child due to the child abuse or neglect cannot have these actions used against them when determining custody or visitation. If a parent makes a good faith allegation based on a reasonable belief which is supported by facts that the child is the victim of child abuse, child neglect, or the effects of domestic violence, and if that parent acts lawfully and in good faith in response to that reasonable belief to protect the child or seek treatment for the child, then that parent may not be deprived of custody, visitation or contact with the child, or restricted in custody, visitation or contact, based solely on that belief or the reasonable actions taken based on that belief. If an allegation that a child is abused is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court must consider such evidence of abuse in determining the visitation arrangement that is in the best interest of the child, and the court may not place a child in the custody of a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm to that child. Laws of 2008, Ch 538, effective September 4, 2008.
Posted by Joel R. Brandes at 8:12 AM