Important New Decisions - February 26, 2012

Supreme Court Holds Once a Party Has Stated under Oath That the Marriage Has Been Irretrievably Broken for a Period of at Least Six Months, the Cause of Action for Divorce Has Been Established as a Matter of Law and There Is No Defense

In Townes v Coker, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 444054 (N.Y.Sup.) the parties were married on June 12, 1981 and had three emancipated children. On October 6, 2008, Wife commenced an action for divorce against Husband. In her verified reply the Wife consented to the entry of the Judgement of Divorce based on Husband's counterclaim for constructive abandonment. On March 23, 2009, the parties executed a Stipulation, "So-Ordered" by Hon. Anthony J. Falanga, wherein Wife agreed to discontinue the 2008 action so that Husband may commence his own action on the grounds of constructive abandonment. Pursuant to the terms of the March 23, 2009 Stipulation, on or about April 8, 2009, the Husband commenced an action for divorce based upon the grounds of constructive abandonment. (Action No. 1). The Wife served a Verified Answer consenting to a divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment. On or about March 21, 2011 the Husband made a motion seeking to discontinue Action No. 1. The Court denied Husband's motion. On or about February 15, 2011 the Wife commenced Action No. 2 and moved to consolidate Action No. 1 and Action No. 2 pursuant to CPLR 602 which the Court granted. The wife then moved Summary Judgment with respect to her cause of action alleged in Action No. 2, based upon the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage between the parties for at least six (6) months. The Wife's cause of action in Action No 2 was predicated upon the "no-fault" ground for divorce established in DRL 170(7), the irretrievable breakdown of the relationship of the parties. The Wife's Verified Complaint (Action No. 2) stated in relevant part: 11. The grounds for divorce are as follows: Irretrievable Breakdown of the Relationship (DRL Sec. 170(7)): The relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant has been broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six (6) months. In opposition to Wife's application for summary judgment as to grounds, the Husband categorically denied his Wife's claims that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature did not enact a defense to this cause of action and courts cannot employ statutory construction to enact an intent that the Legislature did not express. Thus, neither the Husband, nor the Court, may create a defense where it is clear that the Legislature intentionally declined to do so. See, Pajak v. Pajak, 56 N.Y.2d 394, 452 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1982). Since the Wife stated "under oath" that the marriage is irretrievably broken, there was no basis for directing a trial with regard to this action of action for divorce. DRL 170(7) states that a divorce may be granted where: (7) The relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath. Thus, once a party has stated under oath that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for a period of at least six months, the cause of action for divorce has been established as a matter of law. The Court declined to follow the holding in Strack v.. Strack, 31 Misc.3d 258, 916 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sup.Ct., Essex Cty., 2011), which held that a husband has the right to a trial on the "no fault" ground asserted by Wife. Also, see Schiffer v. Schiffer, 33 Misc.3d 795 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess Co., 2011). Supreme Court held that pursuant to DRL §170(7), once either party states under oath that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for at least six months, the grounds are no longer at issue and there is no right to a trial, by jury or otherwise. The entire purpose of the statute was to permit the Court to grant a divorce without requiring a trial. It noted that in AC v. DR, 32 Misc.3d 293, 305, 927 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup.Ct. Nassau Co., 2011), Justice Falanga stated the plaintiff's self-serving declaration about his or her state of mind is all that is required for the dissolution of a marriage on grounds that it is irretrievably broken. In the court's view, the Legislature did not intend nor is there a defense to DRL 170(7). Notwithstanding the foregoing and assuming arguendo, that the Husband was entitled to a defense regarding DRL 170(7), here the Husband's general denial of Wife's allegations that the marriage was broken down irretrievably was belied by his sworn statement in his Verified Complaint (Action No. 1) in which he stated: Continuing for a period of more than one (1) year immediately prior to the commencement of this action, defendant has continuously refused to have sexual relations with the plaintiff despite plaintiff's repeated requests to resume such relations. Based upon the Husband's sworn admission that his Wife has refused to have sexual relations with him for at least one (1) year despite his repeated request for same, it was difficult for this Court to imagine a better example of a irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship where one spouse continually refuses to have sexual relations with the other spouse for a period of at least one year. Here, the Husband was bound by his own sworn admission contained in his Verified Complaint, thereby eliminating any triable issues of fact for the Court to determine.



UCCJEA Requires Court to Communicate with Sister State Court Where Custody Actions Commenced in Two States

In Guzman v Guzman, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 401081 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) in November 2009, the mother commenced a proceeding, seeking to modify thecustody and visitation provisions of a 2008 Florida judgment of divorce, entered upon the parties' stipulation, which awarded the father primary residential custody of the child. Before any determination could be made in this proceeding, the father relocated with the child to Florida. Thereafter, on December 22, 2009, the Family Court issued a determination, in effect, dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and it advised the mother to seek relief in Florida. However, when the mother subsequently commenced a custody proceeding with respect to the child in Florida, the Florida court determined that Florida was an inconvenient forum and that New York was the more appropriate forum, and it stayed the custody proceeding commenced in the Florida court. The mother then moved in the Family Court, Queens County, to vacate the Family Court's determination dated December 22, 2009. Without consulting with the Florida court, the Family Court denied the motion in an order dated March 2, 2011. The Appellate Division held that under the circumstances of this case, the order dated March 2, 2011, had to be reversed, that branch of the mother's motion to vacate the determination dated December 22, 2009, granted, the petition reinstated, and the matter remitted to the Family Court, for further proceedings. At the time the mother commenced this modification proceeding in November 2009 the Family Court, Queens County, had jurisdiction over it pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §76-b, based on the fact that the parties and the child lived in New York, and none of them had resided in Florida for over a year. The child was enrolled in school in New York, her sister had resided in New York with the mother since 2007, the father had commenced a proceeding in New York to modify the custody provisions of the Florida judgment of divorce with respect to the sister, and the Family Court, Queens County, had obtained a forensic study of the parties for use in that proceeding. Therefore, the parties and the subject child had significant connections with this State, and it appeared that "substantial evidence [was] available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships" (Domestic Relations Law § 76[1][b][ii] ). Accordingly, New York had jurisdiction to modify the custody and visitation provisions of the parties' Florida judgment of divorce with respect to the subject child. Nonetheless, where custody proceedings relating to a child are pending in different states-in this case, New York and Florida-Domestic Relations Law § 76-e applies, and the courts of the two states must confer with each other. Since the Family Court made its initial determination, in effect, dismissing the petition in this proceeding, the father and the child apparently had resided in Florida. In view of these circumstances, upon remittal, the Family Court, Queens County, was directed to contact the Florida court so that the courts of the two states may confer with each other and determine which state was the more appropriate forum for the proceeding at this juncture.

　

important New Decisions - February 12, 2012

Child Support Cap Raised from $130,000 to $136,000

The "combined parental income amount" to be utilized in calculating child support orders has increased from $130,000 to $136,000 effective January 31, 2012. (See Child Support Worksheet (Form UD-8) revised January 2012). The amount of the "combined parental income" is established by Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (2) as the amount set forth in Social Services Law § 111-I (2) (b). Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (2) provides that the amount established shall be multiplied by the appropriate child support percentage and such amount shall be prorated in the same proportion as each parent's income is to the combined parental income. Social Services Law § 111-I (2)(b) provides that the 　$130,000 cap is increased automatically on January 31, 2012 and on January 31 every two years thereafter by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States department of labor bureau of labor statistics for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars. (See Bureau of Labor Statistics for its publications at http://www.bls.gov)



First Department Holds That Double Dipping Is Not Allowed Under Temporary Maintenance Guidelines
In Khaira v Khaira, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 371997 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.) the Appellate Division, in an opinion by Justice Saxe, considered the guidelines for awards of temporary spousal maintenance under Domestic Relations Law 236 (B)(5-a), particularly with regard to the circumstances in which the court may deviate from the guideline amount derived by formula (the presumptive award), and the procedures that must be undertaken to do so. The parties married on July 8, 2006. They had two sons, and the wife had a son from a previous marriage. In September of 2010, the husband voluntarily moved out of the marital residence, and in October 2010, the wife commenced the divorce proceeding. She moved for pendente lite support, asking for monthly maintenance of $11,500 and child support of $7,290, and a direction that the husband directly pay the carrying costs on the marital residence, child care expenses, and all health care expenses for the family.

The court observed that to determine temporary maintenance, the motion court had to apply Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(5-a), which had become effective on October 12, 2010. The court determined the presumptive award to be $11,500 per month, awarded the wife $13,870 in unallocated spousal and child support, tax deductible to the husband, and required the husband to directly pay to the lender the monthly mortgage payments on the marital residence in which the wife and the children continue to reside, and the health care insurance premiums and unreimbursed health care expenses for the family, including his stepson. It also directed the husband to pay the wife interim counsel fees of $42,000.

On appeal, the husband contended that the motion court awarded the wife an excessive sum because it failed to consider his actual, documented net monthly income and cash flow, and incorrectly calculated his annual income by including non-recurring earnings such as a one-time bonus, and illiquid, noncash equity compensation. He challenged the counsel fee award on the ground that the wife's mother guaranteed her counsel fee obligation, and counsel has been paid in full to date. He also challenged the directive that he pay the health care expenses of his stepson.

Justice Saxe observed that Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(5-a) reflects a substantial change in the Legislature's approach to temporary maintenance. The previous spousal maintenance provision gave the court great leeway, directing only in general terms that it order maintenance"in such amount as justice requires," considering the parties' standard of living during the marriage, the reasonable needs of the non-monied spouse and the monied spouse's ability to pay, and with regard to a list of factors such as the parties' respective earning capacities (former DRL 236[B][6] ). Courts applying that provision observed that pendente lite maintenance was awarded to "tide over the more needy party, not to determine the correct ultimate distribution and to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support and reasonable needs" The new provision, rather than aiming merely to "tide over" the non-monied spouse, creates a substantial presumptive entitlement. He noted that the motion court properly followed the initial procedures. It applied the $500,000 cap to the husband's income, and using $60,000 as the wife's income, based on the monthly payments she acknowledged receiving from her parents, performed the two calculations: for the first, it subtracted 20% of $60,000 ($12,000) from 30% of $500,000 ($150,000), arriving at $138,000; for the second, it calculated 40% of $560,000 ($224,000), then deducted $60,000, arriving at $164,000. It properly treated the lesser of these two calculations, $138,000, as the guideline amount. At that point, the court observed that the parties' 2008 joint income tax return reflected an adjusted gross income of $851,549, almost all from the husband's earnings at the investment firm the Blackstone Group, and that their 2009 tax return reflected an adjusted gross income of $1,063,426, also almost entirely from the husband's employment. However, it did not then proceed to explicitly discuss whether an additional amount of maintenance was warranted from the portion of the husband's income that exceeded the $500,000 cap, as required by 236(B)(5-a)(c)(2). Instead, the court next examined the wife's submitted monthly expense budget of approximately $21,267 and concluded that with the exception of claims for $1,000 for gifts and $225 for charitable contributions, the remainder ($20,041), which included $4,125 for the cost of a nanny, represented the wife's and the children's reasonable needs. In essence, the court simply ruled that the husband should pay the full amount of the wife's and the children's claimed needs, partly through his payment of the mortgage on the marital residence ($5,317) and the family's health care premiums and unreimbursed medical expenses ($855), and partly through monthly payments to the wife of $13,870. In other words, the court awarded the wife $20,041 in unallocated spousal and child support without setting out a calculation of appropriate child support and without discussing or even mentioning the factors in Domestic Relations Law 236[B][5-a][c][2] ).

In considering the husband's challenge to the award, the Court rejected his suggestion that his support obligation should have been calculated based solely on his base pay, without reference to his bonus, or that the court should have taken into consideration his net pay. The statute instructs the court to base the calculations on the payor's gross income as reported in his federal income tax return, and the motion court properly did exactly that, correctly treating the husband's bonuses as income and ignoring his reliance on his net income (which can be manipulated with deductions and deferred compensation). However, the motion court did not strictly comply with the requisites of Domestic Relations Law 236 (B)(5-a).

Justice Saxe observed that no language in either the new temporary maintenance provision or the CSSA specifically addresses whether the statutory formulas are intended to include the portion of the carrying costs of their residence attributable to the non-monied spouse and the children. The new law "does not factor in child support issues or payment of household expenses. In the absence of a specific reference to the carrying charges for the marital residence, the Court considered it reasonable and logical to view the formula adopted by the new maintenance provision as covering all the spouse's basic living expenses, including housing costs as well as the costs of food and clothing and other usual expenses. The Court believed that the new approach of calculating spousal support payments to the non-monied spouse by means of a formula is intended to arrive at the amount that will cover all the payee's presumptive reasonable expenses. By calculating the guideline amount and then simply adding the direct mortgage payment on top of that, the motion court awarded more than the amount reached by the formula, without providing the required explanation.

Justice Saxe indicated that it is possible that directing payment above and beyond the guideline amount may be appropriate in certain situations. For instance, the direct mortgage payment might be justifiable as additional support when the payor's income exceeds $500,000 and the applicable factors listed in Domestic Relations Law 236 (B)(5-a)(c)(2)(a) are taken into account; or, depending on the size of the mortgage payment, perhaps only part of it should be treated as the payee's housing costs, and the remainder should be treated as the upkeep of a marital investment. He suggested that perhaps there are other reasons why the guideline amount is unjust or inappropriate. "It may well be that in this case, consideration of the enumerated factors, such as the stark difference in the parties' current earning capacities, their standard of living during the marriage, and the need to pay for day care, would justify the motion court's direction that the husband pay as additional maintenance a specified portion of his income beyond the $500,000 cap."

Because the statute expressly requires the court to both make and explain that determination (DRL 236[B][5-a][c][2][b] ), the Appellate Division could not permit the award to remain as it stood. While the ultimate support award may well be appropriate, it must be appropriately supported and explained. The Court therefore modified so as to vacate the support award and remanded the matter for a reconsideration of the award in light of the directives of Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(5-a). It also vacated the portion of the order that placed responsibility on the husband for his stepson's health care insurance and unreimbursed health care expenses. There was no allegation that the stepson was a recipient of public assistance or that he was in danger of becoming a public charge, and no other legal rationale for imposing that obligation on the husband.

The Court upheld the award of counsel fees to the wife as the "less monied spouse" (Domestic Relations Law 237[a] ). Justice Saxe observed that the statute provides that "[p]ayment of any retainer fees to the attorney for the petitioning party shall not preclude any awards of fees and expenses to an applicant which would otherwise be allowed under this section"; the husband's argument that no award of fees was appropriate because the wife's mother paid her attorney's retainer fee failed to rebut the presumption in favor of the award.

Comment:

Counsel for the spouse paying temporary maintenance should request, in his opposing papers, that the temporary maintenance order contain a provision directed the spouse who is awarded temporary maintenance to pay the "carrying costs of the marital residence" . Without such a direction, the spouse receiving the temporary maintenance award will not be under any court ordered obligation to pay those expenses, even though the temporary maintenance award includes sums for their payment, and the credit rating of the payyor spouse may suffer or the mortgage may go into foreclosure..

Counsel for a spouse seeking temporary maintenance should to make sure, in preparing an application for temporary support, that the "presumptive award" will be enough to permit his client to pay the "carrying costs of the marital residence." The application for temporary maintenance should ask the court to specify what items are considered "carrying costs of the marital residence".

important New Decisions - February 12, 2012

Threat to Cancel Wedding Is Not Duress.

In Ramunno v Ramunno, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 266464 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.) Plaintiff commenced a action seeking a determination that the parties' Antenuptial Agreement was null and void on the grounds of , inter alia, duress. The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court property determined that defendant's threat to cancel the wedding unless plaintiff signed the agreement did not amount to duress (citing Colello v. Colello, 9 AD3d 855). The Appellate Division held that court erred, however, in sua sponte determining that plaintiff could not, prior to the marriage, waive her right to equitable distribution of defendant's pension (citing Strong v. Dubin, 75 AD3d 66, 72-73) or her right to maintenance (DRL 236[B][3][3] ), and modified the order accordingly.

Husband's Motion to Modify Divorce Judgment to Conform to Agreement Not Barred by the Doctrine of Laches, Although He Waited Eight Years to Make the Motion

In Markell v Markell--- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 234084 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) in a stipulation of settlement dated May 14, 2002, the plaintiff former wife and the defendant former husband agreed, inter alia, that the defendant would pay child support on the fifteenth day of each month, and that unreimbursed health care expenses for their children would be divided equally after the plaintiff paid the initial sum of $500 per child. The Supreme Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated December 10, 2002, which reflected this agreement. However, the judgment of divorce, which was entered on December 10, 2002, provided that the defendant was to pay child support on the first day of each month and two thirds of the children's unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff paid the initial $500 per child. On or about December 10, 2010, the defendant moved to modify the judgment of divorce to "accurately reflect the provisions of the December 10, 2002 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and [the] parties' May 14, 2002 Stipulation of Settlement." The Supreme Court denied the motion and, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination. The Supreme Court determined that the husband's motion to modify the judgment was barred by the doctrine of laches, in that he waited eight years to make the motion.
The Appellate Division modified the order made upon reargument. It observed that the doctrine of laches is an equitable doctrine which bars the enforcement of a right where there has been an unreasonable and inexcusable delay that results in prejudice to a party. The mere lapse of time without a showing of prejudice will not sustain a defense of laches. In addition, there must be a change in circumstances making it inequitable to grant the relief sought. Notably, prejudice may be established by a showing of injury, change of position, loss of evidence, or some other disadvantage resulting from the delay ( Skrodelis v. Norbergs, 272 A.D.2d at 316-317). In support of his motion, the defendant demonstrated that the subject provisions of the judgment were the result of a clerical error, as the parties had been adhering to the terms of the stipulation of settlement for approximately eight years, and that the plaintiff had only recently informed him at a Family Court proceeding that the judgment contained terms different from those in the stipulation of settlement and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In opposition, the plaintiff conceded that the parties had been complying with their stipulation of settlement since it was executed in May 2002. Since the parties had been operating under the terms of the stipulation of settlement for approximately eight years prior to the husband's motion, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances that would render inequitable the relief sought by the defendant. Further, the plaintiff failed to show that she would be prejudiced by a modification of the judgment to accurately reflect the provisions contained in the stipulation of settlement and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law .

Court Should Not Rely on New Statutory Formula in Domestic Relations Law 236(b)(5-a) in Actions Commenced Prior to its Effective Date
In Truglia v Truglia, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 233765 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division held that in determining an award of pendente lite maintenance, a court should not rely on the new statutory formula in Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(5-a) in actions, such as this one, commenced prior to its effective date (see Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 86 AD3d 684, 685). Here, however, the Supreme Court's award, while erroneously arrived at using the new statutory formula, was upheld in accordance with the prior standard under former Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(6)(a). The award of pendente lite maintenance reflected " 'an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse... with due regard for the preseparation standard of living.

Plaintiff Made Direct Contributions to the Business Established by Husband Prior to Parties Marriage by Serving as Company Bookkeeper for Approximately Seven Years
In Scher v Scher,--- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 233930 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the Appellate Division held that contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff was entitled to share in the appreciated value of Home Companion Services of New York, Inc., which the defendant incorporated approximately three years prior to the marriage. Separate property includes "property acquired before [the] marriage" (Domestic Relations Law 236[B] [1][d][1] ), such as the business interest in Home Companion Services in this case, as well as "the increase in value of [such] separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse" (Domestic Relations Law 236[B][1][d][3] ). In order for appreciation in the value of separate property to be deemed marital property subject to equitable distribution, the nontitled spouse must demonstrate the manner in which his or her contributions resulted in the increase in value and the amount of the increase which was attributable to his or her efforts. Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in finding that the plaintiff made no direct or indirect contributions to the appreciation of Home Companion Services which resulted in the increase in the value of the company. The evidence established that the plaintiff made direct contributions to the business by serving as the company bookkeeper for approximately seven years. The evidence further established that the defendant's active participation in expanding the business was aided and facilitated by the plaintiff's indirect contributions as homemaker and occasional caretaker of one of his children from a prior marriage. Moreover, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff committed "wasteful dissipation" of marital assets in her role as bookkeeper. The Appellate Divison held that in light of the plaintiff's direct and indirect contributions, the Supreme Court should have awarded her 20% of the appreciated value of Home Companion Services. As the parties stipulated that the appreciated value over the course of the marriage amounted to $1,146,000, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of $229,200.
Furthermore, contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff was entitled to an equitable share of the appreciated value of the marital residence over the course of the marriage, notwithstanding that the residence was the separate property of the defendant until March 2005, when the property was transferred to the plaintiff and defendant as tenants by the entirety. The increase in the value of separate property remains separate property except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse at which point the increase in value becomes marital property, in accordance with the rule that the definition of marital property is to be broadly construed, given the principle that a marriage is an economic partnership. The parties stipulated to a neutral appraisal which found that the marital residence had increased in value by $40,000 due to "active appreciation" in the form of physical improvements, and $300,000 due to "passive appreciation" in the form of "market forces, without regard to any improvements, except normal maintenance." Since the record established that the $340,000 in appreciation was attributable to the efforts of both parties, the plaintiff was entitled to share equitably in that increased value. Applying the plaintiff's 50% distributive share to the $340,000 in appreciation, she was entitled to an award of $170,000 for the appreciated value in the martial residence from the date of marriage. In light of the plaintiff's contributions, the Supreme Court should have awarded the parties equal shares in the increase in the value of the marital residence.
The Appellate Division found that Supreme Court erred in finding that the interest in Green Fields East Holding, LLC , which was held in the defendant's name, was the separate property of the defendant. Domestic Relations Law 236 defines "marital property" as "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held". Likewise, expenses incurred prior to the commencement of an action for a divorce are marital debt to be equally shared by the parties upon an offer of proof that they represent marital expenses. Where a party has paid the other party's share of what proves to be marital debt, reimbursement is required. As the interest in Green Fields was acquired during the marriage and before the commencement of the instant action, it was marital property. Likewise, a loan in the approximate amount of $239,000 which was taken out simultaneously, was marital debt. Since the defendant established that he paid the plaintiff's share of the marital debt by satisfying the loan, reimbursement was required. Taking the market value of the interest in Green Fields ($350,000), and applying the plaintiff's 50% distributive share thereto, she was entitled to an award of $55,500 after reimbursing the defendant the sum of $119,500 for satisfying her portion of the marital debt.
The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court erred in awarding the defendant a separate property credit in the amount of $32,719.59. Where separate property has been commingled with marital property, there is a presumption that the commingled funds constitute marital property. However, a party may overcome this presumption by presenting sufficient evidence that the source of the funds was separate property. Defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the source of the funds in the disputed profit-sharing plan account was separate property.
Considering the plaintiff's distributive award with respect to the marital residence and Home Companion Services and Green Fields, and in light of the plaintiff's direct and indirect contributions, an award of 10% of the value of the parties financial accounts, except a 529 college savings plan account, was equitable. It declined to disturb the provision of the judgment which directed that the defendant was to receive all the proceeds of the 529 college savings plan account.
In light of the distribution of the marital property and the plaintiff's own testimony regarding her expenses and earning capacity, the Appellate Division declined to disturb the Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to future maintenance payments and declined to disturb the Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to an award of an attorney's fee. In light of the substantial distributive award in favor of the plaintiff, she was capable of paying for her own attorney.

important New Decisions - February 12, 2012

Emergency Jurisdiction Continues Under UCCJEA for More than Three Years Where Family Court Not Satisfied With Steps to Protect Children Taken by Home State of New Mexico Court

In Matter of Bridget Y, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 6848352 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.), a 3-2 decison, the primary issue raised was whether Family Court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction over the children pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-c (3). The parents Kenneth M.Y. and Rita S., appealed from an order of fact-finding and disposition determining, following a fact-finding hearing, that their children were neglected and placing the children in the custody of petitioner Chautauqua County Department of Social Services (DSS), and from a corrected order that denied their motion to vacate the order of fact-finding and disposition in appeal No. 1. The parents contended in both appeals that Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because New Mexico was the home state of the children, the neglect took place in New Mexico, and the parents were neither domiciliaries of nor otherwise significantly connected to New York State. The majority opinion concluded that the court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-c (3) inasmuch as the children were imminent risk of harm, and concluded that both orders should be affirmed.
Respondent Kenneth M.Y. (father), the biological father of the children, married respondent Rita S. (stepmother), after the children's biological mother died in September 2001. The stepmother subsequently adopted the children. At some time between February 2007 and November 2007, the parents moved with the children from Pennsylvania to New Mexico. On August 7, 2008, the parents were arrested and were each charged with seven counts of child abuse with respect to the children. The charges stemmed from allegations that the parents left Kelly and Colleen, then 15 years old, and Michaela, then 12 years old, unsupervised in a bug-infested trailer miles away from the family residence, with limited supplies and inadequate food for a period of six to eight weeks. It was further alleged that the parents, as a form of discipline, had confined each of the children to their bedrooms or to the garage for days, weeks, or months at a time. While confined to the garage, the children received only water, bread, peanut butter and a sleeping bag, and they were permitted to use the bathroom once or twice a day.
As a result of the criminal charges, a Magistrate Court in New Mexico ordered the parents to avoid all contact with the children. In light of the no-contact order, on August 11, 2008 the parents placed the children in the care of their "maternal step-aunt and uncle", Robin S. and Paul S., who were respondents in appeal No. 2. Robin S. signed a "safety contract" with the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD), which stated that the parents voluntarily placed the children in the care of the aunt and uncle and that the parents were "still legally responsible for the [children's] well-being."Robin S. agreed to prohibit any contact between the parents and the children and to advise the Dona Ana County District Attorney's Office in the event that the parents attempted to remove the children from her care or otherwise to contact the children in any way. Robin S. transported the children to her home in Chautauqua County, New York.
By letter dated September 22, 2008, CYFD notified the parents that it had closed its file concerning the children. The letter further stated that "[t]he Department believes that the voluntary placement of the children with Robin S[.] was in the best interests of the children. However, [the parents] are free to make changes in that voluntary placement if they choose to as they remain the legal custodians of their children. The Department has no legal authority with respect to the children at this time. The safety contract between the Department and Robin S[.] was for placement purposes and does not prevent [the parents] from making changes to the children's placement."
According to the parents, they provided a copy of that letter to the aunt and uncle and notified them of their "intent to revoke the temporary placement of the minor children in their care and place the minor children with an appropriate guardian." The aunt and uncle refused to return the children, however, and instead filed a petition in Family Court seeking custody of the children. On October 1, 2008, the parents were indicted in New Mexico on six counts each of felony abuse of a child. On November 5, 2008, the parents filed a "Petition to Determine Custody Pursuant to the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act]" in District Court in New Mexico against the aunt and uncle. The petition alleged, that the parents had resided in New Mexico since February 2007, that New Mexico was the home state of the children, and that the parents had placed the children with the aunt and uncle on a temporary basis "until a more suitable placement could be made or until [the parents'] conditions of release were modified or disposed of so that the children could be reunited with them." By their petition, the parents sought to place the children in the care and custody of a different temporary guardian. The parents thus sought an order confirming that they are the legal guardians of the children, and appointing a temporary guardian for the minor children until the criminal charges against them were resolved or their conditions of release were modified.
Two days later, Family Court issued a temporary order of custody asserting temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-c and granting temporary custody of the children to the aunt and uncle. DSS thereafter commenced the neglect proceeding in Family Court by petition filed November 13, 2008, alleging that the parents had neglected each of the children. At a Family Court appearance on November 24, 2008, an attorney for the parents appeared for the limited purpose of contesting jurisdiction, asserting that the parents were residents of New Mexico, that the alleged neglect took place in New Mexico, and that the children remained residents of New Mexico. Family Court continued to assert temporary emergency jurisdiction over the matter.
On December 10, 2008, the New Mexico court issued an "Order Assuming Jurisdiction." The New Mexico court determined that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, i.e., the children, noting that the children had resided with the parents in New Mexico since February 2007 and expressly stating that New Mexico is the home state of the children. With respect to the merits, the New Mexico court ruled that the parents "remain the sole legal custodians of the minor children, which includes the right to decide the temporary placement of the minor children with an appropriate guardian of their choosing."According to the New Mexico court, the parents wished to nominate Jim L. and Angela L., residents of Ohio, as temporary guardians of the children. To that end, the New Mexico court ordered the parents to arrange for a home study of the Ohio guardians, and to pay for the cost of the home study. Finally, the New Mexico court ruled that "[t]he issue of permanent custody is hereby reserved pending resolution of the criminal charges. Following resolution of the criminal proceeding, the Court may appoint a guardian ad litem herein and may conduct in camera interviews of the minor children."
The parents sought to register the above New Mexico order in Family Court. At a December 15, 2008 appearance, Family Court indicated that it had some concerns relative to relinquishing jurisdiction to the New Mexico court. Specifically, the Family Court judge indicated that "[w]hat concerns me is, apparently, there is no neglect proceeding in the State of New Mexico. There are criminal proceedings against these parents, but for whatever reason, there was no neglect proceeding ... [W]ith criminal charges pending, and the children being the ones who would be put in the position of testifying, should there be a criminal trial, ... the children are left with no legal remedies. There hasn't even been a law guardian appointed ... for these children in the State of New Mexico. And the parents are given full authority to do whatever, and place these children wherever they so choose."
By order entered January 9, 2009, the New Mexico court approved the home study and ordered the immediate transfer of the children to the Ohio guardians. The New Mexico court reiterated that the parents "are the sole legal guardians of the minor children and maintain their constitutional right to management and control of their minor children," and approved "[t]he parents' selection of placement guardian for their minor children."In light of that order, the parents requested that Family Court issue an order (1) registering and enforcing the New Mexico order assuming jurisdiction; (2) dismissing the New York custody proceeding; (3) dismissing the New York neglect proceeding; (4) vacating the temporary order of custody; and (5) enforcing the New Mexico transfer order.
DSS thereafter sought an award of temporary custody of the children. In support thereof, DSS submitted an affidavit of a psychologist who had counseled each of the children. The psychologist averred that the children "have related very credible stories of child abuse and neglect," and that the parents demonstrated a "disturbing pattern of isolating these children from each other, from children their age, and from their mother's relatives."With respect to the proposed move to Ohio, the psychologist averred that "[a]ny change in placement for the [children] that is instigated by their father or adoptive mother carries the implicit message to these girls that they are still under the control of their father, and therefore still at risk for abuse and maltreatment ... Removing them from an emotionally secure family environment, the friends they have recently established, and a school environment which has been affirming for them, must be considered a further emotional deprivation for these girls, and a demonstration to the girls that they remain at risk of capricious, abusive and insensitive treatment by their father. Accordingly, by generating a constant state of anxiety and uncertainty for them, such a move would result in a perpetuation of the emotional abuse and deprivation that these children suffered under the care of their father and adoptive mother."
Family Court granted temporary custody of the children to DSS, concluding that the basis for asserting emergency jurisdiction continued to exist. Family Court explained that, "[w]hen there is a placement out of state in a situation where parents are facing criminal charges, and there is no underlying custody order, and no law guardian appointed for the children, ... then the children are left without protection, plain and simple." At the fact-finding hearing on the neglect petition, DSS introduced testimony from each of the children as well as from the maternal step-aunt, Robin S., and the children's psychologist, and Family Court received in evidence records from the New Mexico Police Department and financial records relative to the father. The parents failed to appear at the hearing and subsequently moved to dismiss the neglect proceeding for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
By the order in appeal No. 1, Family Court implicitly denied the parents' motion to dismiss the neglect proceeding by issuing an order of fact-finding and disposition, which determined that the parents neglected each of the four children, ordered that the children be placed in the custody of DSS, and adopted the permanency plan proposed by DSS. By the corrected order in appeal No. 2, Family Court, inter alia, denied the parents' motion to vacate the order of fact-finding and disposition. The Appellate Division initially agreed with the parents that, absent the exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction, Family Court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect proceeding. Pursuant to New York's version of the UCCJEA (Domestic Relations Law art 5-A), Domestic Relations Law 76(1) "is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state" (DRL 76[2] ). A "[ c]hild custody determination" is defined as "a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order" (DRL 75-a [3] ).
Here, the neglect proceeding commenced by DSS fell within the UCCJEA's expansive definition of a child custody proceeding (DRL 75-a [4] ). There was no question that New Mexico, not New York, was the home state of the children at the time of commencement of the neglect proceeding. New Mexico remained the home state of the children when the neglect proceeding was commenced in New York, and Family Court lacked jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. In addition, Domestic Relations Law 76-e states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in section [76-c] of this title[, i .e., temporary emergency jurisdiction], a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this title if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child[ren] has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this article...." Here, at the time of commencement of the neglect proceeding in New York, the parents had already commenced a custody proceeding in New Mexico. Thus, inasmuch as a custody proceeding was pending in the children's home state when the neglect petition was filed, New York was precluded from exercising jurisdiction except in an emergency.
The Majority concluded that Family Court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-c. In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 76(1), section 76-c provides that a New York court has "temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child[ren are] present in this state and the child[ren] ha [ve] been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child [ren], a sibling or parent of the child[ren]" ( DRL 76-c [1];). There was no question that the children were present in New York at all relevant times in which Family Court exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction. There must, in addition, be an emergency that is real and immediate, and of such a nature as to require [s]tate intervention to protect the child[ren] from imminent physical or emotional danger". The duration of an order rendered pursuant to temporary emergency jurisdiction depends upon whether there is an enforceable child custody determination or a child custody proceeding pending in a court with jurisdiction. Here, a child custody proceeding had been commenced in New Mexico when Family Court first asserted temporary emergency jurisdiction. Thus, Family Court's exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction was governed by DRL 76-c (3), which provides that "any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under sections [76] through [76-b] of this title. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires, provided, however, that where the child who is the subject of a child custody determination under this section is in imminent risk of harm, any order issued under this section shall remain in effect until a court of a state having jurisdiction under sections [76] through [76-b] of this title has taken steps to assure the protection of the child."
Family Court first exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction on November 7, 2008, when it issued a temporary order of custody in the proceeding commenced by the aunt and uncle. In the Majority’s view there was no question that an emergency existed at that point in time. On September 22, 2008, CYFD notified the parents' attorney that it had closed its file concerning the children and that the parents, as the "legal custodians of their children," were "free to make changes in th[eir] voluntary placement."Shortly thereafter, the parents sent the stepmother's father, who lived with them, to New York in an attempt to take the children to an undisclosed address in New Mexico. On November 5, 2008, the parents commenced a custody proceeding in New Mexico seeking, inter alia, to place the children in the care and custody of yet another temporary guardian. According to the aunt and uncle, the parents also made "a threat ... immediately before the [New Mexico] Grand Jury Proceedings where the children were told that they would be taken to an unknown location."The parents initially sought to appoint the father's office manager as temporary guardian for the children. They then nominated the Ohio guardians, allegedly "long time and close friends of the family," as the temporary guardians of the children. The children told their attorneys and Family Court that they had never met the Ohio guardians. We thus conclude that Family Court properly acted to protect the children from imminent danger, i.e., the likelihood of returning the children to the home at which the abuse and neglect occurred or to another guardian under the control of the parents. At that point in time, no New Mexico court had issued an order protecting the children, and CYFD-the New Mexico equivalent of DSS-had determined that it had "no legal authority with respect to the children."
The orders challenged on appeal, however, were issued after the parents had obtained two orders in New Mexico: (1) the December 10, 2008 order assuming jurisdiction, and (2) the January 9, 2009 order approving the home study and ordering the immediate transfer of the children. The propriety of Family Court's orders thus depended upon whether this case fell within the narrow exception set forth in Domestic Relations Law 76-c (3), which provides that, "where the child[ren] who [are] the subject of a child custody determination under this section [are] in imminent risk of harm, any order issued under this section shall remain in effect until a court [of the home state] has taken steps to assure the protection of the child[ren]." The Majority concluded that this case falls within that category.
With respect to the first of the two New Mexico orders issued before the orders challenged on appeal, the court noted that, despite the criminal charges, the substantial evidence of abuse and neglect, and the no-contact order, the New Mexico court allowed the parents to select new guardians for the children and ruled that it would not address the issue of permanent custody until after the criminal charges had been resolved. The order provided that the New Mexico court "may appoint a guardian ad litem herein and may conduct in camera interviews of the minor children" following resolution of the criminal proceeding. The order further provided that the parents "shall not in any manner communicate with the minor children or cause any third party or their agent to communicate in any manner with the minor children regarding this matter or the criminal matter " (emphasis added). The New Mexico court thus left open the possibility of communication or contact between the parents and the children on other subjects. Although the New Mexico court ordered the parents to "continue to abide by the no[-]contact order or any further order" issued in the criminal proceeding, the court noted that "[t]here is no other order limiting [their] parental rights to the minor children."With respect to the second of the two New Mexico orders, the New Mexico court, after reviewing a home study arranged and paid for by the parents, reiterated that the parents "maintain their constitutional right to management and control of their minor children," approved the parents' "selection of placement guardian[s] for their minor children," and ordered the immediate transfer of the children to the Ohio guardians. Thus, without any input from CYFD or any other agency charged with the protection of children, an attorney for the children, or the children themselves, the New Mexico court ordered that the children be transferred from family members to non-relatives who were strangers to them and who resided in a state with which they had no connection, all at the behest of the parents who had abused them.
The Majority found it particularly troubling that CYFD failed to commence an abuse or neglect proceeding against the parents and that the New Mexico court failed to appoint an attorney for the children to advocate on their behalf pursuant to New Mexico law. CYFD apparently failed to conduct the statutorily mandated investigation into the abuse and neglect allegations against the parents (see NM Stat Ann s 32A-4-4 [A] ), and the agency also failed either to recommend or to refuse to recommend the filing of an abuse or neglect petition against them ( sees 32A-4-4 [C] ). Instead, CYFD simply transferred the children to New York and closed its file, leaving the children's fate to the wishes of their alleged abusers. In addition, upon asserting jurisdiction over the case, the New Mexico court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem or attorney for the children to "represent and protect the best interests of the child[ren] in [the] court proceeding" (s 32A-1-4 [J]; see s 32A-4-10). The New Mexico court then proceeded to change the children's placement at the request of the parents without enabling the children to have a voice in the courtroom and without any consideration, let alone determination, of the children's best interests. The children's psychologist averred in an affidavit presented to Family Court that the parents displayed a "disturbing pattern of isolating these children from each other, from children their age, and from their mother's relatives," and he opined that moving the children to Ohio at the behest of the parents "would result in a perpetuation of the emotional abuse and deprivation that the[ ] children suffered under the care of their father and adoptive mother". The parents' actions in attempting to remove the children from their New
York placement constituted "a continuing pattern of abuse to isolate [the children] from family members," and she and the psychologist similarly concluded that the parents' actions communicated to the children that they remain under the
control of their abusers. In light of the above-described circumstances, including the absence of a neglect proceeding in New Mexico and the refusal of the New Mexico court to act to protect the children pending the resolution of the criminal charges against the parents, the Majority concluded that Family Court properly continued to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction of the children after the issuance of the two New Mexico orders. In their view, the children remained "in imminent risk of harm," namely, emotional abuse inflicted by the parents, and it appears from the record before us that New Mexico has not acted to "assure the protection of the child[ren]"
The parents further contended that, even if Family Court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction in the neglect proceeding, such jurisdiction did not permit Family Court to enter an order of disposition. The Majority rejected that contention. It stated: “Domestic Relations Law § 76-c (3), however, which is previously quoted herein and governs the instant case in light of the custody proceedings in New Mexico, contains no such provision. Thus, orders issued pursuant to section 76-c (3) are required to expire at a date certain unless the “imminent risk of harm” exception applies, in which case the order applies “until [the home state] has taken steps to assure the protection of the child.” Even assuming, arguendo, that the parents are correct, they concluded that Family Court was not thereby precluded from issuing the order of disposition in appeal No. 1. Although an order of fact-finding and disposition is a final order for purposes of appellate review (see Ocasio v Ocasio, 49 AD2d 801; see generally Matter of Gabriella UU., 83 AD3d 1306; Matter of Mitchell WW., 74 AD3d 1409, 1411-1412), it is not a final or permanent “child custody determination” (§ 76-c [2], [3] [emphasis added]). Rather, the order in appeal No. 1 here simply placed the children in the custody of DSS, scheduled a permanency hearing, and approved a proposed plan for the children. A placement with DSS is never intended to be a final or permanent custodial relationship. In cases such as this in which a child is placed with DSS pursuant to Family Court Act § 1055, the court retains continuous jurisdiction over the case (see § 1088), and the child’s placement is reviewed at permanency hearings conducted every six months (see § 1089 [a] [2], [3]). Such jurisdiction continues until the child is “discharged from placement” (§ 1088), i.e., until permanency is achieved Family Court “maintains complete continuing jurisdiction whenever a child has been placed outside his [or her] home. Accordingly, the case remains on the Court’s calendar — there is no final disposition until permanency has been ordered — and the Court may hear the matter upon motion at any time. There is no need or requirement to wait until the next scheduled hearing date”. The parents therefore may at any time petition for the return of their children and/or move to vacate or terminate the children’s placement with DSS. Thus, the order of fact-finding and disposition in appeal No. 1, which concerns placement rather than custody of the children, does not conflict with New Mexico’s order, which provides that the “issue of permanent custody is hereby reserved pending resolution of the criminal charges” against the parents. Upon resolution of the criminal charges or when the emergency abates, i.e., when the New Mexico court ensures that the children are not “in imminent risk of harm” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [3]), the children’s placement with DSS may be revisited and the issue of permanent custody addressed. Until then, the order of fact-finding and disposition simply maintains the status quo – placement in the custody of DSS – with periodic judicial review to assess any changed circumstances. Inasmuch as the order of fact-finding and disposition does not constitute a final custody determination, it cannot be said that Family Court exceeded the scope of its temporary emergency jurisdiction in issuing the order in appeal No. 1. “
Justice Smith dissented in part, only agreeing with the majority that the appeal must be dismissed with respect to the two older children because they were no longer under the age of 18 and voted to reversed in accordance with an opinion in which Judge Lindley concurred. They would reverse the orders on appeal insofar as they applied to the children under the age of 18 and grant the parents’ motion to dismiss the proceeding with respect to them for lack of jurisdiction. The dissent could not agree with the majority that Family Court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction over the subject children and could not agree that such an emergency existed here. The dissent pointed out that: ” The majority fails to note, however, that the latter order contained an order of protection prohibiting the parents from communicating with the children in any manner, including through third parties, regarding the custody case or the criminal proceedings. The New Mexico court also ordered the parents to attend a court- approved Parent Education Workshop, approved a home study of the Ohio family by a licensed social worker and, most importantly, ordered that the children shall not be removed from the care of that family, or from a 100-mile radius of the Ohio family’s residence without the prior approval of the New Mexico court. Consequently, there is no imminent risk that the parents will continue their alleged abuse of the children, and the majority’s conclusion that the New Mexico court acted “without any consideration, let alone determination, of the children’s best interests” is simply incorrect. The dissent also observed that: “Family Court has issued an order that was in conflict with an order of the children’s home state, and which had no provision for the eventual transfer of jurisdiction to the home state. Family Court thereby created a jurisdictional competition rather than eliminating such a competition, the latter of which is required by the UCCJEA.

Under the UCCJEA , which Controls Jurisdiction in Neglect Proceedings, Jurisdictional Facts must Be Demonstrated to the Court's Satisfaction 'In the First Instance' and Whatever May Occur after the Jurisdictional Question Is Determined Is Irrelevant to That Issue"

In Matter of Destiny EE, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 6820412 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) Respondent was the mother of two sons (born in 1997 and 2000) and a daughter (born in 2003). In 2001, petitioner commenced abuse and neglect proceedings against respondent and her husband arising out of the husband's sexual abuse of the older son; both sons were removed from their custody. Respondent subsequently consented to a finding of neglect based on, among other things, her admission that she should have known of the abuse. The husband absconded, and Family Court issued a warrant for his arrest, which was never executed. Following an inquest held in the husband's absence, Family Court determined that he had sexually abused the older son and had neglected both sons, and issued orders of protection as to both children; the order applicable to the older son extended until his 18th birthday. In July 2003, the sons were returned to respondent's custody. Petitioner continued to provide services and supervision until approximately June 2005, when the proceedings were closed. Respondent thereafter took the children to Wisconsin, where they lived for approximately 18 months before returning to New York. In June 2007, approximately one month after her return to New York, respondent filed a custody petition alleging that the younger son was visiting the husband in Mississippi, the husband was "doing drugs" and drinking, the husband's girlfriend had hit the younger son with a belt, and the husband had refused respondent's request to return him to her custody. On the day that this custody petition was filed, petitioner applied, pursuant to Family Ct Act 1022, for temporary removal of respondent's children on the ground that she had sent the younger son to visit the husband despite her knowledge of his sexual abuse of the older son. After a two-day hearing, the court found that it had jurisdiction, ordered the removal of the children, and placed them in petitioner's temporary custody. The court also vacated the 2001 warrant against the husband and issued a new warrant for his arrest. The younger son was thereafter returned to New York. Petitioner commenced neglect proceedings as to each of the children and, following respondent's admission that her actions constituted neglect, the court placed the children in petitioner's custody.
In 2009, petitioner commenced proceedings seeking termination of respondent's parental rights as to all three children. Respondent moved to dismiss the petitions and requested vacatur of the 2007 neglect determination and return of the children to her custody. Family Court denied the motion in its entirety, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
Respondent contended that dismissal and vacatur were required because Family Court lacked jurisdiction over the temporary removal and neglect proceedings under Domestic Relations Law article 5-A, known as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Appellate Division observed that the UCCJEA controlled as to jurisdiction here, as in all matters falling within the statutory definition of child custody proceedings (DRL 75-a [4]). Here, no jurisdiction other than New York had ever issued custody determinations affecting the subject children, nor had any applications for such determinations been made elsewhere. Therefore it found that Family Court properly determined that it had jurisdiction over the 2007 proceedings.
The Appellate Division observed that the UCCJEA establishes specific grounds as the basis for initial child custody jurisdiction, including, among others, that "this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state" (DRL 76[1][a] ). The home state is defined as "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding" (DRL 75-a [7] ). In certain circumstances, children do not have home states. Respondent's children did not have a home state when the temporary removal proceedings were commenced, as they did not live in Wisconsin immediately before the proceedings were commenced and had not yet lived in New York for the requisite six months (see DRL 75-a [7]). Although Wisconsin had been the children's home state within the previous six months, it did not have jurisdiction when the removal application was filed because no "parent or person acting as a parent" was residing there (DRL 76 [1][a]; see DRL 76[1][b]).
Respondent claimed that the family's stay in New York was intended to be a "temporary absence" (DRL 75-a [7]), that Wisconsin was still the children's home state, and that she was still a Wisconsin resident. However, the record did not support this claim. "Jurisdictional facts must be demonstrated to the court's satisfaction 'in the first instance' and whatever may occur after the jurisdictional question is determined is irrelevant to that issue" ( Gomez v. Gomez, 86 A.D.2d 594, 595 [1982],affd 56 N.Y.2d 746 [1982], quoting Vanneck v. Vanneck, 49 N.Y.2d at 608, 427 N.Y.S.2d 735, 404 N.E.2d 1278). The jurisdictional analysis here thus depended upon the facts presented to Family Court when petitioner filed the emergency removal application in June 2007.
At that time, the record included respondent's sworn statements in her custody petition providing New York addresses for herself and the younger son, alleging that the younger son had lived in New York since May 2007, seeking his return to New York, and giving no indication that either respondent's presence in New York or that of her children was temporary. Respondent and the older son also made several statements indicating that the family had relocated permanently to New York; among other things, respondent told petitioner's caseworkers that she sent the younger son to Mississippi in part to make it easier to get settled after the move, and the older son stated that the family had moved from Wisconsin because of conflict between respondent and the maternal grandmother. During the removal hearing, respondent made no claim that her stay in New York was temporary, nor did she produce any evidence of continued residence in Wisconsin such as a permanent address or an anticipated date of return. Accordingly, the record before Family Court fully supported a determination that neither respondent nor her children still resided in Wisconsin and that their presence in New York was not temporary . Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76(1)(b), a New York court may exercise jurisdiction, as pertinent here, when no court in another state has jurisdiction, the child and a parent have a "significant connection" with New York, and "substantial evidence is available in [New York] concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships."Such a connection exists only when "the forum in which the litigation is to proceed has optimum access to relevant evidence. Maximum rather than minimum contacts with the [s]tate are required" ( Vanneck v. Vanneck, 49 N.Y.2d at 610).
The Appellate Division found that the removal and neglect proceedings in this matter did not depend primarily upon information or contacts available in Wisconsin, but on the degree of risk posed to respondent's children by her decision to permit the younger son to visit the husband. New York was the only jurisdiction with pertinent information about the husband's previous abuse of the older son, respondent's knowledge of that abuse, and the related risk to her children. The prior proceedings took place in the same Family Court where the 2007 proceedings were commenced, extended over a four-year period, and resulted in determinations that the husband had abused the older son-then approximately four years old-by repeated acts of sodomy over an extended period of time, as well as respondent's admission that she knew or should have known of the abuse, and that her failure to protect the older son constituted neglect of both sons. A New York warrant for the husband's arrest was still outstanding at the time of the temporary removal application. At the removal hearing, respondent and the older son were represented by the same attorneys who had represented them throughout the prior proceedings. Petitioner was familiar with respondent and her children, as the sons were in its care between 2001 and 2003, and it had continued to provide supervision and services to the family over the next two years. As to contacts with New York, all three of respondent's children were born here and, except for the 18-month stay in Wisconsin, resided here throughout their lives. The children's previous foster family was still in contact with them; at the emergency removal hearing, respondent's counsel advised the court that the previous foster mother had come to court and was available to act as a resource. Moreover, the record indicated that the fathers of the older son and the daughter reside in New York, although it is unclear whether they had any significant involvement in the children's lives. Accordingly, both the "significant connections" and "substantial evidence" requirements were satisfied. New York was the jurisdiction with optimum access to evidence relevant to the determinations at issue, and Family Court properly exercised jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law 76(1)(b).
The Appellate Division observed that as an alternative basis for jurisdiction, Domestic Relations Law 76 (1)(d) provides that a New York court may exercise jurisdiction where, as here, "no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of [DRL 76(1) ]". Accordingly, it did not have to address whether New York's "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" as to the sons resulting from the prior proceedings was severed by respondent's relocation to Wisconsin (DRL 76-b [1]; see 28 USC 1738A [d])
The Appellate Division rejected respondent's contention that vacatur of the 2007 neglect finding was required based upon a recent determination by the Court of Appeals holding that an untreated sex offender's residence in the same home as his minor children, without more, is insufficient to establish an imminent danger to his
children or neglect by the mother in allowing him to reside there ( Matter of Afton C. [James C.], 17 N.Y.3d 1, 11 [2011] ). In that case, no evidence of actual danger to the children other than the sex offender designation was presented, but the Court of Appeals acknowledged that previous crimes against a child in an offender's care might be sufficient to establish such danger. In this case, the neglect finding against respondent was supported by evidence that the husband had sexually abused a child in his care, and by considerable additional evidence.